King Tower Realty Corp. v G & G Funding Corp. 2018 NY Slip Op 05027 Decided on July 5, 2018 Appellate Division, Second Department illustrates the power of the statute of limitations. While plaintiff may succeed in Supreme Court, many such decisions are reversed in the AD. This is one.
“The plaintiff commenced this action on February 27, 2015, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, fraud, and legal malpractice. The plaintiff alleged that it retained the defendant Maximo A. Figueredo, an attorney, in connection with its procurement of a loan from the defendant G & G Funding Corp. (hereinafter G & G Funding) relating to real property the plaintiff owned in Queens. A mortgage was executed on June 30, 2010. On January 5, 2012, after G & G Funding declared a default on the loan, the plaintiff executed a deed and contract of sale in lieu of foreclosure transferring title to the property to G & G Funding. The plaintiff alleged that Figueredo made false and misleading statements and improperly advised it to execute the deed on the basis that the deed would be held in escrow, the other defendants could collect rents from the properties, and the plaintiff preserved a right of redemption.”
“Here, Figueredo established that the legal malpractice cause of action accrued on January 5, 2012, when the plaintiff executed the deed and contract of sale in lieu of foreclosure transferring title to the property to G & G Funding, allegedly based upon Figueredo’s advice and misrepresentations. Since the plaintiff did not commence this action until February 27, 2015, more than three years later, Figueredo demonstrated, prima facie, that the legal malpractice cause of action was time-barred (see Quinn v McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP, 138 AD3d at 1086; Alizio v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., 126 AD3d at 735; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C., 111 AD3d at 796).
In opposition, the plaintiff’s submissions failed to demonstrate that any damages were incurred after the conveyance of the property on January 5, 2012. Further, there is no indication that Figueredo performed any legal services for the plaintiff with respect to the ownership or the financing of property after the January 5, 2012, conveyance. The plaintiff, thus, failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the alleged legal malpractice occurred at any time after January 5, 2012, or whether any continued representation by Figueredo served to toll the statute of limitations (see Quinn v McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP, 138 AD3d at 1087; Alizio v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., 126 AD3d at 736; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C., 111 AD3d at 797).”