What happens when a plaintiff partnership sues and then loses?  Well, in Ernest & Maryanna Jeremias Family Partnership, L.P v Sadykov   2015 NY Slip Op 25100  Decided on April 7, 2015  Appellate Term, Second Department the next thing the plaintiff partnership does is realize that they were represented by a partner who was not an attorney.  So, with the greatest chutzpah, they ask for a new trial because they were not represented by an attorney.  (think:  Murder case, defendant orphan’s claim for leniency)

“On April 20, 2012, landlord, a limited partnership, served tenant with a notice of petition and petition alleging the nonpayment of rent totaling $5,421.66, due from November 2011 through January 2012 for a rent-stabilized apartment. Ernest Jeremias, a partner of landlord, verified the petition as landlord’s agent. On April 25, 2012, tenant filed an answer, asserting a general denial and a warranty-of-habitability defense. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court found that tenant was entitled to a complete setoff and, among other things, dismissed the petition. On appeal, landlord principally argues that the entire proceeding is a nullity because landlord appeared by Mr. Jeremias, who is not an attorney, citing CPLR 321 (a), which requires that corporations and voluntary associations be represented by counsel in court proceedings.”

“Where it is the answering party that must be represented by an attorney, any action taken by a non-attorney representative of the party, who lacks standing to appear (Boente v Peter C. Kurth Off. of Architecture & Planning, P.C., 113 AD3d 803, 804 [2014]; People v Park Ave. Plastic Surgery, P.C., 48 AD3d 367, 367 [2008]; Bilello v Genesis Seafood, Inc., 12 AD3d 474, 474 [2004]; Mail Boxes Etc. USA v Higgins, 281 AD2d 176, 176 [2001]; Barretta Realty Skyline v Principal Land Abstract, LLC, 38 Misc 3d 146[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50327[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]), is a nullity (Boente, 113 AD3d at 804; Evans v Conley, 124 AD2d 981, 982 [1986]),and an adverse determination against such a defending party is deemed entered on default (Boente, 113 AD3d at 804; see e.g. Megan Holding LLC v Conason, 37 Misc 3d 135[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52117[U], *1 [App Term, 1st Dept 2012] [dismissing landlord’s appeal from a final judgment against it because, landlord, having appeared without counsel, the final judgment must be deemed to have been entered on default]). Further, it is well settled that a defaulting party’s attempt to vacate its default on the ground that it had violated CPLR 321 (a) will be rejected “since the rule is not intended to penalize an adverse party for the . . . improper appearance” (Jimenez v Brenillee Corp., 48 AD3d 351, 352 [2008]; see also Lake George Park Commn. v Salvador, 245 AD2d 605, 607 [1997]; 130 Cedar St. Corp. v Ct. Press, Inc., 267 App Div 194, 197 [1943]). The failure of a plaintiff required to be represented by counsel to appear by counsel normally requires that its action be dismissed at the outset (Moran v Hurst, 32 AD3d 909, 910 [2006]; Cindarella Holding Corp. v Calvert Ins. Co., 265 AD2d 444, 444 [1999]). However, here, it is only after a trial of the merits resulting in an adverse determination that landlord seeks to have its action dismissed ab initio and without prejudice. We see no reason why the rule against penalizing an adverse party for the opposing party’s misconduct, essentially one of estoppel, should not likewise be applied to landlord, which improperly commenced the action without counsel. Consequently, landlord’s request to reverse the final judgment and to dismiss the petition is rejected.”