It is almost universally said at Legal Malpractice (or Professional Responsibility) CLEs that suing your clients for legal fees not paid is the surest source of a legal malpractice counterclaim.  Legal fee billing appears, anecdotally, to be the largest category of litigation involving attorneys. Exeter Law Group LLP v Immortalana Inc.  2016 NY Slip Op 31913(U)  October 11, 2016  Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 161667/2014  Judge: Eileen A. Rakower  is a prime example.  From a preliminary glance, the parties have expended a couple of hundred hours of work on fees, and have barely ended the pleading stage.

“Plaintiff-counterclaim defendant The Exeter Law Group LLP (“Exeter”) brings suit to collect legal fees allegedly owed to it by Defendants. Exeter commenced this action against defendants Immortalana Inc. (“Immortalana”) and Robin Farias-Eisner (“Eisner”) by filing a Complaint on November 24, 2014 asserting six causes of action, including breach of contract (first cause of action), an account stated (second cause of action), unjust enrichment (third cause of action), quantum meruit (fourth cause of action), fraud (fifth cause of action), and tortious interference with contractual relations (sixth cause of action). On January 15, 2015, Immortalana and Eisner moved to dismiss portions of the complaint (Mot. Seq. #1) and, on June 30, 2015, the Court dismissed several of Exeter’s causes of action, including its second cause of action for an account stated, and directed Exeter to file an Amended Complaint. Exeter filed its Verified Amended Complaint on July 20, 2015. The Amended Complaint named Eisner and Immortalana as defendants, as well as Kelly Day (“Day”) and Salvaregen, Inc. (“Salvaregen”). Eisner and Day are individual defendants. Immortalana and Salvaregen are corporations in which Day and Eisner allegedly held shares and Exeter allegedly performed work on behalf of both companies. The Amended Complaint asserts the following claims: breach of contract as against Eisner and Day (first cause of action); account stated for the months of February 2013 through April 2013 as against Eisner and Day (second cause of action); unjust enrichment as against Immortalana and Salvaregen (third cause of action); quantum meruit as against Immortalana and Salvaregen (fourth cause of action); and account stated for the months of May 2012 through July 2013 as against Eisner and Day (fifth cause of action). ”

“Exeter claims that for approximately three years between 2011 and 2014, Day and Eisner, as the “clients,” engaged Exeter to represent them on two matters. On June 12, 2011, Day and Eisner executed an engagement letter engaging Exeter to provide advice “on patenting and regulatory strategy for the development of certain products that may be governed under [federal law].” On February 1, 2012, Day and Eisner executed a second engagement letter reengaging Exeter to “assist [Day and Eisner] in procuring counsel to enable Ms. Kelly Day to provide Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) per year in financing from her personal funds toward the efforts of Dr. Robin Farias· Eisner to continue his research.” Exeter was to “identify and engage outside counsel” to complete the work if necessary. Exeter claims, “After uncovering irregularities and conflicts with the transactions, the Exeter Firm withdrew from the engagements.” Day and Eisner refused to pay the outstanding balance of Exeter’s invoices. Exeter commenced this action to recover those monies. ”

“As for Plaintiffs second and fifth causes of action, an account stated is “an account balanced and rendered, with an assent to the balance express or implied”. (Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein v. Janet L. N. Ackerman, 280 A.D.2d 355, 355-56 [1st Dep’t 2001]). ”

“Here, accepting Exeter’s allegations as true and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the four comers of Exeter’s Amended Complaint adequately plead an account stated in the second cause of action. Turning to Exeter’s cross motion for summary judgment on the second cause of action for account stated, summary judgment, the proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. ”

“Day’s affidavit attests to similar statements as set forth in Eisner’s affidavit. Attached to both are emails commencing August 25, 2014 between Wong, Eisner, and Day regarding billing issues. “

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened…

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened his private law office and took his first legal malpractice case.

Since 1989, Bluestone has become a leader in the New York Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice bar, handling a wide array of plaintiff’s legal malpractice cases arising from catastrophic personal injury, contracts, patents, commercial litigation, securities, matrimonial and custody issues, medical malpractice, insurance, product liability, real estate, landlord-tenant, foreclosures and has defended attorneys in a limited number of legal malpractice cases.


Bluestone also took an academic role in field, publishing the New York Attorney Malpractice Report from 2002-2004.  He started the “New York Attorney Malpractice Blog” in 2004, where he has published more than 4500 entries.

Mr. Bluestone has written 38 scholarly peer-reviewed articles concerning legal malpractice, many in the Outside Counsel column of the New York Law Journal. He has appeared as an Expert witness in multiple legal malpractice litigations.

Mr. Bluestone is an adjunct professor of law at St. John’s University College of Law, teaching Legal Malpractice.  Mr. Bluestone has argued legal malpractice cases in the Second Circuit, in the New York State Court of Appeals, each of the four New York Appellate Divisions, in all four of  the U.S. District Courts of New York and in Supreme Courts all over the state.  He has also been admitted pro haec vice in the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida and was formally admitted to the US District Court of Connecticut and to its Bankruptcy Court all for legal malpractice matters. He has been retained by U.S. Trustees in legal malpractice cases from Bankruptcy Courts, and has represented municipalities, insurance companies, hedge funds, communications companies and international manufacturing firms. Mr. Bluestone regularly lectures in CLEs on legal malpractice.

Based upon his professional experience Bluestone was named a Diplomate and was Board Certified by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys in 2008 in Legal Malpractice. He remains Board Certified.  He was admitted to The Best Lawyers in America from 2012-2019.  He has been featured in Who’s Who in Law since 1993.

In the last years, Mr. Bluestone has been featured for two particularly noteworthy legal malpractice cases.  The first was a settlement of an $11.9 million dollar default legal malpractice case of Yeo v. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman which was reported in the NYLJ on August 15, 2016. Most recently, Mr. Bluestone obtained a rare plaintiff’s verdict in a legal malpractice case on behalf of the City of White Plains v. Joseph Maria, reported in the NYLJ on February 14, 2017. It was the sole legal malpractice jury verdict in the State of New York for 2017.

Bluestone has been at the forefront of the development of legal malpractice principles and has contributed case law decisions, writing and lecturing which have been recognized by his peers.  He is regularly mentioned in academic writing, and his past cases are often cited in current legal malpractice decisions. He is recognized for his ample writings on Judiciary Law § 487, a 850 year old statute deriving from England which relates to attorney deceit.