When does continuing representation end?  In the absence of a bright line rule, the Courts and practitioners have to rely upon arguments that the representation continued while there was a continuing relationship of trust and confidence and a shared understanding of the need for more work on the case.  An alternative bright line rule might be that continuing representation ends with a filed consent to change attorneys or a court order.

In Beroza v Sallah Law Firm, P.C.  2015 NY Slip Op 01913  Decided on March 11, 2015  Appellate Division, Second Department the court denies a motion to dismiss without any real explanation of what the parties did to indicate continuing representation.

“The three-year limitations period applicable to causes of action to recover damages for legal malpractice “may be tolled by the continuous representation doctrine where there is a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim” (Aseel v Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 AD3d 1037, 1038 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Zorn v Gilbert, 8 NY3d 933, 934; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 306; Singh v Edelstein, 103 AD3d 873, 874). “For the doctrine to apply, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney” (Aseel v Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 AD3d at 1038 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d 511, 512). ” One of the predicates for the application of the doctrine is continuing trust and confidence in the relationship between the parties'” (Aseel v Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 AD3d at 1038, quoting Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d 505, 507; see Coyne v Bersani, 61 NY2d 939; Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d at 512).

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to dismissal of the complaint based on the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR [*2]214[6]). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the applicable statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation (see Kitty Jie Yuan v 2368 W. 12th St., LLC, 119 AD3d at 674-675; Bill Kolb, Jr., Subaru, Inc. v LJ Rabinowitz, CPA, 117 AD3d 978, 980; Macaluso v Del Col, 95 AD3d 959, 960-961).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.”