Plaintiffs run a marina, and are hounded by the Town of Carmel.  Apparently the Town does not like how they are running the marina.  The problem for the town is that it does not have jurisdiction over the marina.  Hence, its criminal and civil zoning cases are defective.  Plaintiffs resist for years and then sue in Federal Court, only to have their case dismissed on timeliness grounds.  Is there a legal malpractice case?  Here are some excerpts from Melchner v Quinn Law Firm, PLLC
2015 NY Slip Op 31846(U)  October 3, 2015  Supreme Court, Putnam County  Docket Number: 382/15  Judge: Lewis J. Lubell.

“Plaintiffs, Charles Melchner and Lillian Melchner, commenced this legal malpractice action on March 9, 2015 against their former attorney, Andrew C. Quinn, Esq., and his law firm, The Quinn Law Firm, PLLC (collectively “Quinn”) alleging, among other things, that Quinn was negligent in his representation of Plaintiffs by permitting the applicable statute of limitations to expire with respect to federal and state law claims against the Town of Carmel and its elected officials (the “Town”). Plaintiffs further alleg that but for said negligence they would have recovered money damages against the Town in connection with multiple alleged frivolous criminal and civil actions initiated against them by the Town. The complaint alleges that it all started in July of 1998 when the Town filed a criminal information in Justice Court of the Town of Carmel charging Plaintiffs with three zoning violations with respect to their ownership, operation and control of the Mahopac Marina (hereinafter the “Marina”), a commercial marina located in the hamlet of Mahopac. In connection therewith, Plaintiffs retained Quinn to defend them. Quinn’s representation of the Plaintiffs would continue over the next fifteen years in connection with a series of criminal and civil actions filed against Plaintiffs by the Town in connection with the Marina and Plaintiffs’ use of certain related docks. All tolled, criminal actions were filed in 1998, 2003 and 2008; civil actions in 2000, 2006 and 2009. Plaintiffs allege that the criminal and civil actions were initiated by the Town despite the Town’s knowledge that it did not have jurisdiction over the docks.”

“The complaint makes specific reference to Plaintiffs’ appeal of the July 21, 2010 Decision & Order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Nicolai, J.), enjoining their use of certain docks in connection with the operation of the Marina. More specifically, by Decision & Order of February 27, 2013, the Appellate Division Second Department, modified, the July 21, 2010 Decision & Order….”

“The complaint makes note that the 2008 criminal action and the 2009 civil action (that gave rise to the 2013 Appellate Division vacatur of the stay) are still pending. Plaintiffs contend that, in reliance upon Quinn’s alleged assurances that they would be able to commence an action against the Town, Plaintiffs commenced an action in November 2013 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Federal Action”) wherein Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, a violation of their constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (the “1983 Action”). They also advanced several state law claims including tortious interference with business, abuse of process, selective enforcement of laws, breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. It should be noted that Quinn did not represent Plaintiffs in the Federal action. By then, Plaintiffs had retained other counsel.”

“The complaint alleges, and is not otherwise disputed, that the third criminal action instituted by the Town on September 2, 2008 and the civil action commenced by the Town on June 30, 2009 that gave rise to the February 27, 2013 Appellate Division Decision and Order, are still pending” (Compl. ¶15 [parentheticals as in original]). Therefore, contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, Plaintiffs are not precluded from bringing a “lawsuit”, a “claim” or an “action” against the Town. “The one-year statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action for malicious prosecution (see CPLR 215[3]) does not begin to run until favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding” (Roman v. Comp USA, Inc., 38 A.D.3d 751, 752 [2d Dept 2007][citations omitted]; see Williams v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 126 AD3d 890, 891 [2d Dept 2015]). Thus, additionally, a notice of claim is not yet due (Brownell v. LeClaire, 96 AD3d 1336, 1337 [3d Dept 2012]).”

“The Court is satisfied that upon consideration of the full and complete “record”, including the attachments annexed to the complaint such as the Appellate Division decision of Town of Carmel v. Melchner, supra), that the factual claims advanced by Plaintiffs in the body of the compliant are patently tailored and/or edited by Plaintiffs to convey such a false impression and succession of facts that they should be deemed “contradicted” by the record as a matter of law. Upon that contradicted record, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action against Quinn The Court is satisfied that the documentary evidence before it, be it by way of attachment to the complaint or otherwise, sufficiently refutes Plaintiffs’ conveniently tailored allegations of fact such that a defense to the complaint has been established as a matter of law (see CPLR 3211[a][1]; Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v. Superior Well Servs., Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 59, 63 [2012]). Moreover, even though Plaintiffs’ Federal lawsuit was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, the record establishes that Quinn’s assurance that Plaintiffs’ would be able to bring “a lawsuit” (Compl. ¶TWELFTH), “a claim” (Compl. ¶THIRTEENTH) or “an action” (Compl. ¶SIXTEENTH) against the Town once the criminal and civil proceedings initiated by the Town “had been resolved” does not, as a matter of law, constitute legal malpractice for the reasons hereinabove indicated and, in any event, it would be nothing more than conjecture to say that any damages sustainable in the federal action would have been any greater than that which Plaintiffs could have or would have been able to recover in a state action. ”