Privity in legal malpractice law is one of the major stumbling blocks.  People definitely suffer from the acts of attorneys, yet may not be in a direct contractual relationship with the attiring.  Executors and estates are one prime example, and in the past (before Schneider v. Finmann)  had almost no ability to sue the attorneys. 

Betz v Blatt  2014 NY Slip Op 02554 [116 AD3d 813]  April 16, 2014  Appellate Division, Second Department is a prime example. 

"This action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice, challenges the work performed by attorneys and law firms who represented an executor of a decedent’s estate, who was removed for cause. In his will, the decedent left the bulk of his estate to his daughters, the plaintiff [*2]and Christina Carbone-Lopez. The decedent also named his brother, Michaelangelo Carbone (hereinafter Carbone), as executor. After contested probate proceedings, including a contested accounting, Carbone’s letters testamentary were suspended and he was surcharged in excess of $1,025,000 for his looting and mismanagement of the estate. On prior appeals from orders of the Surrogate’s Court, this Court upheld those sanctions (see Matter of Carbone, 101 AD3d 866 [2012]). The plaintiff was substituted as executor.

In her capacity as executor, the plaintiff commenced this action alleging, inter alia, legal malpractice by the defendants George A. Sirignano, Jr., Enea, Scanlan & Sirignano, LLP (hereinafter together the Sirignano defendants), Arnold W. Blatt, and Anthony J. Pieragostini. Each of the defendants represented Carbone in the contested probate proceedings.

"Contrary to the Supreme Court’s factual finding, the Sirignano defendants’ retainer agreement with Carbone does not contain the phrase "administration of the estate." Both the retainer agreement and the facts as pleaded in the complaint indicate that the Sirignano defendants were retained solely to defend Carbone in the contested accounting proceeding and related matters, and were not retained to administrate the estate. Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in finding that the Sirignano defendants "under[took] a duty of undivided loyalty to the Estate and its beneficiaries." Since the documentary evidence demonstrates that the Sirignano defendants were not in privity with the estate, and because the plaintiff failed to plead specific facts tending to show that the Sirignano defendants engaged in fraud or colluded with Carbone, the plaintiff did not assert a viable cause of action against them on the estate’s behalf to recover damages for legal malpractice. Accordingly, the eleventh cause of action, which alleged legal malpractice by the Sirignano defendants, must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (see Keness v Feldman, Kramer & Monaco, P.C., 105 AD3d at 813; Jacobs v Kay, 50 AD3d at 526-527; Chinello v Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, LLP, 15 AD3d at 895; Conti v Polizzotto, 243 AD2d at 672). For the same reasons, the twelfth cause of action, which alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the Sirignano defendants, was properly dismissed.

This Court has held that "an attorney represents the administrators individually and not the estate itself" (Matter of Hof, 102 AD2d 591, 593 [1984], citing Matter of Schrauth, 249 App Div 847, 847 [1937], and Matter of Scanlon, 2 Misc 2d 65, 69 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1956] see Matter of Della Chiesa, 23 AD2d 562 [1965])."