Continuing our review of JL 487 cases from 2016 we come across the ironic gem of a JL 487 case which ends in plaintiff’s attorney being sanctioned for bringing a case which (in essence) seeks a sanction for deceit.

Lawrence Ripak Co., Inc. v Gdanski  2016 NY Slip Op 06805 [143 AD3d 862]  October 19, 2016  Appellate Division, Second Department:

“The Supreme Court correctly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in this action to recover damages for attorney misconduct pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487. The defendant demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that he did not “commit deceit or collusion” upon the court or any party (Judiciary Law § 487 [1]; see Tenore v Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., 121 AD3d 775 [2014]; Pui Sang Lai v Shuk Yim Lau, 50 AD3d 758 [2008]; Knecht v Tusa, 15 AD3d 626 [2005]; O’Connell v Kerson, 291 AD2d 386 [2002]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and to impose sanctions upon the plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. The court correctly concluded that the lawsuit against the defendant was “completely without merit in the law,” and that it was “undertaken primarily to . . . harass or maliciously injure another” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [1], [2]). Under such circumstances, the plaintiff’s commencement and maintenance of the lawsuit constituted sanctionable “frivolous conduct” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]; see Miller v Cruise Fantasies, Ltd., 74 AD3d 919 [2010]; Astrada v Archer, 71 AD3d 803, 806 [2010]; Kamen v Diaz-Kamen, 40 AD3d 937, 938 [2007]).”