From time to time the appellate divisions decide cases and introduce “stray” or previously unstated standards. Whether this is merely a “restatement” of a previously enunciated standard of when the 487 claim may be brought in a new proceeding versus when it must be brought in the underlying proceedings is up in the air. Previously, it appeared that the standard was whether the 487 claim attempted to undo a judgment or decision in the underlying case as against trying to obtain damages from the law firm because of its deceit in the underlying case. Nevertheless, Little Rest Twelve, Inc. v Zajic 2016 NY Slip Op 01767 Decided on March 15, 2016 Appellate Division, First Department uses new and untested language.
“Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy S. Friedman, J.), entered December 11, 2014, which, to the extent appealed from, granted third-party defendants’ motion to dismiss the third-party complaint with prejudice, and declined to disqualify third-party defendants as plaintiff’s counsel, unanimously modified, on the law, to make the dismissal without prejudice, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
As discussed below, the motion to dismiss the third-party complaint was correctly granted. However, since it is based on a failure to state a cause of action, the dismissal should be without prejudice to apply upon a proper showing for leave to plead again (Morpheus Capital Advisors LLC v USB AG, 105 AD3d 145, 154 [1st Dept 2013], revd on other grounds 23 NY3d 528 [2014]).
Third-party plaintiffs fail to allege a duty owed them by third-party defendants that would support a claim for contribution or indemnification (see Raquet v Braun, 90 NY2d 177, 183 [1997]; Garrett v Holiday Inns, 86 AD2d 469, 471 [4th Dept 1982], mod on other grounds 58 NY2d 253 [1983]).
In support of the claim alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487, the third-party complaint contains no nonconclusory allegations that the alleged misconduct was “merely a means to the accomplishment of a larger fraudulent scheme” (Newin Corp. v Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 37 NY2d 211, 217 [1975]) “greater in scope than the issues determined in the prior proceeding” (Specialized Indus. Servs. Corp. v Carter, 68 AD3d 750, 752 [2d Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, the claim is not properly asserted in this action but would be appropriately raised in the still pending underlying action, where the alleged [*2]misconduct occurred (see Seldon v Spinnell, 95 AD3d 779 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 857 [2013]; Melnitzky v Owen, 19 AD3d 201 [1st Dept 2005]).”