Judiciary Law 487 is a powerful common law tool for use in legal malpractice and attorney deceit settings.  However, it can be overused.  Overuse dilutes its power, and causes judges to, in effect, roll their eyes at the mere mention. AQ Asset Mgt., LLC v Levine  2014 NY Slip Op 05244 [119  AD3d 457]  July 10, 2014  Appellate Division, First Department  is an example.

"By an amended stock purchase agreement (SPA) effective December 9, 2005, defendants Habsburg and Patrizzi (together the sellers) agreed to sell half of the shares in a group of companies (the Antiquorum entities) to Artist House Holdings, Inc. (Artist House), predecessor to plaintiff AQ Asset Management, LLC (AQ). [FN1]The Antiquorum entities included plaintiffs Antiquorum, S.A. (ASA) and Antiquorum USA, Inc. Defendant Michael Levine, an attorney, provided legal counsel to the sellers, drafted the SPA and other transaction documents, and served as the escrow agent for the deal. Plaintiff Evan Zimmermann, also an attorney, helped broker the  transaction and is alleged by the sellers to have been their legal counsel throughout.
The SPA provided that the sellers would receive $30 million in cash, as well as proceeds from the sale of certain inventory held by the Antiquorum entities. In order to pay the book value of the inventory, the SPA provided that ASA was to execute a promissory note obligating it to pay, to an unspecified third party, the sum of 16 million Swiss Francs (CHF) within six months of the SPA’s execution date. The SPA further provided that, "[a]lternatively, Patrizzi may become personally responsible [for payment of the CHF 16 million] to any Stockholder which is entitled thereto."
The parties agreed that the CHF 16 million was to be paid from the sale of inventory on hand and owned by the Antiquorum entities as of the date of the SPA. The SPA also required Patrizzi to put the inventory up for sale before the due date of the promissory note, and provided that any funds received in excess of the CHF 16 million would belong to Patrizzi or his designees. According to the sellers, Habsburg was entitled to the first CHF 16 million in inventory sale proceeds and Patrizzi was entitled to the remainder. It is undisputed that ASA never executed a promissory note, and the sellers contend that they received no proceeds from the sale of inventory .

The motion court correctly dismissed the ninth and tenth causes of action in the fourth-party complaint alleging legal malpractice against Levine, and the seventeenth counterclaim alleging legal malpractice against Zimmermann, as barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]; Champlin v Pellegrin, 111 AD3d 411 [1st Dept 2013]). These claims accrued no later than August 2007, when the sellers became aware of Levine’s and Zimmermann’s alleged betrayal and any attorney-client relationship had come to an end. Since the claims were not brought until, at the earliest, December 2010, when this action was commenced, they are untimely.

Contrary to the sellers’ contention, the statute of limitations was not tolled by alleged fraudulent concealment (see Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 448-449 [1978]). Any improper collaboration between Levine and Zimmermann would have come to light no later than August 2007 and thus, there could be no tolling after that date. Nor was the limitations period tolled by continuous representation (see Matter of Merker, 18 AD3d 332, 332-333 [1st Dept 2005]). Communications dated after August 2007 do not demonstrate that Levine and Zimmermann continued to represent the sellers. In light of the dismissal of the malpractice claims against Levine, the motion court properly dismissed the eleventh cause of action in the fourth-party complaint seeking forfeiture of Levine’s legal fees.

The sixth interpleader counterclaim and seventh cause of action in the fourth-party complaint, which allege that Levine violated Judiciary Law § 487 by bringing his interpleader claims without informing the court of his purported business relationship with Zimmermann, were properly dismissed. The absence of such information in Levine’s interpleader pleading does not rise to the level of "withholding of crucial information from a court" or "conceal[ing] from a court . . . a fact . . . required by law to [be] disclose[d]" (see Melcher v Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 102 AD3d 497, 500 [1st Dept 2013], revd on other grounds 23 NY3d 10 [2014])."