Judiciary Law § 487 cases are very very hard to bring.  In the First Department they are even harder to maintain.  When such a case is brought pro-se, the chances of viability plummet.  So it was with Rondeau v Bargman  2017 NY Slip Op 32256(U)  October 19, 2017
Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 153727/16  Judge: Jennifer G. Schecter.  The decision starts with a tone setting fact.  Plaintiff wanted to sue the New York Knicks for slander. It then tells us that an ad was placed for an attorney.  This scenario promises disaster.  It ended disastrously.

“In 2010, Arthur Rondeau and his personal attorney determined that Rondeau would sue Allan Houston and the New York Knickerbockers (Knicks), for among other things, slander (Houston Lawsuit) (Affirmation in Support [Supp], Ex A [Complaint] at ¶ 12). Rondeau’s personal attorney, who was not an expert in this area of law, placed an ad on a website looking for a litigator who was experienced with suing for defamation ( id. ) . Bargman and at least one other lawyer responded to the ad. Rondeau’s personal attorney interviewed the responding lawyers and informed Rondeau that both seemed suitable.

On or about May 3, 2010, Rondeau met Bargman who “at all times presented himself as a hard-nosed litigator and expert negotiator, ready to file the Houston Lawsuit at a moment’s notice. The impression that Bargman gave to Rondeau made [him] decide to hire Bargman not only because of his purported background and purported successful current litigation practice but because Bargman would bring an aggressiveness to Rondeau’s team that was necessary in light of years of attempts . . to resolve his differences with Houston and/or the Knicks without litigation” (id. at ¶ 15). ”

“On January 24, 2011, after Rondeau, his personal attorney and Bargman went back and forth with drafts of the complaint, Bargman filed a version of the complaint with numbers out of sequence and “important corrections that had been made in the drafts of the complaint subsequent to the misnumebered draft were lost” (id. at ¶26). On March 25, 2011, the day that a response to the complaint was due, Bargman informed Rondeau that he planned to withdraw as counsel. In April 2011, he moved to be relieved and, in the motion, “divulged confidential, sensitive and/or privileged information” that was used against Rondeau in the Houston Lawsuit (id. at  34).”

“Rondeau contends that if he had been aware that on a motion to dismiss all statements in the complaint are considered true and if he knew about renewal or reargument, he could have proceeded with some of his causes of action (Complaint at  36) . He maintains that if Bargman had told him that he could have moved for sanctions based on false statements made in the motion to dismiss, “it would have alerted the court to the defamatory nature of the statements Instead, Rondeau was demonized in front of both the Trial Court and the Appellate Division, First Department” (id. at  37) Rondeau maintains that he incurred $300,000 in expenses related to having to continue the Houston Lawsuit on his own (id. at  49). ”

“Rondeau’s causes of action based on violation of Judiciary Law § 487 fare no better as Rondeau has not sufficiently alleged facts demonstrating “either a deceit that reaches the level of egregious conduct or a chronic and extreme pattern of behavior” on the part of defendant (see Savitt v Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 126 AD3d 506, 507 [1st Dept 2015); Seldon v Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, 116 AD3d 490, 491 [1st Dept 2014), lv dismissed 25 NY3d 985 [2015)). Rondeau, moreover, had an opportunity to address all of the allegedly “false statements [that Bargman made] in an attempt to deceive the court into allowing him to withdraw” at oral argument in opposition to the motion to withdraw (Complaint at  32; see e.g. Rondeau v Houston, Index No 650198/11, NYSCEF Doc No 19, Tr at 4-5). The court heard everything that Rondeau had to say in opposition–much of which is the basis of his causes of action–reviewed email correspondence between Rondeau and Bargman and ultimately granted Bargman’s motion to withdraw because Bargman had not been fully paid and because of the “breakdown in the relationship” (id. at 5). The allegations here do not constitute egregious conduct sufficient to implicate Judiciary Law§ 487. “