Although the headline may sound exhortatory, it is rather a recitation of when a Judiciary Law § 487 claim may properly lie against a attorney-client, rather than an attorney who represents a client. Witty v 1725 Fifth Ave. Corp.   2017 NY Slip Op 32624(U)   December 12, 2017   Supreme Court, Suffolk County   Docket Number: 02509-17   Judge: Elizabeth H. Emerson tells us that JL 487 will not apply when the client and not the offending attorney happens merely to be an attorney.  The Judge says it much better:

“Judiciary Law § 487 provides that an attorney who is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or who consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party is guilty of a misdemeanor and that the injured party may recover treble damages from such attorney in a civil action. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, Judiciary Law§ 487 only applies to an attorney who is acting in his or her capacity as an attorney. It does not apply to a party who is represented by counsel and who happens to be an attorney (Oakes v Muka, 56 AD3d 1057, 1058). Frampton and Veltry were represented by counsel in the note action. The mere fact that they are attorneys is insufficient to impose liability on them (see , Crown Assocs., Inc. v Zot, LLC, 83 AD3d 765, 768, citing Oakes v Muka, supra). The plaintiff does not specify what documents, if any, were concealed, withheld, or not produced by Frampton and Veltry. The record in the note action reveals that complete copies of the note, the agreement of sale, and the mortgage were attached to the plaintiffs complaint. It, therefore, appears that she was in possession of all of the relevant documents. The plaintiff contends that Frampton and Veltry deceived her by sending her checks for less than the full amount of the monthly payments due under the note. The plaintiff is alleging a breach of contract, specifically a breach of the terms of the promissory note. When, as here, the plaintiff is essentially seeking enforcement of her bargain, she should proceed under a contract theory (see, Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 NY2d 540, 552, citing ClarkFitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 NY2d 382, 389-390). The plaintiff has already pleaded a cause of action for breach of contract in the note action. Accordingly, the third cause of action is dismissed. “

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Andrew Lavoott Bluestone

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened…

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened his private law office and took his first legal malpractice case.

Since 1989, Bluestone has become a leader in the New York Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice bar, handling a wide array of plaintiff’s legal malpractice cases arising from catastrophic personal injury, contracts, patents, commercial litigation, securities, matrimonial and custody issues, medical malpractice, insurance, product liability, real estate, landlord-tenant, foreclosures and has defended attorneys in a limited number of legal malpractice cases.

Bluestone also took an academic role in field, publishing the New York Attorney Malpractice Report from 2002-2004.  He started the “New York Attorney Malpractice Blog” in 2004, where he has published more than 4500 entries.

Mr. Bluestone has written 38 scholarly peer-reviewed articles concerning legal malpractice, many in the Outside Counsel column of the New York Law Journal. He has appeared as an Expert witness in multiple legal malpractice litigations.

Mr. Bluestone is an adjunct professor of law at St. John’s University College of Law, teaching Legal Malpractice.  Mr. Bluestone has argued legal malpractice cases in the Second Circuit, in the New York State Court of Appeals, each of the four New York Appellate Divisions, in all four of  the U.S. District Courts of New York and in Supreme Courts all over the state.  He has also been admitted pro haec vice in the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida and was formally admitted to the US District Court of Connecticut and to its Bankruptcy Court all for legal malpractice matters. He has been retained by U.S. Trustees in legal malpractice cases from Bankruptcy Courts, and has represented municipalities, insurance companies, hedge funds, communications companies and international manufacturing firms. Mr. Bluestone regularly lectures in CLEs on legal malpractice.

Based upon his professional experience Bluestone was named a Diplomate and was Board Certified by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys in 2008 in Legal Malpractice. He remains Board Certified.  He was admitted to The Best Lawyers in America from 2012-2019.  He has been featured in Who’s Who in Law since 1993.

In the last years, Mr. Bluestone has been featured for two particularly noteworthy legal malpractice cases.  The first was a settlement of an $11.9 million dollar default legal malpractice case of Yeo v. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman which was reported in the NYLJ on August 15, 2016. Most recently, Mr. Bluestone obtained a rare plaintiff’s verdict in a legal malpractice case on behalf of the City of White Plains v. Joseph Maria, reported in the NYLJ on February 14, 2017. It was the sole legal malpractice jury verdict in the State of New York for 2017.

Bluestone has been at the forefront of the development of legal malpractice principles and has contributed case law decisions, writing and lecturing which have been recognized by his peers.  He is regularly mentioned in academic writing, and his past cases are often cited in current legal malpractice decisions. He is recognized for his ample writings on Judiciary Law § 487, a 850 year old statute deriving from England which relates to attorney deceit.