In a short and cryptic decision, the First Department affirmed dismissal of a legal malpractice case. Evart v Shapiro, Beilly & Aronowitz, LLP  2015 NY Slip Op 02847  Decided on April 2, 2015  Appellate Division, First Department consists of just two sentences.  Really only one counts.

“The motion court properly dismissed plaintiff’s legal malpractice claims, since this Court previously dismissed the informed consent claims in the underlying action for lack of causation (Evart v Park Ave. Chiropractic, P.C., 86 AD3d 442 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 922 [2011]). Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish that she would have succeeded on the merits ofher underlying informed consent claims “but for” defendants’ negligence (see AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428, 434 [2007]).

Evart v. Park Ave  was a chiropractic malpractice case coming from a sudden unexpected and disastrous maneuver.  There, the AD wrote:

“Assuming, arguendo, that the questions [of informed consent] were properly before the jury, the result would not change. Plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence in support of her lack of informed consent claim. In order to establish a prima facie claim based upon failure to procure a patient’s informed consent to a procedure, a plaintiff, pursuant to CPLR 4401-a, must first adduce expert testimony establishing that the information disclosed to the patient about the risks inherent in the procedure was qualitatively insufficient (see Rodriguez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 50 AD3d 464 [2008]). The expert offering the opinion must be qualified in the area of medicine at issue (see Gershberg v Wood-Smith, 279 AD2d 424 [2001]). In this case, plaintiff failed to put forth any such testimony, either through her experts, or upon cross-examination of defendants’ witnesses. Thus, the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the jury’s finding that a reasonably prudent person in plaintiff’s position would not have proceeded with treatment had she been fully informed of the risks, benefits and alternatives (Public Health Law § 2805-d [3]; see Thompson v Orner, 36 AD3d 791 [2007]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Catterson, DeGrasse, Abdus-Salaam and RomÁn, JJ.