In DUSHYANT KURUWA and MONICA ARGUELLES, Plaintiffs, -v.- MILTON L. MEYERS, Defendant.;09 Civ. 4412 (GWG);UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ;2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122466; October 21, 2011, we a most unusual case of successful pro-se litigants. Even more so, the Court granted punitive damages agaisnt the attorney. In the opening paragraphs, we may see the reason.
"On April 12, 2011, after the Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, see Order, filed Mar. 2, 2011 (Docket # 40), the Court ordered the parties to submit a proposed joint pretrial order by May 6, 2011. Order, filed Apr. 12, 2011 (Docket # 43). The Court directed Meyers to supply his portion of the pre-trial order materials to plaintiffs by April 22, [*2] 2011. See id. ¶ 2. At Meyers’ request, this deadline was extended to April 27, 2011. Memorandum Order, filed Apr. 25, 2011 (Docket # 44). Meyers did not comply with this deadline but instead wrote a letter after the deadline seeking an extension sine die for medical reasons, which was granted. See Memorandum Order, filed May 6, 2011 (Docket # 47). By Order dated May 24, 2011, the Court gave Meyers an extension until June 15 to submit his pre trial order materials to plaintiffs. See Order, filed May 25, 2011 (Docket # 48). The Court extended this deadline to June 22. See Order, filed June 15, 2011 (Docket # 49). Meyers failed to meet this deadline, however, and has never asked that it be extended.
When the June 22 deadline was not met, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing Meyers to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his failure to supply his portion of the joint pre-trial order materials. See Order, filed June 29, 2011 (Docket # 50). Not only did Meyers fail to provide a reason to the Court as to why he should not be sanctioned, he failed to respond to the Order to Show Cause at all. Accordingly, the Court issued an order finding Meyers in default as a sanction [*3] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(vi). See Order, filed July 14, 2011 (Docket # 51)"
"Meyers is an attorney with an office in New York, NY. Compl. ¶ 4. Kuruwa is a citizen of India and his wife, Arguelles, is a citizen of Mexico. Id. ¶¶ 2,3. In August 2007, Kuruwa was hired "as a Project Engineer by the Turner Corporation." Id. ¶ 8. At the time he was hired, Kuruwa had an H1-B visa which authorized him to work in the United States. Id. ¶ 10. Kuruwa had obtained the H1-B visa in or around 1999 and it was set to expire on July 28, 2008. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. As the dependent of an H1-B visa recipient, Arguelles had an H-4 visa. Id. ¶ 17.
In September 2007, Kuruwa agreed that Meyers would process his visa paperwork to extend his stay past July 28, 2008. Id. ¶ 12. Meyers was aware that Kuruwa’s visa expired in 2008 and that he needed to act quickly. See Email from M. Meyers to R. Vigilante, dated Aug. 21, 2007 (annexed as Ex. 16 to Pl. Aff.). Kuruwa’s employer, Turner Corporation, agreed to sponsor Kuruwa for a green card application. Compl. ¶ 20. Meyers agreed to submit the green card application [*8] for Kuruwa. Id. ¶ 21. Meyers claimed to have filed the green card application, see id. ¶ 23; id. Ex. A, but in fact did not do so, id. ¶ 24. Nor did Meyers file for an extension of the H1-B visa before it expired. Id. ¶ 25. Kuruwa did not learn that his paperwork was not completed until March 7, 2009, when he was notified by the Department of Homeland Security that a petition to extend his B-2 status had been denied. Id. ¶ 26. Kuruwa also learned that someone, without his authorization, had filed a petition to change his status to "B1/B2 – business or tourist." Id. ¶ 27, 29.
Kuruwa and Arguelles departed from the United States in July 2009, though they later returned. The record on this motion does not explain how they returned or what their current immigration status is. The Court notes that they appeared at a court conference seeking to relieve their attorney on October 1, 2010."
"Meyers does not dispute the amount that Kuruwa asserts constitutes one-year’s salary at Turner Corporation.3 Instead, he argues that Kuruwa had a duty to mitigate his damages. Def. Aff. ¶ 4. Meyers is correct that under New York law a "harmed [*11] plaintiff must mitigate damages." Air Et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 494 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); accord Wilmot v. State, 32 N.Y.2d 164, 168 (1973) ("[T]he party seeking damages is under the duty to make a reasonable effort to avoid consequences of the act complained of.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the burden is on the defendant to introduce "evidence to prove that plaintiffs could have lessened their damages." Air Et Chaleur, S.A., 757 F.2d at 494 (citation omitted). A defendant must show that the plaintiff failed to mitigate, and that reasonable efforts "would have reduced the damages." Tatar v. Elite Gold, Inc., 2002 WL 31682391, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002) (citations omitted); accord Coastal Power Int’l Ltd. v. Transcont’l Capital Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 345, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted).
3 Kuruwa seeks $109,227 as one year’s salary. See Pl. Aff. at 9; Ex. 8A, 8B. While the total amount supported by the documentary evidence Kuruwa provides — including a promised bonus, a 15% locality adjustment, and a July 1, 2008 merit increase — would seem to support a slightly greater annual salary, we will accept Kuruwa’s figure.
Despite [*12] having the burden to show the failure to mitigate, Meyers has provided no evidence on this point. He merely states his own belief — the foundation of which is not revealed — that "while markets and construction were depressed here that apparently was not the case in India." Def. Aff. ¶ 4. This vague and unsupported statement is insufficient to show that Kuruwa failed to mitigate damages. Accordingly, Kuruwa is entitled to damages of $109,227, or one year’s salary, as Kuruwa requests. See Pl. Aff. at 9; Ex. 8A, 8B.
In addition, Meyers’ failure to inform plaintiffs that their visas had expired led them to incur costs in arranging for a voluntary departure from the United States. See Pl. Aff. at 13. In order to avoid being subject to a mandatory ten-year ineligibility period, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), plaintiffs voluntarily departed the United States on July 18, 2009. Pl. Aff. at 13, Ex. 11D. As it was Meyers’ failure to file the necessary paperwork and inform plaintiffs of their illegal status that led to their voluntary departure, Kuruwa is entitled to the expenses related to arranging for and effectuating the voluntary departure, or $6,808. See Pl. Aff. 13; Ex. 11A-G."
"Punitive damages are available where the plaintiff demonstrates "conduct that was directed to the [*17] general public or that evinced the requisite ‘high degree of moral turpitude’ or ‘wanton dishonesty.’" Williams v. Coppola, 23 A.D.3d 1012, 1013 (4th Dep’t 2005) leave dismissed 7 N.Y.3d 741 (2006) (quoting Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 405 (1961)). The Court believes the standard of "wanton dishonesty" has been met in that it is alleged that Meyers was dishonest in asserting that he had filed a green card application on Kuruwa’s behalf. Accordingly, the Court in its discretion awards $25,000 in punitive damages to Kuruwa and $5,000 in punitive damages to Arguelles."