The expert comes into trial and is subject to cross-examination. When that cross-examination hits home, and the court precludes some of the expert testimony, or fails to qualify the expert, or the expert has to admit that it did not examine or consider some piece of evidence, then things will not go well for the proponent. What does the proponent then do?
Toaspern v Laduca Law Firm LLP 2017 NY Slip Op 07374 Decided on October 19, 2017
Appellate Division, Third Department is the example of what happens when the expert sues for an unpaid fee. There are qualified privileges and limits in cases against experts.
“Defendants — an attorney and his law firm — represented a married couple in an action against the Harley-Davidson Motor Company Group in relation to an accident that occurred when the couple’s motorcycle lost power (see Smalley v Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Group LLC, 134 AD3d 1490 [2015]; Smalley v Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 115 AD3d 1369 [2014]). In connection with that action, defendants retained plaintiff, an accident reconstructionist, to provide expert services and testimony. Plaintiff intermittently consulted with defendants between 2006 and 2013. During the trial of that action, plaintiff testified that he had examined a motorcycle similar to the one at issue but had not disclosed this inspection as a basis for his expert opinion. That testimony prompted Supreme Court to grant Harley-Davidson’s motion for a mistrial.
Following the mistrial, defendants refused to pay the remainder of plaintiff’s bill, prompting him to commence this action to recover the fees for his expert services. Defendants served an answer containing two counterclaims. The first counterclaim alleged that plaintiff “failed to both review and understand [the] records provided to him,” which resulted in plaintiff being “unable to answer critical questions posed to him regarding the electrical testing conducted [*2]by Harley[-]Davidson,” which in turn resulted in Supreme Court deeming a portion of the trial evidence inadmissible. The second counterclaim alleged that plaintiff referred to precluded evidence during his testimony, despite warnings from the court that he could not do so. The second counterclaim further alleged that plaintiff testified that a few weeks before trial he viewed a motorcycle similar to the one at issue, but he did not include in his expert disclosure that examination of a motorcycle formed part of the basis for his opinion testimony. Plaintiff moved to dismiss defendants’ counterclaims, arguing, among other things, that the doctrine of absolute witness immunity shielded him from liability for damages arising from his trial testimony. Defendants cross-moved for partial summary judgment.”
“A “witness at a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding enjoys an absolute privilege with respect to his or her testimony,” as long as the statements made are material to the issues to be resolved therein (Pfeiffer v Hoffman, 251 AD2d 94, 95 [1998]; accord Martinson v Blau, 292 AD2d 234, 235 [2002]; see Youmans v Smith, 153 NY 214, 219 [1897]; Wilson v Erra, 94 AD3d 756, 756-757 [2012]). The purposes of this privilege are to further the truth-seeking process at trial and encourage cooperation of witnesses, particularly with regard to expert witnesses, so that they can discharge their public duty freely “with knowledge that they will be insulated from the harassment and financial hazard of subsequent litigation” (Tolisano v Texon, 144 AD2d 267, 271 [1988, Smith, J., dissenting], revd for reasons stated in dissent 75 NY2d 732 [1989]; see Rehberg v Paulk, 566 US 356, 367 [2012]).
Defendants argue that the witness privilege does not bar actions against a party’s own expert for breach of contract or malpractice, just as a party can proceed against his or her attorney for legal malpractice based upon conduct that occurred during a trial. Plaintiff argues that an expert witness is absolutely immune from liability for claims that arise out of his or her testimony provided in prior litigation.
We conclude that a party cannot hold its own expert liable for the content of his or her testimony in prior litigation, but may pursue claims for negligence, professional malpractice, breach of contract or similar causes of action due to the expert’s alleged failure to properly prepare for the trial or to perform agreed-upon litigation-related services. Although an expert may not be held liable for the substance of his or her prior testimony or the opinions expressed therein, such testimony may be used as evidence in connection with these other types of causes of action. As the Court of Appeals recently stated when addressing the witness privilege in another context, “[t]he test is ‘whether the plaintiff can make out the elements of his [or her] . . . claim without resorting to the . . . testimony. If the claim exists independently of the . . . testimony, it is not “based on” that testimony . . . [but] if the claim requires the . . . testimony, the defendant enjoys absolute immunity'” (De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 770 [2016], quoting Coggins v Buonora, 776 F3d 108, 113 [2d Cir 2015], cert denied 575 US ___, 135 S Ct 2335 [2015]; cf. Rehberg v Paulk, 566 US at 370 n 1). Stated otherwise, a plaintiff may not assert a claim that is entirely based on the expert’s prior testimony — and nothing more — but may assert a claim that is viable apart from, but supported by, that testimony (see De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d at 770 [precluding the subjection of a witness to potential liability for prior testimony [*3]”alone”]).”