It's Pure Speculation Whether Anyone Could Save the Day

Defendant A handles a case, and defects in service take place.  Successor counsel has about 6 months until the statute lapses.  Defendant 1 moves for dismissal.  Defendant 2 opposes.  Was there enough time for Defendant 2 to fix the problems, and if so, is Defendant 1 excused?

Grant v LaTrace  2014 NY Slip Op 05155  Decided on July 9, 2014  Appellate Division, Second Department  answers the question such that both defendants remain in the case.

"The plaintiff commenced this instant action against the defendants asserting a single cause of action sounding in legal malpractice. The defendants Anthony P. LaTrace, Michael E. Glynn, and the Law Offices of Michael S. Lamonsoff, PLLC (hereinafter collectively the Lamonsoff defendants), moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them, contending that the actions of the defendants Colin Liverpool and Liverpool Law Office, P.C. (hereinafter together the Liverpool defendants), were the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages because they had assumed representation of the plaintiff when there was sufficient opportunity to protect the plaintiff's rights. The plaintiff did not oppose the motion; however, the Liverpool defendants did. The Supreme Court denied the Lamonsoff defendants' motion. The Lamonsoff defendants appeal.

The Lamonsoff defendants' contention, that the ability of successor counsel, i.e., the Liverpool defendants, to remedy any negligence of the predecessor counsel, i.e., the Lamonsoff defendants, during the approximately six-month period that the Liverpool defendants represented the plaintiff prior to the lapse of the applicable statute of limitations, is without merit. Unlike the cases relied upon by the Lamonsoff defendants (see Katz v Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., 48 AD3d 640, 641; Ramcharan v Pariser, 20 AD3d 556, 557; Perks v Lauto & Garabedian, 306 AD2d 261; Albin v Pearson, 289 AD2d 272; Golden v Cascione, Chechanover & Purcigliotti, 286 AD2d 281, 281; Kozmol v Law Firm of Allen L. Rothenberg, 241 AD2d 484), here, the Liverpool defendants could not have moved as of right to remedy the defects in service alleged. The Supreme Court would have had to exercise its discretion in the underlying action to extend the time to serve process (see CPLR 306-b, CPLR 2004), and it is pure speculation as to whether the court would have permitted such late service (see generally Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87; Lanoce v Anderson, Banks, Curran & Donoghue, 259 AD2d 965). Accordingly the Supreme Court properly denied the Lamonsoff defendants' motion."

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