Two items caught our notice this morning, and though unrelated, sound a similar theme.  Fraud on the Court in one and feigned issues of fact in the other compliment the idea of how the truth divining process happens in litigation. Somehow, even creakily, the process of cross-examination and discovery seem to work.

In Scheuer v. General Motors, this morning’s New York Law Journal, in an article by Mark Hamblett reports that Judge Furman basically called a halt to the case to look at whether Mr. & Mrs. Scheuer had committed  “fraud on the court and on the jury” in possibly misrepresenting their injuries and the financial consequences of those injuries by having “altered or fabricated a $ 441,431 check stub from the federal government’s retirement account” and fooling around with text messages.  Things, as one might guess, are not going well for plaintiff in this case.

Not as bad for plaintiff in Law Off. of Zachary R. Greenhill, P.C. v Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc.  2016 NY Slip Op 30078(U)  January 7, 2016  Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 650414/2014  Judge: Charles E. Ramos, the case nevertheless hit a brick wall, where the judge found that: “At issue is whether there is a triable dispute regarding Mr. Greenhill’s status as an officer, partner, and/or manager of Dwight China. In the Underlying Action, Mr. Greenhill plainly admitted in his pleadings and sworn testimony to being President of Dwight China (Affirmation of Kevin Mattessich [“Mattessich affu], Ex. A, ~21; Mattessich aff, Ex. E, ~41). Greenhill’s statements to the contrary in the affidavits filed in this action are merely attempts to create a feigned issue of fact. Moreover, Mr. Greenhill himself produced documents in the Underlying Action that he had signed in his capacity as President of Dwight China (Mattessich aff, Ex. E, ¶41).

The judge went on to say: “Greenhill is attempting to feign an issue of fact regarding the Greenhills’ equity interest in Dwight China by contradicting prior admissions in the Underlying Action. These prior admissions, proffered through affidavit testimony, constitute findings of fact. Mr. Greenhill’s own admissions in the Underlying Action, and not his most recent affidavits, are undisputed facts for purposes of this §3212 motion (see Harty, 294 AD2d at 298; Rubin, 305 NY at 306).”

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Andrew Lavoott Bluestone

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened…

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened his private law office and took his first legal malpractice case.

Since 1989, Bluestone has become a leader in the New York Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice bar, handling a wide array of plaintiff’s legal malpractice cases arising from catastrophic personal injury, contracts, patents, commercial litigation, securities, matrimonial and custody issues, medical malpractice, insurance, product liability, real estate, landlord-tenant, foreclosures and has defended attorneys in a limited number of legal malpractice cases.

Bluestone also took an academic role in field, publishing the New York Attorney Malpractice Report from 2002-2004.  He started the “New York Attorney Malpractice Blog” in 2004, where he has published more than 4500 entries.

Mr. Bluestone has written 38 scholarly peer-reviewed articles concerning legal malpractice, many in the Outside Counsel column of the New York Law Journal. He has appeared as an Expert witness in multiple legal malpractice litigations.

Mr. Bluestone is an adjunct professor of law at St. John’s University College of Law, teaching Legal Malpractice.  Mr. Bluestone has argued legal malpractice cases in the Second Circuit, in the New York State Court of Appeals, each of the four New York Appellate Divisions, in all four of  the U.S. District Courts of New York and in Supreme Courts all over the state.  He has also been admitted pro haec vice in the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida and was formally admitted to the US District Court of Connecticut and to its Bankruptcy Court all for legal malpractice matters. He has been retained by U.S. Trustees in legal malpractice cases from Bankruptcy Courts, and has represented municipalities, insurance companies, hedge funds, communications companies and international manufacturing firms. Mr. Bluestone regularly lectures in CLEs on legal malpractice.

Based upon his professional experience Bluestone was named a Diplomate and was Board Certified by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys in 2008 in Legal Malpractice. He remains Board Certified.  He was admitted to The Best Lawyers in America from 2012-2019.  He has been featured in Who’s Who in Law since 1993.

In the last years, Mr. Bluestone has been featured for two particularly noteworthy legal malpractice cases.  The first was a settlement of an $11.9 million dollar default legal malpractice case of Yeo v. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman which was reported in the NYLJ on August 15, 2016. Most recently, Mr. Bluestone obtained a rare plaintiff’s verdict in a legal malpractice case on behalf of the City of White Plains v. Joseph Maria, reported in the NYLJ on February 14, 2017. It was the sole legal malpractice jury verdict in the State of New York for 2017.

Bluestone has been at the forefront of the development of legal malpractice principles and has contributed case law decisions, writing and lecturing which have been recognized by his peers.  He is regularly mentioned in academic writing, and his past cases are often cited in current legal malpractice decisions. He is recognized for his ample writings on Judiciary Law § 487, a 850 year old statute deriving from England which relates to attorney deceit.