Continuing a line of cases containing the unique Schiller v. Bender Burroughs & Rosenthal allocution anomaly, Valentina v Beckerman 2025 NY Slip Op 04682 decided on August 13, 2025 Appellate Division, Second Department finds that the pro-forma question “are you satisfied with your attorney’s representation?” kills a subsequent legal malpractice claim that she was “effectively compelled” to settle.

In 2019, the plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action against the defendants, asserting causes of action alleging legal malpractice, fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and sex discrimination. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants represented her in a matrimonial action (hereinafter the underlying action), which resulted in a settlement agreement that the plaintiff described as “unconscionable” and “fraudulent.” The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that the legal malpractice cause of action was barred by the plaintiff’s allocution regarding the settlement agreement in the underlying action. The plaintiff opposed the motion and thereafter moved for leave to amend the complaint. In an order entered December 21, 2020, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint. In a separate order also entered December 21, 2020, the court denied, as academic, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint. A judgment entered January 6, 2021, upon the orders, dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.

“Under CPLR 3211(a)(1), a dismissal is warranted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” (374-76 Prospect Place Tenants Assn., Inc. v City of New York, 231 AD3d 911, 912 [*2][internal quotation marks omitted]; see Klein v Catholic Health Sys. of Long Is., Inc., 231 AD3d 797, 798). “For the purpose of CPLR 3211(a)(1), judicial records . . . , the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary evidence” (Oparaji v ABN Amro Mtge. Group, Inc., 202 AD3d 985, 987 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Gorbatov v Tsirelman, 155 AD3d 836, 837). “Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal shall not eventuate” (374-76 Prospect Place Tenants Assn., Inc. v City of New York, 231 AD3d at 913; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 274-275).

“In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages” (Glenwayne Dev. Corp v James J. Corbett, P.C., 175 AD3d 473, 473-474 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Givens v De Moya, 193 AD3d 691, 693). “To establish causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages, but for the lawyer’s negligence” (Glenwayne Dev. Corp v James J. Corbett, P.C., 175 AD3d at 474 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “A legal malpractice cause of action is viable, despite settlement of the underlying action, if it is alleged that settlement of the action was effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, in support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, a transcript of the court proceeding in the underlying action containing the plaintiff’s allocution conducted by the court regarding the settlement agreement, which conclusively established that the plaintiff was not effectively compelled to settle the underlying action (see Schiller v Bender, Burrows & Rosenthal, LLP, 116 AD3d 756, 757-758). The plaintiff’s allegations that she was coerced into settling the underlying action were utterly refuted by her admissions during that proceeding that she authorized the defendants to prepare the settlement agreement, was satisfied with the defendants’ representation, was not forced to enter into the settlement agreement, and was not under the influence of stress or duress (see Glenwayne Dev. Corp v James J. Corbett, P.C., 175 AD3d at 474). Although the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendants failed to obtain temporary maintenance during the pendency of the underlying action, improperly advised her that the court was required to impute income to her, and advised her of the possible pitfalls of proceeding to trial rather than settling, those actions did not proximately cause any injuries to the plaintiff since the underlying action was settled and, in light of the plaintiff’s admissions in the underlying action, the “settlement of the [underlying] action was [not] effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). The fact that the plaintiff subsequently was unhappy with the settlement she obtained does not rise to the level of legal malpractice (see Floral Park Ophthalmology, P.C. v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, LLP, 216 AD3d 1136, 1137; Williams v Silverstone, 215 AD3d 787, 789). Accordingly, the legal malpractice cause of action was properly dismissed.”

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Andrew Lavoott Bluestone

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened…

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened his private law office and took his first legal malpractice case.

Since 1989, Bluestone has become a leader in the New York Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice bar, handling a wide array of plaintiff’s legal malpractice cases arising from catastrophic personal injury, contracts, patents, commercial litigation, securities, matrimonial and custody issues, medical malpractice, insurance, product liability, real estate, landlord-tenant, foreclosures and has defended attorneys in a limited number of legal malpractice cases.

Bluestone also took an academic role in field, publishing the New York Attorney Malpractice Report from 2002-2004.  He started the “New York Attorney Malpractice Blog” in 2004, where he has published more than 4500 entries.

Mr. Bluestone has written 38 scholarly peer-reviewed articles concerning legal malpractice, many in the Outside Counsel column of the New York Law Journal. He has appeared as an Expert witness in multiple legal malpractice litigations.

Mr. Bluestone is an adjunct professor of law at St. John’s University College of Law, teaching Legal Malpractice.  Mr. Bluestone has argued legal malpractice cases in the Second Circuit, in the New York State Court of Appeals, each of the four New York Appellate Divisions, in all four of  the U.S. District Courts of New York and in Supreme Courts all over the state.  He has also been admitted pro haec vice in the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida and was formally admitted to the US District Court of Connecticut and to its Bankruptcy Court all for legal malpractice matters. He has been retained by U.S. Trustees in legal malpractice cases from Bankruptcy Courts, and has represented municipalities, insurance companies, hedge funds, communications companies and international manufacturing firms. Mr. Bluestone regularly lectures in CLEs on legal malpractice.

Based upon his professional experience Bluestone was named a Diplomate and was Board Certified by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys in 2008 in Legal Malpractice. He remains Board Certified.  He was admitted to The Best Lawyers in America from 2012-2019.  He has been featured in Who’s Who in Law since 1993.

In the last years, Mr. Bluestone has been featured for two particularly noteworthy legal malpractice cases.  The first was a settlement of an $11.9 million dollar default legal malpractice case of Yeo v. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman which was reported in the NYLJ on August 15, 2016. Most recently, Mr. Bluestone obtained a rare plaintiff’s verdict in a legal malpractice case on behalf of the City of White Plains v. Joseph Maria, reported in the NYLJ on February 14, 2017. It was the sole legal malpractice jury verdict in the State of New York for 2017.

Bluestone has been at the forefront of the development of legal malpractice principles and has contributed case law decisions, writing and lecturing which have been recognized by his peers.  He is regularly mentioned in academic writing, and his past cases are often cited in current legal malpractice decisions. He is recognized for his ample writings on Judiciary Law § 487, a 850 year old statute deriving from England which relates to attorney deceit.