The overwhelming effect of an attorney fee award on legal malpractice cannot be overstated.  The general understanding is that no fee may be awarded to an attorney if there has been malpractice, hence, if an award is made, there could have been no malpractice.  So, when the attorney gets his awarded fees, that wipes out the legal malpractice case. 

This principal was the basis of Raghavendra v Brill  2014 NY Slip Op 33035(U)  November 26, 2014 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: 600002/2011 Judge: Lucy Billings.

"Plaintiff seeks reargument, C.P.L.R. § 2221(d) (2), insisting he court erroneously held that the United States District Court’s decision entitling defendants Stober and the Law Office of Louis D. Stober to attorneys’ fees for representing plaintiff, Raghavendra v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 686 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 434 F. App’x 31 (2d Cir. 2011), barred his legal malpractice claims against the Stober defendants under the doctrine of res judicata.  C.P.L.R. § 3211{a) (5). Plaintiff seeks renewal, C.P.L.R. § 2221(e) (2), claiming new facts that constitute defendants’ continuing violation of his rights. The only claims that the court dismissed in this action based on the applicable statute of limitations, C.P.L.R. §§ 215(3), 3211(a) (5), however, were plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and abuse of judicial process by the Stober defendants, Spinale v. 10 West 66th St. Corp., 291 A.D.2d 234, 235 (1st Dep’t 2002), and his claim of intentional wrongdoing, which the court construed as a claim for a prima facie tort. Casa de Meadows Inc. (Cayman Is.) v. Zaman, 76 A.D.3d 917, 921 (1st Dep’t 2010).

Plaintiff’s reiteration of a lack of opportunity to litigate the Stober defendants’ misconduct and malpractice in the federal district court’s adjudication of the parties’ attorneys’ fees dispute does not point to any facts that this court overlooked. Instead, he claims that the authority the court relied on, Finkel v. New York City Hous. Auth., 89 A.D.3d 492 (1st Dep’t 2011); Bettis v. Kelly, 68 A.D.3d 578 (1st Dep’t 2009).; Urlic v. Insurance Co. of State of Penn., 259 A.D.2d 1 (1st Dep’t 1999);
and Uzamere v. Uzamere, 89 A.D.3d 1013 (2d Dep’t 2011), was inapposite because the plaintiffs in those actions had an opportunity to litigate the merits of their claims in a prior action. See Bisk v. Manhattan Club Timeshare Ass’n, Inc., 118 A.D.3d 585, 585 (1st Dep’t 2014). His argument completely ignores this court’s analysis and determination that the federal district court’s conclusion regarding the Stober defendants’ entitlement to fees was on the merits and arose from the same transactions and occurrences as his malpractice claims in this action. RM 18 Corp v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A.,  104 A.D.3d 752, 756 (2d Dep’t 2013); Uzamere v. Uzamere, 89 A.D.3d at 1014. See Insurance Co. of State of Pa. v. HSBC Bank of USA, 10 N.Y.3d 32, 39 (2008). "