Often, a Judiciary Law § 487 claim is mentioned, or even discussed, but not resolved in a case. Gerard v Cahill 2017 NY Slip Op 02779 Decided on April 12, 2017 Appellate Division, Second Department is such an example. A real estate dispute with overtones of fraud, there is a 487 claim. Was it decided?
“In an action, inter alia, in effect, for a judgment declaring the rights and obligations of the parties under an operating agreement of a limited liability company and to recover damages for fraud (Action No. 1), and a related action, inter alia, to recover damages for conversion (Action No. 2), which were joined for trial, (1) Catherine Cahill, as executrix of the estate of Marvin Hyman, a defendant in Action No. 1, appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Baisley, Jr., J.), dated May 20, 2014, as, upon a decision of the same court dated April 21, 2014, made after a nonjury trial, declared that she is required to restore the sum of $1,045,400 to the account of Buckskill Farm, LLC, a plaintiff in Action No. 1, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of the same judgment as failed to award them treble damages for an alleged violation of Judiciary Law § 487, and (2) Catherine Cahill, individually, the defendant in Action No. 2, appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the same court, also dated May 20, 2014, as, upon the decision, is in favor of Buckskill Farm, LLC, a plaintiff in Action No. 2 and against her in the principal sum of $1,045,400.”
“”Where the trial court’s findings of fact rest in large measure on considerations relating to the credibility of witnesses, deference is owed to the trial court’s credibility determinations” (Bennett v Atomic Prods. Corp., 132 AD3d 928, 930; see Neiss v Fried, 127 AD3d 1044, 1045). Here, contrary to Cahill’s contention, the Supreme Court’s determination that Hyman agreed to allow Buckskill to redeem his interest in the company for the sum of $850,000, or one lot, if the subject property was sold to the Town, was warranted by the facts. The court specifically found that Cahill’s testimony was not credible, and there is no basis to disturb the court’s determinations (see Lawson-Groome v Smalls, 144 AD3d 633, 634; Pappas v Liapes, 138 AD3d 943, 944).
The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit.”