The oft-repeated statement that legal fee actions invite counterclaims is amply demonstrated in Law Offs. of Ira H. Leibowitz v Landmark Ventures, Inc.  2015 NY Slip Op 06575
Decided on August 19, 2015  Appellate Division, Second Department where a lot of litigation, and an appeal has gone on regarding what appears to be a claim for $ 15,000 or so.

“The plaintiffs, Ira H. Leibowitz and his law offices, commenced this action to recover legal fees for services rendered on behalf of the defendant, Landmark Ventures, Inc. (hereinafter Landmark), in connection with two separate matters. The plaintiffs’ services on each matter were rendered pursuant to separate retainer agreements for each matter.

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the cause of action alleging breach of contract. “Construction of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law, and the intention of the parties may be gathered from the four corners of the instrument and should be enforced according to its terms” (Beal Sav. Bank v Sommer, 8 NY3d 318, 324; see Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v 538 Madison Realty Co., 1 NY3d 470, 475; A. Gugliotta Dev., Inc. v First Am. Tit. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 112 AD3d 559, 560). “A contract is unambiguous if the language it uses has a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the [agreement] itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion'” (Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v Duane Reade, 98 AD3d 403, 406, affd 20 NY3d 1082, quoting Breed v Insurance Co. of N. Am., 46 NY2d 351, 355).

Here, the plaintiffs established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action alleging breach of contract by submitting certain email exchanges between the parties, which demonstrated, “[b]y the plain language employed,” that the plaintiffs made an offer to represent Landmark in each matter for a certain fee, and that Landmark accepted that offer (Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v Duane Reade, 98 AD3d at 405). In one matter, the parties agreed that the plaintiffs would represent Landmark at a rate of $350 per hour. The invoices documenting the number of hours worked and the amount of disbursements paid out demonstrated, prima facie, the plaintiffs’ entitlement to legal fees in the sum of $4,760 in connection with the services rendered for that matter. In the second matter, the agreement was for an initial retainer fee of $5,000, plus a 25% contingency fee with respect to any sums that Landmark ultimately recovered in that matter. Since it is undisputed that, shortly after the commencement of an action in connection with the second matter, Landmark entered into a stipulation of settlement whereby Landmark recovered $40,000, the plaintiffs established, prima facie, entitlement to their full fee of $5,000 plus a contingency fee of 25% of $40,000.

In opposition, Landmark failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Landmark’s counterclaim, which alleged tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective business relations, was premised upon the plaintiffs’ alleged contact with the third party with whom Landmark had entered into the stipulation of settlement in connection with the second matter. Specifically, Landmark alleged that, contrary to the terms of the stipulation, the plaintiffs requested that certain of the agreed-upon payments be made directly to them as Landmark’s counsel, rather than to Landmark. The ostensible purpose of this communication was to ensure that the plaintiffs would be able to deduct their legal fees from the settlement funds.”