Champerty is not a subject that generates wide discussion.  You won’t see a blog about it on Gawker.  When the word comes up, we see a figure from a Daumier etching or a Puck cartoon.  Nevertheless, the transfer of causes of action from individual to individual or to a corporate entity is higly regulated.

In Melcher v Greenberg Traurig LLP  2014 NY Slip Op 51296(U)  Decided on August 19, 2014  Supreme Court, New York County  Sherwood, J. we see the denial of a request to transfer or assign interests to an entity.  It should be remembered that Mr. Melcher made history in his Court of Appeals decision.  There the Court said: ‘Thus, even if a claim for attorney deceit originated in the first Statute of Westminster rather than preexisting English common law (a question unresolved by Amalfitano and disputed by the parties in this case), liability for attorney deceit existed at New York common law prior to 1787. As a result, claims for attorney deceit are subject to the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 (1). Because of our disposition of this appeal, we do not reach and need not resolve Melcher’s other arguments.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint denied."

Here, back in Supreme Court, we see a denial of his assignment request.  "Plaintiff Melcher initiated this action for attorney misconduct pursuant to the New York Judiciary Law §487 in 2007. Now, Melcher, 74, moves to substitute a limited liability company, LJBD Recovery LLC (LJBD) for himself as plaintiff in this action pursuant to CPLR 1018. Plaintiff has assigned his interests in this litigation to LJBD, which he created, and of which he is sole owner and manager. Plaintiff who states that "I am currently in good health", claims the substitution will avoid delay in prosecuting the case in the event of his death, and argues that as such an assignment is not prohibited pursuant to General Obligations Law § 13-101, it is permissible.Defendants argue that the proposed assignment is unnecessary and prejudicial, as Melcher, as a non-party, would be less accessible for discovery, and because the assignment could act to insulate Melcher from decisions of the court. Defendants also argue that the substitution "contravenes clear and long-settled public policy against champerty" (Opp., NYSECF Doc. No. 155 at 4).

When an assignment was made after litigation had already begun, courts have allowed a transfer of claims (see Rosenkrantz v Berlin, 65 Misc 2d 320 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1971]), but prohibited the addition of new claims (see Erlich v Rebco Ins. Exchange, Ltd., 225 AD2d 75, 77 [1st Dept 1996]).The proposed substitution, if allowed, would prejudice the defendants by shifting the risks of litigation to a shell entity, making plaintiff less accessible to discovery, and allowing Melcher, a non-party, to continue to direct the litigation through his alter ego and to collect and retain all of the relevant information and documents. The plaintiff’s rationale for the substitution, to allow the litigation to continue seamlessly in the event of his death, ignores that he is the sole owner and manager of the proposed substitute plaintiff. Plaintiff provides no rationale for how litigation would continue more smoothly with the sole owner and manager of LJBD deceased, than it would with an administrator appointed for a deceased plaintiff (see Moore v Washington, 34 AD2d 903, 904 [1st Dept 1970]). Accordingly, the court declines the invitation to allow the substitution. Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute LJBD Recovery LLC is DENIED."