There are some differences between legal malpractice and accounting malpractice, but far more similarities.  One major difference, as set forth in New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Fuller & LaFiura, CPAs, P.C.  2017 NY Slip Op 00225  Decided on January 12, 2017
Appellate Division, Third Department is that traditionally accountants do work in one tax-year increments which affects calculation of the statute of limitations.  “As for the cause of action asserted against Fuller for professional negligence, we cannot agree with plaintiff’s argument that the doctrine of continuous representation applies to toll the applicable three-year statute of limitations until Fuller delivered its last audited financial statement on May 4, 2011. It is well settled that “‘[t]he continuous representation doctrine tolls the statute of limitations . . . where there is a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim'” (Deep v Boies, 121 AD3d 1316, 1318 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 903 [2015], quoting McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 306 [2002]; see Giarratano v Silver, 46 AD3d 1053, 1055 [2007]). However, the existence of a continuing, general, professional relationship is insufficient to invoke this doctrine. Instead, the doctrine applies only in the narrow circumstance “where the continuing representation pertains specifically to the matter in which . . . the alleged malpractice” occurred (Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 168 [2001]; accord Deep v Boies, 121 AD3d at 1318; seeChicago Tit. Ins. Co. v Mazula, 47 AD3d 999, 1000 [2008]). Here, we agree with Supreme Court that the allegations of professional malpractice against Fuller are exclusively directed at the separate and discrete yearly audited financial statements that Fuller prepared (see 12 NYCRR 317.19 [a] [2]). In addition, plaintiff has not alleged that it engaged Fuller to provide corrective or remedial services after Fuller submitted the financial statements or that plaintiff and Fuller explicitly contemplated further services regarding completed financial statements (see Williamson v PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 9 NY3d at 11). Under these circumstance, Supreme Court properly found that the continuous representation doctrine was inapplicable (see id. at 10-11; Rodeo Family Enters., LLC v Matte, 99 AD3d 781, 784 [2012]; Giarratano v Silver, 46 AD3d at 1055). Accordingly, the cause of action for professional negligence is time-barred to the extent that it alleges actions occurring prior to May 31, 2010.”

In so many other ways, they are similar.  “We find merit in plaintiff’s contention that Supreme Court erred in dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claim asserted against Fuller (tenth cause of action). Although the duty owed by an accountant is generally not fiduciary in nature (see Bitter v Renzo, 101 AD3d 465, 465 [2012]; Caprer v Nussbaum, 36 AD3d 176, 194 [2006]), a fiduciary relationship exists where the accountant is “under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of [the client] upon matters within the scope of the relation” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Oddo Asset Mgt. v Barclays Bank PLC, 19 NY3d 584, 592-593 [2012]). This inquiry is “necessarily fact-specific” (Marmelstein v Kehillat New Hempstead: Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, 11 NY3d 15, 21 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and the dispositive factor is whether there is “confidence on one side and resulting superiority and influence on the other” (New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd. v SGRisk, LLC, 116 AD3d 1148, 1152 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 11 NY3d 146, 158 [2008]). Plaintiff alleged that Fuller held itself out to have the requisite skill and expertise to maintain the trust’s financial records, provide auditing services and — [*2]importantly — provide advice to the trust regarding the trust’s financial status. According to plaintiff, Fuller breached its fiduciary duty by knowingly and consistently concealing the trust’s true financial condition and failing to properly advise the trust regarding its solvency, causing over $8 million in damages. Accepting these allegations as true and giving plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Chanko v American Broadcasting Cos. Inc., 27 NY3d 46, 52 [2016]), we find that plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is sufficiently stated to survive Fuller’s motion to dismiss (see New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd. v SGRisk, LLC, 116 AD3d at 1153).”