As is true of many other things, this story started with mismanaged money.  The original problem was exacerbated by mismanaged litigation.  in Gordon v Barrett  2014 NY Slip Op 51431(U)
Decided on September 30, 2014  Supreme Court, Kings County  Schmidt, J. plaintiff originally had money problems. 

"Plaintiff Gloria Gordon (plaintiff [FN1] ) maintains that, in 2002, she unwittingly and under false pretenses conveyed title to her six-family house at 646 East 96th Street in Brooklyn (Block 4755, Lot 69) (the property) to a Malco entity for a fraction of its value and became Malco’s tenant under a lease which contained an option for her to buy back her property at a stated price, but that Malco refused to honor the option and sold her property in Oct. 2012 to defendant 646 East 96 Street Associates, LLC (Associates). As part of this action, she sought to file a notice of pendency, dated Oct. 3, 2013, against the property. The County Clerk initially declined to accept her notice for filing because of a previously expired and vacated notice of pendency (a lapsed notice of pendency) she filed in connection with her 2004 action against Malco under index No. 19828/04 for specific performance of the sale/leaseback agreement and for a declaration that she was the true owner of the property (the prior action). On Oct. 8, 2013, the County Clerk, in accordance with an unopposed order to show cause of the same date, accepted for filing plaintiff’s notice of pendency, pending a hearing on plaintiff’s motion in Seq. No. 2 to deem such notice valid and effective. In addition, presently before the Court are two pre-answer motions to dismiss, one in Seq. No. 4 served by Associates, and the other in Seq. No. 3 served by plaintiff’s former counsel Clover Barrett, Esq. (Barrett [FN2] ) in the prior action.

Associates’ fourth and final argument for dismissal is that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cause of action against it under CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Associates posits that it is a bona fide purchaser for value because, when it recorded its deed to the property from Malco, the notice of pendency in the prior action had already lapsed and plaintiff’s sale/leaseback agreement with Malco was never recorded. Associates’ position raises a threshold question of whether, at the time of its purchase of the property, it was chargeable with constructive or inquiry notice of plaintiff’s competing claim by virtue of her lapsed notice of pendency.

"At common law, the doctrine of lis pendens provided that any person who purchased real property that was the subject of litigation was presumed to have constructive notice of the dispute and was bound by the judgment in the action as if he or she were a party to it" (Kolel Damsek Eliezer, Inc. v Schlesinger, 90 AD3d 851, 855 [2d Dept 2011], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 919 [2012]). Thus, a search of all court records was required under the common-law lis pendens doctrine to determine whether real property in which a purchaser sought an interest was the subject of pending litigation (id.). Because this cumbersome process of searching through court records was seen as an intolerable burden effectively restraining alienation of real property, "the common-law lis pendens doctrine was replaced in most states by statutes requiring the filing of a notice of pendency before a would-be purchaser . . . would be charged with notice of the prior interest" (Matter of Sakow, 97 NY2d 436, 440-441 [2002] [internal citation omitted]).[FN3] This reduced the harshness of the former [*4]common-law rule because the notice of pendency is now filed with the records pertaining to the real property itself, and third persons are chargeable with knowledge only of what appears in the records filed in the central registry (see Kolel Damsek Eliezer, Inc., 90 AD3d at 855-856). The primary purpose of the notice of pendency procedure set forth in CPLR article 65 is to furnish a substitute for actual notice of pending litigation (see Da Silva, 76 NY2d at 442).

On the other hand, once a notice of pendency expires, or is vacated or canceled, it is considered to be a "nullity" — a "void" that cannot be filled (see Sakow, 97 NY2d at 442).[FN4] The authorities are nearly uniform in their conclusion that a lapsed notice of pendency in a subsisting action does not impart inquiry notice to a prospective purchaser despite his or her actual knowledge of the lapsed notice of pendency (see Polish Natl. Alliance of Brooklyn, U.S.A. v White Eagle Hall Co., 98 AD2d 400, 405 [2d Dept 1983] [a lapsed notice of pendency could not affect the rights of contract vendees who acquired their interest in the property after the notice lapsed]; Walter v State Bank of Albany, 73 AD2d 406, 408 [3d Dept 1980] [an expired notice of pendency had no effect as to the parties acquiring and/or perfecting an interest in real property after its expiration]; Bankers Trust Co. of Cal., N.A. v Bok, 26 Misc 3d 1203[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52650[U] [Sup Ct, NY County] ["A Notice of Pendency . . . only serves as constructive notice while it is valid. . . . In the case at bar, there was only one Notice of Pendency, which . . . expired long before (the property buyer) obtained title."] [internal citations omitted]; but see Schoepp v State of NY, 69 AD2d 917, 917 [3d Dept 1979] [the defendant was responsible for determining the disposition of the action in which the lis pendens was filed but later expired]).

In conclusion, Barrett’s motion can be quickly disposed. However denominated in the complaint, plaintiff’s claims against Barrett sound in legal malpractice and, as such, are time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations, considering that Barrett’s representation of plaintiff in the prior action ended no later than Feb. 27, 2009, when Barrett was relieved by court order entered on consent of plaintiff’s successor counsel (see Biberaj v Acocella, 2014 NY Slip Op 06165 [2d Dept]).[FN10] Plaintiff’s claims against Barrett are also barred by the doctrine of res judicata because in a separate action under index No. 4960/09 instituted by Barrett against her for unpaid legal fees arising from Barrett’s representation of her in the prior action, the Appellate Division, Second Department (at 90 AD3d 973 [2011]), upheld Barrett’s default judgment against her. "