Of all the fields of law, matrimonial law ranks high in the consumer dissatisfaction index.  There are often disparities of income which leads to disparity of representation of the less-monied spouse.  A frequent complaint about matrimonial attorneys concerns the ease with which they enter and leave cases, often on the eve of trial.  Clients often relate that matrimonial attorneys make large financial demands at times where they have strong leverage.

In this pro-se matrimonial case, summary judgment was awarded to the attorneys.  Schiff v Sallah Law Firm, P.C.  2015 NY Slip Op 03820 [128 AD3d 668]  May 6, 2015
Appellate Division, Second Department gives none of the background facts, but one may surmise that the pro-se plaintiff felt cornered into settlement of a divorce and turned on her attorneys right after.

“The plaintiff retained the defendants Donald R. Sallah and Sallah Law Firm, P.C. (hereinafter the law firm), to represent her in a divorce action commenced by her former husband. The divorce action was settled by a stipulation. The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action against the law firm, Donald R. Sallah, Dean J. Sallah, Patrick M. Kerr, Theresa Hansen, and Francine J. Zecca, alleging that they had committed legal malpractice. In an order dated July 31, 2009, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Hansen. After certain discovery was conducted, the remaining defendants (hereinafter collectively the Sallah defendants) moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

“In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the attorney ‘failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession’ and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages” (Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442 [2007], quoting McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301-302 [2002]; see Schiller v Bender, Burrows & Rosenthal, LLP, 116 AD3d 756 [2014]). “A claim for legal malpractice is viable, despite settlement of the underlying action, if it is alleged that settlement of the action was effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel” (Tortura v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, P.C., 21 AD3d 1082, 1083 [2005]; see Schiller v Bender, Burrows & Rosenthal, LLP, 116 AD3d at 757; Steven L. Levitt & Assoc., P.C. v Balkin, 54 AD3d 403 [2008]).

[*2] Here, the Sallah defendants established, prima facie, that the law firm, Donald R. Sallah, Dean J. Sallah, and Patrick M. Kerr did not fail to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession, and that settlement of the underlying divorce action was not effectively compelled by any mistakes on their part (see Boone v Bender, 74 AD3d 1111, 1113 [2010]; Luniewski v Zeitlin, 188 AD2d 642 [1992]). Further, the Sallah defendants established, prima facie, that the defendant Francine J. Zecca could not be held liable for professional malpractice because she was not an attorney.”