One of the four elements in legal malpractice is “ascertainable damages.”  They are more easily provable in some settings than in others.  Custody and matrimonial economic damages are very hard to demonstrate, as Miazga v Assaf  2016 NY Slip Op 01025  Decided on February 11, 2016
Appellate Division, Third Department shows us.

“Plaintiff retained defendants in January 2011 to represent him in a custody proceeding and, thereafter, in a divorce action. In April 2012, after a breakdown in the parties’ relationship, defendant Michael D. Assaf requested that defendants be relieved as plaintiff’s counsel and, after a hearing, the application to withdraw was granted. Plaintiff proceeded pro se in his divorce action and custody proceeding and, thereafter, commenced this action against defendants. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges, among other things, nine causes of action with respect to defendants’ representation, including, among other things, breach of a fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, defamation and breach of contract. Defendants asserted a counterclaim for, among other things, unpaid legal fees. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, which plaintiff opposed. Plaintiff also cross-moved seeking partial judgment on the issue of liability for the disclosure of an allegedly privileged confidential email, among other things. Supreme Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claims of legal malpractice and breach of a fiduciary duty, [*2]fraud, defamation and failure to communicate, but denied the motion regarding plaintiff’s breach of contract claim with respect to defendants’ billing rates. Supreme Court also denied plaintiff’s cross motion. Plaintiff then moved to reargue and/or renew, in addition to moving for Supreme Court’s recusal. Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s motion, adhering to its original order. Plaintiff now appeals from both orders,[FN1] and defendants cross-appeal from that part of Supreme Court’s order as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint [FN2]. We affirm both orders.”

“Here, defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that plaintiff was unable to prove actual and ascertainable damages relating to Assaf’s representation. Specifically, in the affirmation in support of the motion for summary judgment, defense counsel points out that, despite repeated requests, plaintiff never produced evidence supporting the damages that he specified in his bill of particulars and, therefore, failed to show that any such losses occurred. As such, we agree that defendants carried their burden of producing competent evidence sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact. For his part, plaintiff claims that he incurred damages including, but not limited to, $55,000 in fees to defendants, payment of experts, $20,000 in expenses, an unspecified amount of lost income and the amount of money “expended to overcome [defendants’] actions.” However, absent any proof of same in the record, these statements remain speculative assertions, which are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment (see Place v Grand Union Co., 184 AD2d 817, 817 [1992])[FN5]. Thus, plaintiff failed to meet his shifted burden.

Further, setting aside plaintiff’s inability to raise an issue of fact with respect to the element of damages, summary judgment remains an appropriate remedy here inasmuch as plaintiff is also unable to sufficiently demonstrate that he would have been successful on the merits of his underlying action. In support of his opposition, plaintiff provided an affirmation by an expert, who stated that it is “arguable” that the custody matter would have been resolved more quickly had depositions occurred earlier. However, the expert could not state that plaintiff would have been ultimately successful. Thus, because plaintiff failed to produce evidence suggesting that, but for Assaf’s actions or inaction, the underlying matrimonial litigation would have resulted in a more favorable outcome (see Marchell v Littman, 107 AD3d 1082, 1084 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 856 [2013]; Sevey v Friedlander, 83 AD3d at 1227), Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim.

 

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Andrew Lavoott Bluestone

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened…

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened his private law office and took his first legal malpractice case.

Since 1989, Bluestone has become a leader in the New York Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice bar, handling a wide array of plaintiff’s legal malpractice cases arising from catastrophic personal injury, contracts, patents, commercial litigation, securities, matrimonial and custody issues, medical malpractice, insurance, product liability, real estate, landlord-tenant, foreclosures and has defended attorneys in a limited number of legal malpractice cases.

Bluestone also took an academic role in field, publishing the New York Attorney Malpractice Report from 2002-2004.  He started the “New York Attorney Malpractice Blog” in 2004, where he has published more than 4500 entries.

Mr. Bluestone has written 38 scholarly peer-reviewed articles concerning legal malpractice, many in the Outside Counsel column of the New York Law Journal. He has appeared as an Expert witness in multiple legal malpractice litigations.

Mr. Bluestone is an adjunct professor of law at St. John’s University College of Law, teaching Legal Malpractice.  Mr. Bluestone has argued legal malpractice cases in the Second Circuit, in the New York State Court of Appeals, each of the four New York Appellate Divisions, in all four of  the U.S. District Courts of New York and in Supreme Courts all over the state.  He has also been admitted pro haec vice in the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida and was formally admitted to the US District Court of Connecticut and to its Bankruptcy Court all for legal malpractice matters. He has been retained by U.S. Trustees in legal malpractice cases from Bankruptcy Courts, and has represented municipalities, insurance companies, hedge funds, communications companies and international manufacturing firms. Mr. Bluestone regularly lectures in CLEs on legal malpractice.

Based upon his professional experience Bluestone was named a Diplomate and was Board Certified by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys in 2008 in Legal Malpractice. He remains Board Certified.  He was admitted to The Best Lawyers in America from 2012-2019.  He has been featured in Who’s Who in Law since 1993.

In the last years, Mr. Bluestone has been featured for two particularly noteworthy legal malpractice cases.  The first was a settlement of an $11.9 million dollar default legal malpractice case of Yeo v. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman which was reported in the NYLJ on August 15, 2016. Most recently, Mr. Bluestone obtained a rare plaintiff’s verdict in a legal malpractice case on behalf of the City of White Plains v. Joseph Maria, reported in the NYLJ on February 14, 2017. It was the sole legal malpractice jury verdict in the State of New York for 2017.

Bluestone has been at the forefront of the development of legal malpractice principles and has contributed case law decisions, writing and lecturing which have been recognized by his peers.  He is regularly mentioned in academic writing, and his past cases are often cited in current legal malpractice decisions. He is recognized for his ample writings on Judiciary Law § 487, a 850 year old statute deriving from England which relates to attorney deceit.