Although the headline may sound exhortatory, it is rather a recitation of when a Judiciary Law § 487 claim may properly lie against a attorney-client, rather than an attorney who represents a client. Witty v 1725 Fifth Ave. Corp.   2017 NY Slip Op 32624(U)   December 12, 2017   Supreme Court, Suffolk County   Docket Number: 02509-17   Judge: Elizabeth H. Emerson tells us that JL 487 will not apply when the client and not the offending attorney happens merely to be an attorney.  The Judge says it much better:

“Judiciary Law § 487 provides that an attorney who is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or who consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party is guilty of a misdemeanor and that the injured party may recover treble damages from such attorney in a civil action. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, Judiciary Law§ 487 only applies to an attorney who is acting in his or her capacity as an attorney. It does not apply to a party who is represented by counsel and who happens to be an attorney (Oakes v Muka, 56 AD3d 1057, 1058). Frampton and Veltry were represented by counsel in the note action. The mere fact that they are attorneys is insufficient to impose liability on them (see , Crown Assocs., Inc. v Zot, LLC, 83 AD3d 765, 768, citing Oakes v Muka, supra). The plaintiff does not specify what documents, if any, were concealed, withheld, or not produced by Frampton and Veltry. The record in the note action reveals that complete copies of the note, the agreement of sale, and the mortgage were attached to the plaintiffs complaint. It, therefore, appears that she was in possession of all of the relevant documents. The plaintiff contends that Frampton and Veltry deceived her by sending her checks for less than the full amount of the monthly payments due under the note. The plaintiff is alleging a breach of contract, specifically a breach of the terms of the promissory note. When, as here, the plaintiff is essentially seeking enforcement of her bargain, she should proceed under a contract theory (see, Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 NY2d 540, 552, citing ClarkFitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 NY2d 382, 389-390). The plaintiff has already pleaded a cause of action for breach of contract in the note action. Accordingly, the third cause of action is dismissed. “