in  MCCLUSKEY -v.- NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN, GABOR & GABOR, DAVID GABOR, HOPE GABOR, Defendants-Appellees we see a pro-se litigant’s swipe at the NYS Court system, and his former attorneys. This Federal case takes place after plaintiff lost a legal malpractice case against the same defendant-attorneys.

You may not sue the State successfully for claimed mistakes of a judge. "The district court correctly dismissed the claims against the State Defendants. First, the claims against the State Defendants are based solely on judicial acts preformed by judges in their judicial capacity. Hence, the claims against Chief Judge Lippman are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009). In addition, McCluskey’s claims for injunctive relief against Judge Lippman are barred by statutory judicial immunity because McCluskey did not allege that "a declaratory decree was violated" or that "declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999).

Second, the claims against the Unified Court System are barred by the Eleventh Amendment since it is an arm of the State of New York. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) ("This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought."); see also N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 1 (creating the unified court system); In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[The Eleventh Amendment] jurisdictional bar also immunizes a state entity that is an arm of [*6] the State.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Zuckerman v. App. Div., Second Dep’t, 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that the Appellate Division was not a person under § 1983). In addition, there is no evidence suggesting any waiver of sovereign immunity. See Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 684, 102 S. Ct. 3304, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (1982) ("A suit generally may not be maintained directly against the State itself, or against an agency or department of the State, unless the State has waived its sovereign immunity.")."

The claim against the attorney failed too: "Likewise, the district court correctly dismissed the claims against the Gabor defendants. First, private actors are not proper § 1983 defendants when they do not act under color of state law. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, 119 S. Ct. 977, 143 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1999) (explaining that § 1983 actions do not reach purely private conduct). "[A] private actor acts under color of state law when the private actor is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). A "conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert with a state actor [*7] does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the private entity." Id.

McCluskey contends that Gabor acted "jointly" with the Appellate Division by moving to dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, a motion which the Appellate Division granted. This claim is meritless, see Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 324, especially as McCluskey concedes that state law permitted Gabor to move to dismiss the appeal, and the Appellate Division had "no choice but to apply the reargument procedural rule uniformly."

Second, to the extent that McCluskey asked the district court to review state court rulings in favor of Gabor, his complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. V. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005). As the district court correctly concluded, McCluskey’s allegations against Gabor largely reiterate the claims made in the original state court malpractice proceedings, [*8] claims that were dismissed on the merits."