Will B. Sandler Disclaimer Trust v Swersky 2025 NY Slip Op 05909 [242 AD3d 625]
October 23, 2025 Appellate Division, First Department is a fairly unusual case in which an attorney was in business with a clieint for 30 years or more. When the attorney dieed, his interest in a particular LLC was a bequest to his wife, who rejected the bequest. The LLC interest passed to a “Disclaimer Trust” which then sued the former partner over a $ 3.5 million dollar asset. Counterclaims against the trust fell.

“Nonparty Will B. Sandler was an attorney who entered into a number of business ventures with defendant David M. Swersky over the course of approximately 30 years. In addition to being a co-investor in the ventures, Sandler typically acted as counsel, negotiating and drafting the deal documents. Swersky typically acted as the sole manager and controlling partner of the joint venture. Sandler and Swersky formed defendant S&S 34 Investors LLC as a vehicle through which they would invest in Manhattan real estate. According to the complaint, Sandler received an 8.518% interest in S&S. In 2014, Swersky and Sandler invested in an entity that held an interest in real property located at 460 West 34th Street (2014 transaction).

Sandler died in 2015 and, upon his death, his wife, plaintiff Muriel Sandler, rejected the bequest of Sandler’s interest in S&S, which then passed to plaintiff Will B. Sandler Disclaimer Trust. Muriel is the sole beneficiary of the Trust and she and her two children are its Trustees.

Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that defendants improperly withheld from plaintiffs $3.5 million in proceeds from Sandler’s interest in S&S and actively concealed this from plaintiffs. Defendants asserted a counterclaim for rescission against plaintiffs, alleging that the 2014 transaction was the product of Sandler’s breach of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct or, alternatively, a breach of Sandler’s fiduciary duty as Swersky’s attorney. Defendants also asserted a counterclaim for legal malpractice against plaintiffs, alleging that Sandler committed legal malpractice through his various errors and intentional acts surrounding the 2014 transaction.

Supreme Court properly granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the counterclaims for failure to state a cause of action as against plaintiffs because plaintiffs are not the proper parties to the counterclaims. Despite being labelled as a claim for rescission, the first counterclaim asserts a claim against plaintiffs for Sandler’s alleged breach of his ethical and fiduciary duty to defendants. This counterclaim is based only on the alleged conduct of Sandler and not on the conduct of plaintiffs. Accordingly, there is no basis to assert the counterclaim against plaintiffs, who did not owe an ethical or fiduciary duty to defendants.

Moreover, rescission is an equitable remedy and a claim for rescission may only be asserted against a person who is a party to the contract (see McGarry v Miller, 158 AD2d 327, 328 [1st Dept 1990] [dismissing rescission cause of action against nonparty to the contract]; Steinberg v Sherman, 2008 WL 2156726, *7, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 37367, *19-21 [SD NY, May 8, 2008, No. 07cv1001 (WHP)]). Here, plaintiffs were not parties to the 2014 transaction.”

Real estate litigation and legal malpractice share a long brotherhood, and Chef Michael Barton Rest., LLC v Wknapp LTD. 2025 NY Slip Op 35003(U) December 23, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 654339/2022 Judge: Kathleen Waterman-Marshall is an example of how the lack of privity dooms the claim.

“This action arises out of the sale of a restaurant business. Defendant Wknapp LTD
(“Wknapp”) sold its restaurant business to plaintiff Chef Michael Barton Restaurants LLC
(“Barton Restaurants”) pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement (the “ASA”) and a later amended Asset Purchase Agreement (the “Amended ASA”). Mr. Knapp signed both ASAs in his corporate capacity on behalf of Wknapp, and in his individual capacity only “as to his obligations under paragraph 14.” Defendant and second-third party plaintiff Elissa Hecker, Esq. (“Ms. Hecker”) was Barton Restaurants’ attorney in the purchase transaction.
As relevant to this motion, paragraph 14 of the ASA is a non-compete covenant. When
the ASA was amended, the paragraph numbering changed, and paragraph 14 of the ASA was renumbered as paragraph 13 in the Amended ASA. Despite being renumbered as paragraph 13 in the Amended ASA, the non-compete paragraph continued to internally reference itself as paragraph 14. The signature block for Mr. Knapp in both the ASA and Amended ASA stated that he signed in his personal capacity only as to paragraph 14, notwithstanding the change in paragraph numbers.
Barton Restaurants and Michael Barton commenced this action alleging, in sum and
substance, that Mr. Knapp and Wknapp breached the express warranties in the ASA by
misrepresenting the condition of the premises, and that Ms. Hecker committed malpractice by failing to perform the appropriate due diligence to discover publicly available unresolved Department of Building violations related to the premises. By decision and order dated October 11, 2023, the jurist previously assigned to this matter dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against Mr. Knapp, finding that the only portion of the ASA signed in Mr. Knapp’s individual capacity was the covenant not to compete with plaintiffs after the sale.
In December 2024, Ms. Hecker filed the second third-party action against Mr. Knapp,
seeking common law indemnification and contribution from him for any damages the Barton plaintiffs obtain against Ms. Hecker.”

“Ms. Hecker’s second-third party complaint for contribution and indemnification is not
viable because there is no basis to seek contribution or indemnification for legal malpracticefrom Mr. Knapp (see generally, Rivas v Raymond Schwartzberg & Associates, PLLC, 52 AD3d 401 [1st Dept 2008]). Contrary to Ms. Hecker’s argument, neither the ASA nor the Amended ASA require Mr. Knapp to contractually indemnify Ms. Hecker for legal malpractice.
To the extent that Ms. Hecker’s second third-party complaint seeks common law
indemnity, it is likewise unviable because she did not delegate her due diligence responsibility as counsel for Barton Restaurants to Mr. Knapp (Board of Mgrs. of Oliver Park Condominium v Maspeth Props., LLC, 170 AD3d 645, 647 [2d Dept 2019] [party seeking common law indemnification “must have delegated exclusive responsibility… to the party from whom indemnification is sought”]; Desena v North Shore Hebrew Academy, 119 AD3d 631, 635 [2014] [“predicate of common law indemnity is liability without actual fault”] quoting Trustees of Columbia Univ. v Michell/Giurgola Assoc., 109 AD2d 449, 453 [1st Dept 1985]). That Mr. Knapp owes a duty to Ms. Hecker’s former client Barton Restaurant under the non-compete covenant does not transform into a duty owed to Ms. Hecker regarding her due diligence as counsel. Put simply, Mr. Knapp does not share in Ms. Hecker’s responsibility, if any, for plaintiffs’ alleged malpractice loss (Rivas, 52 AD3d at 401).
Contribution is permitted only between parties who are subject to liability for damages
for the same injury (CPLR § 1401). “The critical requirement for apportionment under… CPLR article 14 is that the breach of duty by the contributing party must have had a part in causing or augmenting the injury for which contribution is sought” (Nassau Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. Inc. v Facilities Dev. Corp., 71 NY2d 599 [1988]). As Mr. Knapp has been dismissed from the main party action, as a matter of law he does not share in responsibility for the injuries alleged in the main party action and, therefore, contribution for the main party claims is unavailable (see generally, Gonzales v Jacoby & Meyers, 258 AD2d 560 [2d Dept 1999] [law firm could not seek contribution from third-party for malpractice claim where the third-party was not responsible for the malpractice]).
Therefore, dismissal of the second-third party complaint is also appropriate under CPLR
3211(a)(7).”

Chen v Romona Keveza Collection LLC 2025 NY Slip Op 34953(U) December 16, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 153413/2020
Judge: Emily Morales-Minerva

Attorney wants out, client wants him to stay, huge payments and unauthorized use of a corporate credit card notwithstanding.

“Non-party movant Sutton Sachs Meyer PLLC, New York, NY (Zachary G. Meyers, Esq., of counsel), moves, by order to show cause (mot. seq. no. 010), pursuant to CPLR § 321 (bl (2), for an order permitting it to withdraw as attorney of record for defendants ROMONA KEVEZA COLLECTION, LLC, ROMONA KEVEZA ONE ROCK, LLC, ROMONA KEVEZA 1 ROCK, LLC, and ROMONA KEVEZA (defendants) . 1 Plaintiffs JOSEPH CHEN, INC., and DINA KOZLOVSKA (plaintiffs) oppose the application, {l) arguing prejudice and
(2) asserting that non-party Zachary G. Meyers, Esq., of counsel to defendants, has engaged in a “repeated pattern of misconduct and dilatory behaviorn (New York State Courts Electronic Filing System [NYSCEF) Doc. No. 375, affirmation of James E. Murphy in Opposition, ~ 2). Therefore, plaintiffs move for sanctions against non-party movant Sutton Sachs Meyer PLLC, New York, NY (Zachary G. Meyers, Esq., of counsel) and/or Zachary G. Meyers, Esq., individually (see id.; see also Uniform Civil Rules for Supreme Court [22 NYCRR] § 130-1.1 [c] [2] [Costs;sanctions])”

“On record, Zachary G. Meyers stated that the attorneyclient relationship between non-party law firm and defendants is irretrievably broken. In support of this contention, Zachary G. Meyers stated that Romana Keveza threatened to file a legal malpractice action against him and that she threatened to report Zachary G. Meyers to the bar, among other things.

Romona Keveza countered, under oath, that she never made such threats and that Zachary G. Meyers’s statements are completely false. Romona Keveza affirmed that she did not know how to reach the bar, and that she was completely surprised by the allegations her counsel was making against her. Further, Romona Keveza expressed wanting Zachary G. Meyers to continue to represent her and defendants Romana Keveza Collection, LLC, Romona Keveza One Rock, LLC, and Romona Keveza 1 Rock, LLC.”

In response, Zachary G. Meyers explicitly stated that his client was lying to the Court, insisting that she did threaten him with a legal malpractice action and challenging other
statements Romona Keveza made on the record as untrue. Romona Keveza asserted, under oath, that, among other things, Zachary G. Meyers charged at or around $180,000.00 to her corporate credit card without her permission, and that she
has paid him substantially for his services. Romona Keveza continued to express shock at how counsel characterized her. Still, Romona Keveza expressed hope of not having to engage new counsel and of having this Court deny non-party’s application.

An attorney may withdraw as counsel upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, and reasonable notice (see CPLR § 321 [b] [2]; see also Bok v Werner, 9 AD3d 318 [1st Dept
2004]). “Good cause exists [for counsel] to end [their] relationship with [a] client [when there is an] irretrievable breakdown in the relationship or a failure of cooperation by the
client” (Matter of Cassini, 182 AD3d 13, 40 [2d Dept 2020]; see also Raff & Becker LLP v Kaiser Saurborn & Mair, P.C., 160 AD3d 479 (1st Dept 2018]). The question of whether good cause exists lies within the sound discretion of the court (see Rivadeneria v
New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 306 AD2d 394 [2d Dept 2003]).”

“Here, counsel Zachary G. Meyers and his client Romona Keveza make serious statements against each other, advancing materially different versions of the facts underlying nonparty’s motion for withdrawal. This circumstance presents a clear question of credibility. However, no genuine question exists that their attorney-client relationship has irreparably broken down.
Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion to grant the subject motion, permitting non-party Sutton Sachs Meyer PLLC to withdraw, and staying this action to provide defendants an opportunity to obtain new counsel.”

Calixto v A. Balsamo & Rosenblatt, P.C. 2025 NY Slip Op 06686 Decided on December 3, 2025 Appellate Division, Second Department is the story of a L & T law firm that had an apartment building client, and apparently kept starting cases, knowing that the claims were exagerated and that the apartment building was not registered.

“The plaintiff was a resident of an apartment in a building located in Brooklyn. The building was managed by the defendant Justice McAllister and claimed to be owned by the defendants 266 Realty NY, LLC (hereinafter 266 Realty), and Heung Sang Tam (hereinafter collectively the building defendants). The plaintiff paid her rent directly to Heung Sang Tam, and the building defendants claimed that the apartment was rent stabilized, although there was no written lease for the apartment, and the plaintiff allegedly was never informed that the apartment was rent stabilized.

According to the plaintiff, over the course of her tenancy, defects in the apartment developed that Heung Sang Tam refused to repair. In March 2017, the plaintiff began to withhold her rent payments, with the intent to pay once the repairs were made. The plaintiff received a five-day notice dated August 21, 2017, from the defendant A. Balsamo & Rosenblatt, P.C. (hereinafter A. Balsamo), on behalf of 266 Realty, stating that the plaintiff was indebted to 266 Realty for her failure to pay rent. On or about September 13, 2017, A. Balsamo commenced a nonpayment proceeding on behalf of 266 Realty against the plaintiff, seeking to recover rent arrears in an amount [*2]significantly more than what the plaintiff withheld and a warrant of eviction. In response, the plaintiff paid the amount of rent she had withheld, but the nonpayment proceeding continued.

Thereafter, the plaintiff’s attorney obtained records indicating that the building was not registered with the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development and had not been registered with the New York State Division of Homes and Community Renewal since at least 1984. The plaintiff’s attorney additionally discovered that A. Balsamo and the defendants Balsamo, Rosenblatt & Hall, P.C., Robert Rosenblatt, Edward Hall, and Serenay Taysin (hereinafter collectively the attorney defendants), on behalf of the building defendants, commenced similar proceedings against various tenants. In the nonpayment proceeding, in an order dated February 16, 2018, the Civil Court of the City of New York granted dismissal of the proceeding on the ground that the building was not registered and, thus, the Multiple Dwelling Law prohibited 266 Realty from collecting any rent from the plaintiff.

In March 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action, asserting causes of action alleging a violation of General Business Law § 349 (first cause of action), negligence per se (third cause of action), and gross negligence (fourth cause of action) against the defendants, and a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 (second cause of action) against the attorney defendants. The building defendants and the attorney defendants separately moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. In an order dated April 6, 2022, the Supreme Court granted the separate motions. The plaintiff appeals.”

“Here, the complaint alleged that if the defendants had exercised even the slightest amount of due diligence, they would have realized that the amount they were seeking from the plaintiff was incorrect, that the allegation that the building was in compliance with rent-stabilization laws was false, and that the judgment amount that they demanded was not authorized by law. As such, the complaint sufficiently alleged the material elements of a gross negligence cause of action (see Dolphin Holdings, Ltd. v Gander & White Shipping, Inc., 122 AD3d 901, 903). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the separate motions of the building defendants and the attorney defendants which were to dismiss the fourth cause of action, alleging gross negligence, insofar as asserted against each of them.

A cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 “requires, among other things, an act of deceit by an attorney, with intent to deceive the court or any party” (Grasso v Guarino, 227 AD3d 872, 873 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Shaffer v Gilberg, 125 AD3d 632, 636; Lazich v Vittoria & Parker, 189 AD2d 753, 754). “Relief pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487 is not lightly given, and requires a showing of egregious conduct or a chronic and extreme pattern of behavior on the part of the defendant attorneys” (Kaufman v Moritt Hock & Hamroff, LLP, 192 AD3d 1092, 1093 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]). “‘To mislead the court or a party is to deceive it; and, if knowingly done, constitutes criminal deceit under the statute.’. . . While attorneys must zealously advocate for their clients, such deception or collusion is antithetical to appropriate advocacy, functioning as a fraud on the court or a party” (Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P.C., 35 NY3d 173, 179 [emphasis omitted], quoting Amalfitano v Rosenberg, 12 NY3d 9, 14).

Here, the complaint alleged that the attorney defendants continued to litigate against the plaintiff despite having knowledge that the building defendants had misrepresented the amount owed and had misrepresented that the building was properly registered under rent-stabilization laws. The complaint further alleged that the attorney defendants were engaged in similar lawsuits against additional tenants. Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint adequately stated a cause of action to recover damages for a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 against the attorney defendants (see Garanin v Hiatt, 219 AD3d 958, 959). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the attorney defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the second cause of action, alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487.”

In Coalition of Landlords, Homeowners, & Merchants, Inc. v Glass, https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_05936.htm2025 NY Slip Op 05936 [242 AD3d 1172] October 29, 2025 Appellate Division, Second Department it was alleged that a false lease was used to defeat a claim. The Judiciary Law 487 claim was that the attorneys knew the lease was false and offered it anyways. The Court dismissed.

“The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants, attorneys for the plaintiffs’ former landlord, alleging, among other things, that the defendants knowingly submitted a fraudulent 2010 lease agreement (hereinafter the 2010 lease) to the District Court, Suffolk County, in connection with a holdover proceeding (see Anthi New Neocronon Corp. v Coalition of Landlords, 73 Misc 3d 136[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51067[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2021]) and to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, in connection with a plenary action commenced by the plaintiffs seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring their rights pursuant to a purported purchase agreement for the building where they rented their offices (see Coalition of Landlords, Homeowners & Merchants, Inc. v S. & A. Neocronon, Inc., 224 AD3d 658 [2024]). The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the amended complaint. The plaintiffs opposed. In an order dated December 18, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiffs appeal.”

“”Under Judiciary Law § 487 (1), an attorney who ‘[i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party’ is liable to the injured party for treble damages” (Altman v DiPreta, 204 AD3d 965, 968 [2022]; see Mohammad v Rehman, 236 AD3d 892, 894 [2025]). “Relief pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487 is not lightly given, and requires a showing of egregious conduct or a chronic and extreme pattern of behavior on the part of the defendant attorneys” (Kaufman v Moritt Hock & Hamroff, LLP, 192 AD3d 1092, 1093 [2021] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the plaintiffs failed to allege that the defendants engaged in egregious conduct or a chronic and extreme pattern of behavior.”

Howlader v Aranow Law, P.C. 2025 NY Slip Op 05505 [242 AD3d 841] October 8, 2025
Appellate Division, Second Department is a case lost to plaintiff on the “but for” axis, where the court found that Plaintiff would not have obtained a homestead exemption in bankruptcy, so there was no damage.

“In this legal malpractice action, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to properly counsel the plaintiffs on pre-bankruptcy planning. The plaintiffs asserted that, as a consequence of the defendants’ negligence, a bankruptcy trustee challenged the plaintiffs’ claimed homestead exemption under section 282 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, resulting in the plaintiffs entering into a court-approved stipulation of settlement with the bankruptcy trustee at a cost of $130,000. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In an order entered February 6, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and granted the defendants’ cross-motion. The plaintiffs appeal.

“A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for legal malpractice must establish that (1) the [defendant] attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and (2) the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused the plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages” (McGlynn v Burns & Harris, Esq., 223 AD3d 733, 734-735 [2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442 [2007]). “A defendant seeking summary judgment dismissing a legal malpractice cause of action has the burden of establishing prima facie that he or she did not fail to exercise such skill and knowledge, or that the claimed departure did not proximately cause the plaintiff to sustain damages” (Casey v Exum, 219 AD3d 456, 457 [2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Provenzano v Cellino & Barnes, P.C., 207 AD3d 763, 764 [2022]). “To establish causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages, but for the lawyer’s negligence” (Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d at 442; see Garcia v Polsky, Shouldice & Rosen, P.C., 161 AD3d 828, 830 [2018]).

[*2] Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiffs would be unable to prove the element of causation (see 11 USC §§ 522 [o]; 548 [a] [1] [A]; Debtor and Creditor Law § 282 [i]; see generally Valley Ventures, LLC v Joseph J. Haspel, PLLC, 102 AD3d 955, 956 [2013]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.”

Sanders Equities LLC v Maldonado 2025 NY Slip Op 34592(U) December 17, 2025
Supreme Court, Nassau County Docket Number: Index No. 605681/2022
Judge: Sharon M.J. Gianelli is the only decision we remember where plaintiff was wholly successful, obtained an inquest, and received legal malpractice damages, breach of fiduciary duty damages, disgorgement of previously paid fees damages as well as Judiciary law 487 treble damages. Wow.

The discussion by the judge is too long for a blog article, but here are some of the high points.

“This is a damages inquest resulting from three written Decisions and Orders of this Court following a series of defaults by Defendants Kevin Maldonado (“Maldonado”) and Kevin Maldonado and Associates, P.C. d/b/a Kevin Maldonado & Associates d/b/a Kevin
Maldonado & Partners LLC (the “Firm”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
In the first Decision and Order, this Court ruled on the Sanders Entities’ motion to strike,
to preclude, or to compel under CPLR 3124 (3). The Court concluded that Maldonado and the Firm “have shown themselves overall to be evasive, uncooperative, and dilatory” after ears to produce disclosure, ruling that they “have just about earned” the
“drastic steps” of “[s]striking and/or preclusion.”
But the Court granted them “one additional opportunity” to “fully comply with all
outstanding discovery” within “thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Decision and Order,” with “leave” for Plaintiffs (hereinafter the “Sanders Entities”) to “re-apply” for disclosure sanctions should Maldonado and the Firm “fail to comply with this Decision and Order” (Sanders Equities LLC v Maldonado, 2024 NY Slip Op 34593[U] [Sup Ct, Nassau County Oct. 7, 2024, Gianelli, J.]; NYSCEF Doc. No. 170). The Court’s “one
additional opportunity” became three, this Court extending its original deadline from
November 8, 2024 to January 3, 2025, then from January 3, 2025 to January 10, 2025
(see NYSCEF Doc. No. 181, ,i,i 8-22). Maldonado and the Firm never complied with this
Court’s directives, and the Sanders Entities moved for leave to renew.
In the second Decision and Order, this Court ruled on the Sanders Entities’ motion,
pursuant to CPLR 2221 (e), for leave to renew their prior motion, pursuant to CPLR 3124
(3), to strike Maldonado and the Firm’s Answer. This Court ruled: “Defendants
Maldonado and the Firm have not only been afforded numerous opportunities to comply with the Court’s Orders, including three (3) final warnings, Defendants Maldonado and the Firm have repeatedly and intentionally failed to comply, without reasonable explanation.” The Court “Granted” the Sanders Entities’ motion to strike Maldonado and the Firm’s Answer for “willful and contumacious refusal to comply with required discovery” (Sanders Equities LLC v Maldonado, 2025 NY Slip Op 30694[U] [Sup Ct, Nassau County Mar. 3, 2025, Gianelli, J.]; NYSCEF Doc. No. 246).
In the third Decision and Order, this Court ruled on the Sanders Entities’ motion,
pursuant to CPLR 3212, for partial summary judgment on liability. The Court held that
“the Court’s striking of Defendants’ Answer for failure to comply with discovery directives is tantamount to a liability determination favorable to Plaintiffs. As such, no triable issues of fact remain on the issue of liability.” “Consequently,” the Court held, “in accordance with New York case law, Defendants are considered to have admitted liability.” The Court “Granted” partial summary judgment against Maldonado and the Firm “on the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Causes of Action in the Verified Complaint,” and ordered that “an inquest to assess Plaintiffs’ damages shall be held in person on October 8, 2025 at 9:30 a.m. before Hon. Jeffrey S. Brown (Ret.) at the Nassau County Supreme Court” (Sanders Equities LLC v Maldonado, 2025 NY Slip Op 32439[U]

[Sup Ct, Nassau County, July 2, 2025, Gianelli, J.]; NYSCEF Doc. No. 273).
On October 8, 2025, on the day of the damages inquest, Maldonado and the Firm
defaulted again, declining to appear in Court to defend against a damages award.”

“The First Cause of Action for Attorney Deceit/ Judiciary Law §487

This Court has granted the Sanders Entities partial summary judgment on liability on the First Cause of Action for Attorney Deceit/ Judiciary Law§ 487 (see Sanders Equities LLC v Maldonado, 2025 NY Slip Op 32439[U] [N.Y. Sup Ct, Nassau County 2025]; NYSCEF
Doc. No. 273).

Judiciary Law§ 487 provides: “An attorney or counselor who … [i]s guilty of any deceit
… with intent to deceive … any party … or … wilfully receives any money or allowance
for or on account of any money which he has not laid out … forfeits to the party injured
treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action.””Under Judiciary Law§ 487 (1), an attorney who is guilty of any deceit … with intent to deceive … any party … may be liable to the injured party for treble damages in a civil action” (Altman v Orseck, 235 AD3d 818, 819 [2d Dept 2025] [quotations and brackets omitted]).
“Treble damages awarded under Judiciary Law§ 487 are not designed to compensate a
plaintiff for injury to property or pecuniary interests. They are designed to punish
attorneys who violate the statute and to deter them from betraying their special obligation to protect the integrity of the courts and foster their truth-seeking function” (Specialized Indus. Servs. Corp. v Carter, 99 AD3d 692,693 [2d Dept 2012] [citations and quotations omitted]).
Judiciary Law§ 487 encompasses a claim by a client against a lawyer for “charging her
unnecessary and excessive fees” (Lauder v Goldhamer, 122 AD3d 908, 910 [2d Dept
2014] [affirming denial of dismissal of Judiciary Law§ 487 claim as “not duplicative of
the cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice”]). An attorney’s deceptive
conduct causing a litigant to incur false or unnecessary attorneys’ fees falls within the
ambit of the statute:

Joseph v Fensterman, 204 AD3d 766, 767 [2d Dept 2022] [“Here, the first cause
of action adequately pleaded a claim to recover damages for violations of Judiciary
Law§ 487, as it alleged that the defendants Abrams, Fensterman … intentionally

Garanin v Hiatt, 219 AD3d 958, 959 [2d Dept 2023] [a litigant’s claim that an
attorney’s conduct “caused him” to incur unnecessary “attorneys’ fees” is
actionable under Judiciary Law§ 487];

nterfered with the settlement of the New Franklin litigation, causing years of
additional litigation, in order to generate legal fees in the amount of $1.7 million”];

• Betz v Blatt, 160 AD3d 696, 699 [2d Dept 2018] [“A party’s legal expenses in
  defending the lawsuit may be treated as the proximate result of the
  misrepresentation” covered by Judiciary Law§ 487 ]).
  Applying these authorities, Here, the record evidences that Maldonado and his Firm engaged in a pattern and practice of grossly excessive billing or outright fraudulent billing (i.e., billing for legal services Defendants either never provided, or which were provided entirely by other law firms) that resulted in the Sanders Entities paying $2,037,776.85 in legal fees to Defendants (Blaustein Aff., Ex. 2).
  For example, in the latter part of 2019 and in early 2020, Maldonado and the Firm
  devoted a great detail of time to Next Millennium Realty LLC, et al. v The Travelers
  Companies, Inc., et al., Supreme Court, Nassau County, Index No. 600996/2016 (the “Insurance Litigation Matter”), including responding to a request by the Special Referee for a catalog of all of the policies at issue (Blaustein Aff., ,i 20). Ultimately, Maldonado billed more than $86,ooo simply to review and scan insurance policies when he previously represented that a paralegal would be doing most of the work (Blaustein Aff., Ex. 3)
  In addition, from January 2018 through May 2019 in the Insurance Matter, Maldonado and the Firm’s bills refer extensively to the deposition of an expert witness named “Hughes.” (id., at at 3, 27, 35, 41,43, 62, 68, 73-75, 87, 142, 148, 160-161). For that single deposition, Maldonado and the Firm billed over 600 hours of time (id.). During that same period, Maldonado and the Firm billed approximately 316 hours of legal time for drafting an eight-page lawyer affirmation for a Daubert motion, an amount of time which is criminally disproportionate to the work product produced (id.).”

“All of the claims on which the Sanders Entities proceeded at this inquest, without
exception, arose from Maldonado and the Firm’s dishonesty, misrepresentation, and
deceit by rendering false and inflated legal bills in connection with underlying, pending
litigations, or from concealing the striking of an answer by another Justice of this Court
in one of the underlying litigations (see e.g. Matter of D’Angelo, 158 AD3d 107, 116 [2d
Dept 2017] [an attorney’s “self-dealing” is a “type of dishonesty” and “deceitful conduct”]; Matter of Myerson, 250 AD2d 41, 42 [1st Dept 1998] [“false billing … is, in and of itself, egregious conduct warranting severe penalty”]; Matter of Aaron, 232 AD2d 119, 124-25 2d Dept 1997] [ordering attorney “disbarred from the practice of law, effective immediately,” after he “inflated his legal fees and expenses by charging for work not actually performed”]).
Therefore, under Judiciary Law§ 487, the Court grants treble damages, as set forth below (see e.g. Suzuki v Greenberg, 220 AD3d 604, 604-05 [1st Dept 2023], lv denied 41 NY3d 908 [2024] [“the court properly awarded treble damages” because “affirmatively
misrepresenting . . . information” is “sufficient to establish egregious conduct under
Judiciary Law§ 487”] [quotations omitted]).”

In Hilpert v 16 Judge SPV LLC 2025 NY Slip Op 34683(U) December 4, 2025
Supreme Court, Kings County Docket Number: Index No. 522220/2025
Judge: Reginald A. Boddie the pro-se case ends in dismissal, sanctions and a vexatious litigant finding against the pro-se plaintiff. AI research may have had a part.

“Defendant David Koshers, Esq. ‘s motion seeking dismissal of all claims asserted against him, a declaration that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, sanctions for allegedly frivolous conduct and an award of costs and fees, together with plaintiffs cross-motion for a default judgment against David Koshers, Esq. on liability, are decided as follows:”

“This action arises out of an alleged coordinated scheme by defendants to orchestrate a
strategic foreclosure on a rent-stabilized property located at 16 Judge Street, Brooklyn, ew York (the “Property”), which is also a marital asset subject to orders in plaintiffs ongoing divorce proceedings. Pro se plaintiff Daniel Hilpert (“Hilpert”) alleges that his former attorney, David Koshers (“Koshers”), misused confidential information from a prior attorney-client relationship to assist 16 Judge SPY LLC and its principal, David Khaloyan, acquire a loan and commence foreclosure, obtain a second receiver ex parte in the foreclosure action despite an existing matrimonial receiver, and time everything to interfere with his divorce proceeding. Hilpert further contends that after the foreclosure receiver took over, they failed to update required New York City Housing Preservation & Development (“HPD”) registrations, performed unpermitted construction, ignored safety and rent-stabilization obligations, and allowed violations and fines to accrue while leaving him on record as the responsible party, exposing him to civil, criminal, and regulatory liability”

“Koshers now moves to dismiss all claims against him under CPLR 3211 and 3016(b). to
have Hilpert declared a vexatious litigant, and to obtain sanctions and $10,000 in fees and costs, arguing that: (1) this case is a duplicative second bite at the same dispute already pending in New York County titled Daniel Hilpert v. David Koshers Esq., Index No. 155934/2025 (the ‘”New York County Action”), so it is barred by the prior pending action doctrine; (2) Hilpert personally lacks standing because the Property is owned by 16 Judge LLC; (3) no attorney-client relationship ever existed between Hilpert and Koshers, so there is no fiduciary duty and no basis for any of the tort claims; (4) the pleaded causes of action are legally insufficient, duplicative of the New York
County Action, and not pied with the required particularity; and (5) Hilpert’s pattern of multiple overlapping suits and motions, including commencement of at least five proceedings and assertion of counterclaims in two other actions within the three months prior to Koshers’ filing of the instant motion, plus prior judicial findings about his conduct, warrants a finding of frivolous, harassing litigation and the imposition of sanctions, filing restrictions, and costs in Koshers’ favor.”

“Plaintiffs claims against Koshers rest fundamentally on the assertion that he and Koshers shared a long-standing attorney-client relationship through which Koshers purportedly obtained confidential information later used against him. Even affording the complaint a liberal construction and every favorable inference, the pleadings and exhibits fail to allege, and the documentary evidence affirmatively refutes, the existence of any attorney-client relationship between Hilpert and Koshers.
Plaintiff alleges that Koshers was ··an attorney who represented [him] in multiple legal
matters over more than a decade,” but the only specific engagement he identifies is a 2024 mezzanine loan transaction in Wyoming involving plaintiffs business partners. ln support, plaintiff relies on a North Hill Capital Management term sheet that references a generic ··Legal Deposit of $10,000,” but the document does not identify any attorney or law firm, does not mention Koshers, and contains no language suggesting that Koshers undertook to represent Hilpert personally (see NYSCEF Doc No. 70). Plaintiff provides no engagement letter, retainer agreement, billing records, or any other documentary evidence showing that Koshers undertook to represent him. Even if the “Legal Deposit of $10,000” was for Koshers to act as the attorney representing North Hill Capital Management on the mezzanine loan transaction, Koshers would only be the attorney to the entity, where Hilpert was the CIO (see NYSCEF Doc No. 119) and a
member (see NYSCEF Doc No. 120), not to Koshers in his individual capacity.
Nor do plaintiffs exhibits cure this defect. Plaintiffs exhibit labeled “Koshers Email”
consists of a January 16, 2025 settlement communication in which Koshers, expressly acting for 16 Judge SPV LLC, writes to Hilpert’s real-estate counsel, Anthony Simari, regarding potential resolution “prior to commencing any sort of enforcement action” (NYSCEF Doc No. I 0). In that correspondence, Koshers speaks of Hilpert as Simari ‘s “client,” plainly in the posture of opposing counsel, and nothing in the exhibit suggests he ever represented Hilpert. Likewise, the email chains submitted by plaintiff as “Koshers Communications” (NYSCEF Doc No. 71) and “Koshers Email to Plaintiff’ (NYSCEF Doc No. 121) show Koshers being introduced and treated throughout
as the “lender’s attorney,” coordinating diligence and discussing timing for documents in connection with the mezzanine loan. Those communications do not reflect an attorney undertaking to advise Hilpert personally or to protect his individual legal interests. Taken together, plaintiffs own exhibits demonstrate that Koshers was entity counsel, first for the lender on the Wyoming transaction and later for 16 Judge SPY LLC, and do not support the existence of an attorney-client relationship with Hilpert individually.”

“”Pursuant to Judiciary Law§ 487, an attorney who is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or
consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party is liable to the injured party for treble damages (Guliyev v Banilov & Assoc., P.C. , 221 AD3d 589,591 [2d Dept 2023] [ citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). “A violation of Judiciary Law § 487 requires an intent to deceive ‘ (id.). Additionally, to state a Judiciary Law § 487 claim, ” [ a ]llegations regarding an act of deceit or intent to deceive must be stated with particularity” (Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P. C, 164 AD3d 635, 63 7 [2d Dept 2018], affd, 3 5 NY3d 173 [2020] [ citations omitted]).

Here, plaintiff alleges that Koshers, “in the context of an attorney-client relationship,”
“obtained confidential and privileged information concerning the Property” but later “began representing Defendant Khaloyan and 16 Judge SPY LLC” in the foreclosure action and “provided or facilitated access to sealed or non-public documents .. . the memorandum of contract.” As discus ed above, plaintiff fails to establish any attorney-client relationship from which confidential information could arise, and the memorandum of contract was recorded and publicly available on ACRIS well before the foreclosure action. Plaintiff identifies no specific false statement, no deceptive act directed at any court, and no facts supporting the essential element of intent to
deceive. These conclusory assertions fall far short of the particularity required under CPLR 30 l 6(b ), and therefore the branch of Koshers’ motion seeking dismissal of the sixth cause of action for Judiciary Law§ 487 is granted.”

“Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, ‘”[t]he court, in its discretion, may award to any party or
attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees, resulting from frivolous conduct,” and that “[t]he court, as appropriate, may make such award of costs or impose such financial sanctions against either an attorney or a party to the litigation.”
22 NYC RR 130-1.1 ( c) further defines “frivolous conduct” as conduct that is “completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law,” or “undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another.”
Plaintiffs cross-motion here falls squarely within that definition. As detailed in Koshers’
opposition, plaintiff relies on a dozen of purported “cases” and numerous quotations that simply do not exist in any official reporter or legal database. For example, plaintiff cites “Loeb v Loeb, 84 AD2d 591 (2d Dept 1981 )” (NYSCEF Doc No. 64, ,-r 35) and asserts a legal decision purportedly drawn from that decision. However, upon review by the Court, the citation “84 AD2d 591” corresponds only to two unrelated Third Department decisions: Sanginario v Monroe County Pure Waters Div., 84 AD2d 591 (3d Dept 1981), and First Depot Corp. v State, 84 AD2d 591 (3d Dept 1981 ). Neither case involves the parties or subject matter plaintiff describes, and nor do the cases contain the quotation plaintiff attributes to the nonexistent “Loeb” decision.

A full list of the twelve nonexistent case citations and seven fabricated quotations plaintiff relies upon is identified in Koshers’ opposition papers (NYSCEF Doc No. 102). Despite this, plaintiffs 24-page reply, which was submitted in seemingly single- or 1.5-spacing, offers no explanation for the fabricated authorities. Hilpert’s only explanation is that he ··appear(s] prose and do[es] not have access to commercial legal research platforms such as Westlaw or Lexis,” and that his “research has relied exclusively on publicly available sources.” However, Hilpert provides no description or documentation of any such ‘publicly available sources” that could have yielded these nonexistent authorities. Hilbert further claims that ” [f]or this reply, [he] took [the] extra step
of cross-checking all case law to ensure proper citations,” but his 24-page reply contains not a single citation to any case law.
Plaintiffs reliance on fictitious authorities, without explanation or correction even after the issue was raised, constitutes frivolous conduct under 22 YCRR 130-1. l(c). Plaintiffs “prose status does not excuse his failure to check the legal citations that he offers to a court” (Dowlah v Professional Staff Congress, 227 AD3d 609, 610 [1st Dept 2024], lv to appeal denied, 42 Y3d 911 [2025]; see also, Will of Samuel, 82 Misc 3d 616 [Sur Ct 2024] [holding that “submitting document that contained fictional or erroneous citations … constituted frivolous conduct]).

Accordingly, the branch of Koshers’ motion for an award in Koshers’ favor against Hilpert for sanctionable and frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 YCRR 130.1-1 is granted to the extent that Hilpert shall reimburse Koshers for the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in preparing and submitting his papers (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 96-110, 113-114) in opposition to Hilpert’s cross-motion.”