The Court Giveth and the Appellate Division Taketh
In the past several years we've been given unprecedented access to court records. No more is it necessary to travel to the courthouse to review a file, nor must we wait for the clerk to mail (or not mail) a decision. However, access to written decisions is not universal. in Bullfrog, LLC v Nolan
2013 NY Slip Op 00168 Decided on January 16, 2013 Appellate Division, Second Department
we are able to read the AD decision, but the Supreme Court decision is not on-line. While we can look and see the date it was decided, and the type of motion which was decided, no scan of the decision is available, so we cannot say what the Supreme Court judge saw that the Appellate Division differed with.
"An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after the accrual of the cause of action (see CPLR 214). Here, the defendant Kevin Barry (hereinafter the appellant) sustained his initial burden on that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice by demonstrating that the applicable limitations period had expired with respect to the alleged acts of legal malpractice. Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in opposition was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the running of the statute of limitations (see Hasty Hills Stables, Inc. v Dorfman, Lynch, Knoebel & Conway, LLP, 52 AD3d 566, 567-568; Melendez v Bernstein, 29 AD3d 872, 873; Dignelli v Berman, 293 AD2d 565, 566; Muller v Sturman, 79 AD2d 482, 486-487). Accordingly, the cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice should have been dismissed as time-barred. [*2]
The appellant was also entitled to summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action for replevin insofar as asserted against him. The appellant established, prima facie, that he did not unreasonably refuse to return the documents requested by the plaintiff (see Khoury v Khoury, 78 AD3d 903, 904; Wiel v Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, 66 Misc 2d 466, 469, affd 36 AD2d 1027, affd 30 NY2d 500). In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The Supreme Court, therefore, should have granted that branch of the appellant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for replevin insofar as asserted against him. "