Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine which prevents a litigant from taking a position which is inconsistent with the position it previously took in earlier litigation. Another phrase might be “flip-flopping.”

In Lending Assets, LLC v Gerbi 2026 NY Slip Op 00472 Decided on February 03, 2026
Appellate Division, First Department defendants were able to invoke this principle.

“Supreme Court properly dismissed this action, as the documentary evidence submitted by defendants in support of their motion to dismiss utterly refutes an essential element of plaintiff’s legal malpractice claims — specifically, that defendants had a nondelegable duty to obtain valid title policies and ensure that certain mortgages were recorded in first lien positions (see Mill Fin., LLC v Gillett, 122 AD3d 98, 103 [1st Dept 2014]). Indeed, plaintiff admitted in a complaint in another action that it believed a third party had the duties that plaintiff ascribes to defendants in this complaint, that it relied on this belief to its detriment, and that this reliance led to damages. Thus, negligence, an essential element of a legal malpractice claim, has been “utterly refute[d]” because the allegations in the other complaint amount to a concession that the duties underlying plaintiff’s legal malpractice cause of action are not, in fact, attributable to defendants (CPLR 3211[a][1]; see Excelsior Capital LLC v K&L Gates LLP, 138 AD3d 492, 492 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 906 [2016]; see also Yassky v Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Schlissel, P.C., 36 AD3d 420, 421 [1st Dept 2007]). Furthermore, these judicial admissions constitute admissible documentary evidence for purposes of defendants’ motion to dismiss (see New Greenwich Litig. Trustee, LLC v Citco Fund Servs. [Europe] B.V., 145 AD3d 16, 25 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 917 [2017]).”

It is our anecdotal experience that legal malpractice cases suffer a higher percentage of dismissals at the CPLR 3211 stage than do other types of claims, including medical malpractice. Park W. Exec. Servs., Inc. v Gallo Vitucci & Klar, LLP 2026 NY Slip Op 00428
Decided on January 29, 2026 Appellate Division, First Department is a case lost on a CPLR 3211 motion and reversed on appeal.

This legal malpractice action arises from an underlying personal injury action in which defendants represented Park West Executive Services, a company that furnishes taxi and limousine drivers to customers in need of transportation. The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident in which the driver of one of the vehicles, nonparty Margaret Rivera, had an independent contractor contract with Park West to offer driving services to customers secured by Park West. The driver of the second vehicle involved in the accident commenced the underlying personal injury action against Park West, Rivera, and the owner of the vehicle that was leased to Rivera. In that underlying action, defendants conceded that Rivera was Park West’s employee. A settlement was reached in the underlying action and, shortly thereafter, plaintiffs commenced this action for legal malpractice.

The motion court improperly held that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice against defendants. To state a claim for legal malpractice, a “plaintiff must show that (1) the attorney was negligent; (2) the attorney’s negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s losses; and (3) plaintiff suffered actual damages” (Springs v L&D Law P.C., 234 AD3d 422, 423 [1st Dept 2025]). Moreover, an “attorney’s conduct or inaction is the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s damages if but for the attorney’s negligence the plaintiff would have succeeded on the merits of the underlying action or would not have sustained actual and ascertainable damages” (83 Willow LLC v Apollo, 187 AD3d 563, 563 [1st Dept 2020] [internal citation omitted]).

Here, plaintiffs argue that but for defendants’ negligence in waiving Park West’s independent contractor defense in the underlying action, without their consent and without disclosing conflicts in their representation of several defendants in the action, they would not have been compelled to settle the action, and they would not have been held vicariously liable for Rivera’s negligence. To prevail on its malpractice claim, plaintiffs will ultimately have to prove proximate cause. The discovery in the underlying personal injury action raised factual issues as to whether Park West controlled the means and methods of Rivera’s work (see Goodwin v Comcast Corp., 42 AD3d 322, 322 [1st Dept 2007]), regardless of the existence of the independent contractor agreement between Rivera and Park West (see Edwards v Rosario, 166 AD3d 453 [1st Dept 2018]; Cross v Supersonic Motor Messenger Courier, Inc., 140 AD3d 503, 504 [1st Dept 2016]), and the motion court or a jury will need to resolve this issue post-discovery. However, at this pre-answer motion to dismiss stage of the litigation, plaintiffs have sufficiently plead a claim for legal malpractice.

Defendants’ argument concerning litigation strategy/professional judgment was raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore unpreserved (see Diarrassouba v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc., 123 AD3d 525, 525 [1st Dept 2014]).”

Beyond that question, when does Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, ‘s 6-year statute of limitation apply and when does Farage v. Ehrenberg’s three year statute apply?

In either setting Pergament v Government Employees Ins. Co. (“GEICO”) 2026 NY Slip Op 00267 Decided on January 21, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department reminds us that only attorneys engaged in deceit, in a litigation setting can be held under Judiciary Law 487.

“In May 2023, the plaintiff, as Chapter 7 Trustee of the estate of Melissa Gace Bryant, moved for leave to amend the complaint to add a new cause of action, alleging that the defendants violated Judiciary Law § 487(1), inter alia, by engaging in deceit and collusion to intentionally mislead Bryant by convincing her to file for bankruptcy in an effort to “wipe out” a judgment in an underlying personal injury action against her to the extent that the amount of the judgment exceeded her available insurance coverage. Additionally, the proposed amendment alleged that this was part of a scheme to avoid any causes of action alleging bad faith and legal malpractice against the defendants and to protect their own interests to the detriment of Bryant. The proposed amendment further alleged that the defendants misled Bryant into rejecting a settlement offer after entry of the underlying judgment that included Bryant assigning over to the injured plaintiff in the underlying action her rights to bring this action against the defendants in exchange for a forbearance of the excess. The defendants opposed the motion. In an order entered November 21, 2023, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487(1) against the defendants Picciano & Scahill, LLP, and Gilbert J. Hardy (hereinafter together the P & S defendants) and the defendants Neil H. Greenberg & Associates, P.C., and Neil H. Greenberg (hereinafter together the Greenberg defendants), and denied that branch of the motion which was for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487(1) against the defendant Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”) (hereinafter Geico). The P & S defendants and the Greenberg defendants separately appeal, and the plaintiff cross-appeals. We affirm.”

“The Greenberg defendants’ contention that the proposed amendment insofar as asserted against them was patently devoid of merit because it was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations is improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see Chao v Westchester Med. Ctr. Advanced Physicians Servs., P.C., 131 AD3d 1130; Melendez v City of New York, 271 AD2d 416).

The P & S defendants’ contention that the proposed amendment insofar as asserted against them was patently devoid of merit because it was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations is without merit. The proposed new cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487(1), which was premised upon the same facts, transactions, or occurrences alleged in the original complaint seeking damages for legal malpractice against the P & S defendants, related back to the date of the original timely complaint (see CPLR 203[f]; see O’Keefe v Barra, 215 AD3d 1039; MBIA Ins. Corp. v J.P. Morgan Sec., LLC, 144 AD3d 635; Cinao v Reers, 27 Misc 3d 195 [Sup Ct, Kings County]).

Contrary to the contentions of the P & S defendants and the Greenberg defendants, “the [proposed] cause of action alleging violation of Judiciary Law § 487 is not duplicative of the cause of action alleging legal malpractice. ‘A violation of Judiciary Law § 487 requires an intent to deceive (see Judiciary Law § 487), whereas a legal malpractice claim is based on negligent conduct'” (Bianco v Law Offs. of Yuri Prakhin, 189 AD3d 1326, 1329, quoting Moormann v Perini & Hoerger, 65 AD3d 1106, 1108; see Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P.C., 164 AD3d at 637).

Further, under the circumstances presented here, the P & S defendants and the Greenberg defendants failed to demonstrate that they would be surprised or prejudiced by the proposed amendment to the complaint or that the proposed amendment was palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see Flowers v Mombrun, 212 AD3d 713, 714-715; Lauder v Goldhamer, 122 AD3d 908).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487(1) against the P & S defendants and the Greenberg defendants.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, that branch of his motion which was for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487(1) against Geico was properly denied as patently devoid of merit (see McCluskey v Gabor & Gabor, 61 AD3d 646, 648), because, among other things, the plaintiff did not allege that Geico acted as counsel of record in any legal proceeding to which Bryant was a party (see Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P.C., 35 NY3d at 177; Pinkesz Mut. Holdings, LLC v Pinkesz, 198 AD3d 693, 697-698; Mazzocchi v Gilbert, 185 AD3d 438).”

“

Will B. Sandler Disclaimer Trust v Swersky 2025 NY Slip Op 05909 [242 AD3d 625]
October 23, 2025 Appellate Division, First Department is a fairly unusual case in which an attorney was in business with a clieint for 30 years or more. When the attorney dieed, his interest in a particular LLC was a bequest to his wife, who rejected the bequest. The LLC interest passed to a “Disclaimer Trust” which then sued the former partner over a $ 3.5 million dollar asset. Counterclaims against the trust fell.

“Nonparty Will B. Sandler was an attorney who entered into a number of business ventures with defendant David M. Swersky over the course of approximately 30 years. In addition to being a co-investor in the ventures, Sandler typically acted as counsel, negotiating and drafting the deal documents. Swersky typically acted as the sole manager and controlling partner of the joint venture. Sandler and Swersky formed defendant S&S 34 Investors LLC as a vehicle through which they would invest in Manhattan real estate. According to the complaint, Sandler received an 8.518% interest in S&S. In 2014, Swersky and Sandler invested in an entity that held an interest in real property located at 460 West 34th Street (2014 transaction).

Sandler died in 2015 and, upon his death, his wife, plaintiff Muriel Sandler, rejected the bequest of Sandler’s interest in S&S, which then passed to plaintiff Will B. Sandler Disclaimer Trust. Muriel is the sole beneficiary of the Trust and she and her two children are its Trustees.

Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that defendants improperly withheld from plaintiffs $3.5 million in proceeds from Sandler’s interest in S&S and actively concealed this from plaintiffs. Defendants asserted a counterclaim for rescission against plaintiffs, alleging that the 2014 transaction was the product of Sandler’s breach of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct or, alternatively, a breach of Sandler’s fiduciary duty as Swersky’s attorney. Defendants also asserted a counterclaim for legal malpractice against plaintiffs, alleging that Sandler committed legal malpractice through his various errors and intentional acts surrounding the 2014 transaction.

Supreme Court properly granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the counterclaims for failure to state a cause of action as against plaintiffs because plaintiffs are not the proper parties to the counterclaims. Despite being labelled as a claim for rescission, the first counterclaim asserts a claim against plaintiffs for Sandler’s alleged breach of his ethical and fiduciary duty to defendants. This counterclaim is based only on the alleged conduct of Sandler and not on the conduct of plaintiffs. Accordingly, there is no basis to assert the counterclaim against plaintiffs, who did not owe an ethical or fiduciary duty to defendants.

Moreover, rescission is an equitable remedy and a claim for rescission may only be asserted against a person who is a party to the contract (see McGarry v Miller, 158 AD2d 327, 328 [1st Dept 1990] [dismissing rescission cause of action against nonparty to the contract]; Steinberg v Sherman, 2008 WL 2156726, *7, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 37367, *19-21 [SD NY, May 8, 2008, No. 07cv1001 (WHP)]). Here, plaintiffs were not parties to the 2014 transaction.”

Real estate litigation and legal malpractice share a long brotherhood, and Chef Michael Barton Rest., LLC v Wknapp LTD. 2025 NY Slip Op 35003(U) December 23, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 654339/2022 Judge: Kathleen Waterman-Marshall is an example of how the lack of privity dooms the claim.

“This action arises out of the sale of a restaurant business. Defendant Wknapp LTD
(“Wknapp”) sold its restaurant business to plaintiff Chef Michael Barton Restaurants LLC
(“Barton Restaurants”) pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement (the “ASA”) and a later amended Asset Purchase Agreement (the “Amended ASA”). Mr. Knapp signed both ASAs in his corporate capacity on behalf of Wknapp, and in his individual capacity only “as to his obligations under paragraph 14.” Defendant and second-third party plaintiff Elissa Hecker, Esq. (“Ms. Hecker”) was Barton Restaurants’ attorney in the purchase transaction.
As relevant to this motion, paragraph 14 of the ASA is a non-compete covenant. When
the ASA was amended, the paragraph numbering changed, and paragraph 14 of the ASA was renumbered as paragraph 13 in the Amended ASA. Despite being renumbered as paragraph 13 in the Amended ASA, the non-compete paragraph continued to internally reference itself as paragraph 14. The signature block for Mr. Knapp in both the ASA and Amended ASA stated that he signed in his personal capacity only as to paragraph 14, notwithstanding the change in paragraph numbers.
Barton Restaurants and Michael Barton commenced this action alleging, in sum and
substance, that Mr. Knapp and Wknapp breached the express warranties in the ASA by
misrepresenting the condition of the premises, and that Ms. Hecker committed malpractice by failing to perform the appropriate due diligence to discover publicly available unresolved Department of Building violations related to the premises. By decision and order dated October 11, 2023, the jurist previously assigned to this matter dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against Mr. Knapp, finding that the only portion of the ASA signed in Mr. Knapp’s individual capacity was the covenant not to compete with plaintiffs after the sale.
In December 2024, Ms. Hecker filed the second third-party action against Mr. Knapp,
seeking common law indemnification and contribution from him for any damages the Barton plaintiffs obtain against Ms. Hecker.”

“Ms. Hecker’s second-third party complaint for contribution and indemnification is not
viable because there is no basis to seek contribution or indemnification for legal malpracticefrom Mr. Knapp (see generally, Rivas v Raymond Schwartzberg & Associates, PLLC, 52 AD3d 401 [1st Dept 2008]). Contrary to Ms. Hecker’s argument, neither the ASA nor the Amended ASA require Mr. Knapp to contractually indemnify Ms. Hecker for legal malpractice.
To the extent that Ms. Hecker’s second third-party complaint seeks common law
indemnity, it is likewise unviable because she did not delegate her due diligence responsibility as counsel for Barton Restaurants to Mr. Knapp (Board of Mgrs. of Oliver Park Condominium v Maspeth Props., LLC, 170 AD3d 645, 647 [2d Dept 2019] [party seeking common law indemnification “must have delegated exclusive responsibility… to the party from whom indemnification is sought”]; Desena v North Shore Hebrew Academy, 119 AD3d 631, 635 [2014] [“predicate of common law indemnity is liability without actual fault”] quoting Trustees of Columbia Univ. v Michell/Giurgola Assoc., 109 AD2d 449, 453 [1st Dept 1985]). That Mr. Knapp owes a duty to Ms. Hecker’s former client Barton Restaurant under the non-compete covenant does not transform into a duty owed to Ms. Hecker regarding her due diligence as counsel. Put simply, Mr. Knapp does not share in Ms. Hecker’s responsibility, if any, for plaintiffs’ alleged malpractice loss (Rivas, 52 AD3d at 401).
Contribution is permitted only between parties who are subject to liability for damages
for the same injury (CPLR § 1401). “The critical requirement for apportionment under… CPLR article 14 is that the breach of duty by the contributing party must have had a part in causing or augmenting the injury for which contribution is sought” (Nassau Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. Inc. v Facilities Dev. Corp., 71 NY2d 599 [1988]). As Mr. Knapp has been dismissed from the main party action, as a matter of law he does not share in responsibility for the injuries alleged in the main party action and, therefore, contribution for the main party claims is unavailable (see generally, Gonzales v Jacoby & Meyers, 258 AD2d 560 [2d Dept 1999] [law firm could not seek contribution from third-party for malpractice claim where the third-party was not responsible for the malpractice]).
Therefore, dismissal of the second-third party complaint is also appropriate under CPLR
3211(a)(7).”

Chen v Romona Keveza Collection LLC 2025 NY Slip Op 34953(U) December 16, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 153413/2020
Judge: Emily Morales-Minerva

Attorney wants out, client wants him to stay, huge payments and unauthorized use of a corporate credit card notwithstanding.

“Non-party movant Sutton Sachs Meyer PLLC, New York, NY (Zachary G. Meyers, Esq., of counsel), moves, by order to show cause (mot. seq. no. 010), pursuant to CPLR § 321 (bl (2), for an order permitting it to withdraw as attorney of record for defendants ROMONA KEVEZA COLLECTION, LLC, ROMONA KEVEZA ONE ROCK, LLC, ROMONA KEVEZA 1 ROCK, LLC, and ROMONA KEVEZA (defendants) . 1 Plaintiffs JOSEPH CHEN, INC., and DINA KOZLOVSKA (plaintiffs) oppose the application, {l) arguing prejudice and
(2) asserting that non-party Zachary G. Meyers, Esq., of counsel to defendants, has engaged in a “repeated pattern of misconduct and dilatory behaviorn (New York State Courts Electronic Filing System [NYSCEF) Doc. No. 375, affirmation of James E. Murphy in Opposition, ~ 2). Therefore, plaintiffs move for sanctions against non-party movant Sutton Sachs Meyer PLLC, New York, NY (Zachary G. Meyers, Esq., of counsel) and/or Zachary G. Meyers, Esq., individually (see id.; see also Uniform Civil Rules for Supreme Court [22 NYCRR] § 130-1.1 [c] [2] [Costs;sanctions])”

“On record, Zachary G. Meyers stated that the attorneyclient relationship between non-party law firm and defendants is irretrievably broken. In support of this contention, Zachary G. Meyers stated that Romana Keveza threatened to file a legal malpractice action against him and that she threatened to report Zachary G. Meyers to the bar, among other things.

Romona Keveza countered, under oath, that she never made such threats and that Zachary G. Meyers’s statements are completely false. Romona Keveza affirmed that she did not know how to reach the bar, and that she was completely surprised by the allegations her counsel was making against her. Further, Romona Keveza expressed wanting Zachary G. Meyers to continue to represent her and defendants Romana Keveza Collection, LLC, Romona Keveza One Rock, LLC, and Romona Keveza 1 Rock, LLC.”

In response, Zachary G. Meyers explicitly stated that his client was lying to the Court, insisting that she did threaten him with a legal malpractice action and challenging other
statements Romona Keveza made on the record as untrue. Romona Keveza asserted, under oath, that, among other things, Zachary G. Meyers charged at or around $180,000.00 to her corporate credit card without her permission, and that she
has paid him substantially for his services. Romona Keveza continued to express shock at how counsel characterized her. Still, Romona Keveza expressed hope of not having to engage new counsel and of having this Court deny non-party’s application.

An attorney may withdraw as counsel upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, and reasonable notice (see CPLR § 321 [b] [2]; see also Bok v Werner, 9 AD3d 318 [1st Dept
2004]). “Good cause exists [for counsel] to end [their] relationship with [a] client [when there is an] irretrievable breakdown in the relationship or a failure of cooperation by the
client” (Matter of Cassini, 182 AD3d 13, 40 [2d Dept 2020]; see also Raff & Becker LLP v Kaiser Saurborn & Mair, P.C., 160 AD3d 479 (1st Dept 2018]). The question of whether good cause exists lies within the sound discretion of the court (see Rivadeneria v
New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 306 AD2d 394 [2d Dept 2003]).”

“Here, counsel Zachary G. Meyers and his client Romona Keveza make serious statements against each other, advancing materially different versions of the facts underlying nonparty’s motion for withdrawal. This circumstance presents a clear question of credibility. However, no genuine question exists that their attorney-client relationship has irreparably broken down.
Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion to grant the subject motion, permitting non-party Sutton Sachs Meyer PLLC to withdraw, and staying this action to provide defendants an opportunity to obtain new counsel.”

Calixto v A. Balsamo & Rosenblatt, P.C. 2025 NY Slip Op 06686 Decided on December 3, 2025 Appellate Division, Second Department is the story of a L & T law firm that had an apartment building client, and apparently kept starting cases, knowing that the claims were exagerated and that the apartment building was not registered.

“The plaintiff was a resident of an apartment in a building located in Brooklyn. The building was managed by the defendant Justice McAllister and claimed to be owned by the defendants 266 Realty NY, LLC (hereinafter 266 Realty), and Heung Sang Tam (hereinafter collectively the building defendants). The plaintiff paid her rent directly to Heung Sang Tam, and the building defendants claimed that the apartment was rent stabilized, although there was no written lease for the apartment, and the plaintiff allegedly was never informed that the apartment was rent stabilized.

According to the plaintiff, over the course of her tenancy, defects in the apartment developed that Heung Sang Tam refused to repair. In March 2017, the plaintiff began to withhold her rent payments, with the intent to pay once the repairs were made. The plaintiff received a five-day notice dated August 21, 2017, from the defendant A. Balsamo & Rosenblatt, P.C. (hereinafter A. Balsamo), on behalf of 266 Realty, stating that the plaintiff was indebted to 266 Realty for her failure to pay rent. On or about September 13, 2017, A. Balsamo commenced a nonpayment proceeding on behalf of 266 Realty against the plaintiff, seeking to recover rent arrears in an amount [*2]significantly more than what the plaintiff withheld and a warrant of eviction. In response, the plaintiff paid the amount of rent she had withheld, but the nonpayment proceeding continued.

Thereafter, the plaintiff’s attorney obtained records indicating that the building was not registered with the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development and had not been registered with the New York State Division of Homes and Community Renewal since at least 1984. The plaintiff’s attorney additionally discovered that A. Balsamo and the defendants Balsamo, Rosenblatt & Hall, P.C., Robert Rosenblatt, Edward Hall, and Serenay Taysin (hereinafter collectively the attorney defendants), on behalf of the building defendants, commenced similar proceedings against various tenants. In the nonpayment proceeding, in an order dated February 16, 2018, the Civil Court of the City of New York granted dismissal of the proceeding on the ground that the building was not registered and, thus, the Multiple Dwelling Law prohibited 266 Realty from collecting any rent from the plaintiff.

In March 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action, asserting causes of action alleging a violation of General Business Law § 349 (first cause of action), negligence per se (third cause of action), and gross negligence (fourth cause of action) against the defendants, and a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 (second cause of action) against the attorney defendants. The building defendants and the attorney defendants separately moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. In an order dated April 6, 2022, the Supreme Court granted the separate motions. The plaintiff appeals.”

“Here, the complaint alleged that if the defendants had exercised even the slightest amount of due diligence, they would have realized that the amount they were seeking from the plaintiff was incorrect, that the allegation that the building was in compliance with rent-stabilization laws was false, and that the judgment amount that they demanded was not authorized by law. As such, the complaint sufficiently alleged the material elements of a gross negligence cause of action (see Dolphin Holdings, Ltd. v Gander & White Shipping, Inc., 122 AD3d 901, 903). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the separate motions of the building defendants and the attorney defendants which were to dismiss the fourth cause of action, alleging gross negligence, insofar as asserted against each of them.

A cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 “requires, among other things, an act of deceit by an attorney, with intent to deceive the court or any party” (Grasso v Guarino, 227 AD3d 872, 873 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Shaffer v Gilberg, 125 AD3d 632, 636; Lazich v Vittoria & Parker, 189 AD2d 753, 754). “Relief pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487 is not lightly given, and requires a showing of egregious conduct or a chronic and extreme pattern of behavior on the part of the defendant attorneys” (Kaufman v Moritt Hock & Hamroff, LLP, 192 AD3d 1092, 1093 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]). “‘To mislead the court or a party is to deceive it; and, if knowingly done, constitutes criminal deceit under the statute.’. . . While attorneys must zealously advocate for their clients, such deception or collusion is antithetical to appropriate advocacy, functioning as a fraud on the court or a party” (Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P.C., 35 NY3d 173, 179 [emphasis omitted], quoting Amalfitano v Rosenberg, 12 NY3d 9, 14).

Here, the complaint alleged that the attorney defendants continued to litigate against the plaintiff despite having knowledge that the building defendants had misrepresented the amount owed and had misrepresented that the building was properly registered under rent-stabilization laws. The complaint further alleged that the attorney defendants were engaged in similar lawsuits against additional tenants. Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint adequately stated a cause of action to recover damages for a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 against the attorney defendants (see Garanin v Hiatt, 219 AD3d 958, 959). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the attorney defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the second cause of action, alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487.”

In Coalition of Landlords, Homeowners, & Merchants, Inc. v Glass, https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_05936.htm2025 NY Slip Op 05936 [242 AD3d 1172] October 29, 2025 Appellate Division, Second Department it was alleged that a false lease was used to defeat a claim. The Judiciary Law 487 claim was that the attorneys knew the lease was false and offered it anyways. The Court dismissed.

“The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants, attorneys for the plaintiffs’ former landlord, alleging, among other things, that the defendants knowingly submitted a fraudulent 2010 lease agreement (hereinafter the 2010 lease) to the District Court, Suffolk County, in connection with a holdover proceeding (see Anthi New Neocronon Corp. v Coalition of Landlords, 73 Misc 3d 136[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51067[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2021]) and to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, in connection with a plenary action commenced by the plaintiffs seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring their rights pursuant to a purported purchase agreement for the building where they rented their offices (see Coalition of Landlords, Homeowners & Merchants, Inc. v S. & A. Neocronon, Inc., 224 AD3d 658 [2024]). The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the amended complaint. The plaintiffs opposed. In an order dated December 18, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiffs appeal.”

“”Under Judiciary Law § 487 (1), an attorney who ‘[i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party’ is liable to the injured party for treble damages” (Altman v DiPreta, 204 AD3d 965, 968 [2022]; see Mohammad v Rehman, 236 AD3d 892, 894 [2025]). “Relief pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487 is not lightly given, and requires a showing of egregious conduct or a chronic and extreme pattern of behavior on the part of the defendant attorneys” (Kaufman v Moritt Hock & Hamroff, LLP, 192 AD3d 1092, 1093 [2021] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the plaintiffs failed to allege that the defendants engaged in egregious conduct or a chronic and extreme pattern of behavior.”