Roth v Rubinstein & Rubinstein LLP  2018 NY Slip Op 30038(U)  January 8, 2018  Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 154855/16  Judge: Lynn R. Kotler is a story that Hitchcock could have filmed.  Husband and wife make a lot (really a lot) of money in business, and then after all that, the husband is accused of tricking the wife into giving away all of her portion of the marital estate, while he keeps his!

“Plaintiff alleges that the significant wealth that she and her husband accumulated during marriage
was marital property, subject to equitable distribution, in the event of divorce, pursuant to the Domestic Relations Law. In 2012, Mr. Roth allegedly decided “that he would ultimately leave the marriage,” and “sought out ways to effectively deprive [plaintiff] of … her share in their fortune” so that he could claim “in a divorce proceeding that there were virtually no assets subjects to [e]quitable [d]istribution”. Towards this end, Mr. Roth engaged the services of defendants “as counsel to him and [plaintiff]”. Mr. Roth allegedly did not consult with plaintiff about the retention of defendants, and plaintiff was not aware of defendants’ “loyalty to Mr. Roth at her expense”. “In December 2012, Mr. Roth told [plaintiff] that they needed to very quickly create a new estates tax plan because there was likely going to be a change in the law concerning estate taxes commencing in 2013″. ”

“The series of simultaneous transactions, implemented by defendants, involved: (1) creation of revocable trusts for plaintiff and Mr. Roth; (2) creation of irrevocable trusts for each of their two children; (3) transfer of all of the marital assets and all of plaintiff’s separate property into five family limited partnerships, in which plaintiff and Mr. Roth each had a 1 % general partner interest and a 4 7% limited partner interest, and each of their children’s trusts held a 2% limited partner interest; (4) transfer by plaintiff and Mr. Roth of their respective 47% limited partner interests into their respective revocable trusts; and (5) transfer by plaintiff and Mr. Roth of “their revocable trusts’ respective 47% limited partnership interests in each [family limited partnership] to the two children’s trusts in equal shares”. As a result, 98% of all marital property and 98% of plaintiff’s separate property were allegedly transferred “to the children’s trusts as interests in the [family limited partnerships], as opposed to interests in the underlying assets owned by the [family limited partnerships]”. 1 Unbeknownst to plaintiff, Mr. Roth did not subject his separate property to any of the aforementioned transfers, which deprived plaintiff of her rights to equitable distribution of marital property in the event of divorce. ”

“A deed for the conveyance of property in Water Mill, dated March 6, 2013, was prepared by the law
firm (see id., exhibit 5), and it was recorded on April 17, 2014 by the Suffolk County Clerk (see 01/16/17 Kenneth Rubinstein affirmation, exhibit 4). Defendants’ contention, that the recording of the deed did not affect the conveyance of the Water Mill property, is unavailing. The relevant inquiry, for the purposes of application of the doctrine of continuous representation, is whether defendants continued to perform the same or related services as those that are at the heart of this action (see Luk Lame/Jen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d at 506-507). Clearly, the recording of a deed for the transfer of the Water Mill property was at least a related service to the underlying task of plaintiff’s estate planning that defendants undoubtedly undertook (see December 7, 2012 retainer agreement at 3 (stating that defendants will prepare conveyance documents including deeds)]; cf Voutsas v Hochberg, 103 AD3d 445, 446 [1st Dept 2013] [“(t)he continuous representation doctrine did not apply to the malpractice claim, as the legal services relied upon were unrelated to the specific legal matter as to which malpractice was alleged”]). Therefore, the court finds that the doctrine of continuous representation applies, and plaintiff’s cause of action for legal malpractice is not time barred.”