For social policy reasons, courts have severely limited the class of persons who may sue an attorney for legal malpractice.  The alternative, courts have often held, is chaos.  After every case, no matter who wins, the losing party will sue both attorneys.  There will be two legal malpractice cases for every regular case!  The same is somewhat less true for other forms of professional malpractice. “Near privity” may suffice.   Silverboys, LLC v Skordas   2015 NY Slip Op 31711(U)
September 4, 2015  Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 653874/2014  Judge: Saliann Scarpulla is a recent example.

“The following allegations are drawn from the amended complaint. Silverboys is a Delaware limited liability company owned and managed by the Silvermans, and it “was created to acquire, own, and manage the [Silvermans’ property in the Bahamas].” On or about April 25, 2014, Henry Silverman signed a contract with Skordas, wherein “Skordas agreed to perform traditional architecture services” such as “coordinat[ing] all architectural, structural, MEP, and design drawings.” “Skordas promised to deliver costeffective, honest, and quality supervision and management of an estimated $8 million construction project that included extensive site work, renovation of an existing main residence, and construction of a guest house, pool, and staff residence.” Plaintiffs allege [* 1] Skordas is responsible for many construction defects, including using inappropriate or inferior materials, installing a “jail-like fence around the property,” constructing “a door to nowhere,” and for failing to maintain proper records or make plans for some of the materials purchased. In addition to acting as an architect, Plaintiffs allege that “Skordas agreed to act as the owner’s representative and the project manager.” Skordas’s alleged responsibilities included, among other things “managing the bidding process for all general contractors and subcontractors, supervising the construction and making regular visits to the construction site, handling all shipments of materials and their clearance through customs, and approving payments to all contractors and subcontractors.” In addition to claims of mismanagement, Plaintiffs allege that Skordas was dishonest during their relationship. One of the alleged incidents of dishonesty occurred on July 21, 2014 when “Silverboys transferred $27,907 to Mr. Skordas as a deposit for a Veyko railing and as full payment for 3 Velux America skylights.” Rather than distributing the funds to and placing the orders with the vendors, the Plaintiffs allege that Skordas, himself, retained the funds. ”

“Third, Skordas’s claim that he owed no duty to Karen Silverman and Silverboys because he did not have a contractual relationship with them is meritless. Tort liability may be found absent privity of contract where the relationship of the parties is “so close as to approach that of privity.” See Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 N.Y.2d 417, 424 (1989). Ossining references three factors in assessing liability under these circumstances: “(I) awareness that the [house] w[ as] to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) reliance by a known party or parties in furtherance of that purpose; and (3) some conduct by the defendants linking them to the party or parties and evincing defendant’s understanding of their reliance.” See id. at 425 (citing Credit Alliance Corp. v. Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 551 (1985)). Here, the Plaintiffs allege facts establishing a relationship approaching privity between Karen Silverman, Silverboys, and Skordas. The Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the Silvermans hired Skordas specifically for the purpose of performing architectural services, that they relied on Skordas to complete quality construction of their home, and that Skordas knew that the Silvermans relied on him. Moreover, the complaint alleges 7 [* 7] that Silverboys, an LLC owned by the Silvermans “to acquire, own, and manage the Bahamian Property,” received invoices from Skordas and remitted funds to Skordas. For the foregoing reasons, Skordas’s motion to dismiss the claim for professional malpractice is denied. “