Condon Paxos PLLC v SRC Constr. Corp. of Monroe 2025 NY Slip Op 51505(U) Decided on September 15, 2025 Supreme Court, Rockland County Cornell, J. is a discussion of ancient legal malpractice law coupled with application of a settlement agreement and determines whether the law firm may claim a contingent fee after being fired, settling a legal malpractice claim and litigating with its former clients.

“This action arises from a legal fee dispute between Plaintiff Condon Paxos PLLC, as successors-in-interest to Condon & Associates, PLLC, and Defendants SRC Construction Corp. of Monroe (“SRC”) and Michael Caridi. In 2010, Defendant SRC retained Plaintiff to represent it in an action against the Atlantic City Housing Authority (ACHA), an architect (“Lindemon”), [*2]
and an engineering firm (“Czar”) in a dispute surrounding the construction of a 48 unit low income senior housing project. Plaintiff filed an action in Federal Court, District of New Jersey, on behalf of SRC against ACHA, Lindemon, and Czar on August 8, 2010 (the “New Jersey Action”). A letter of engagement was signed by Defendants on August 9, 2010, in which the parties agreed to a 33% contingency legal fee.”

“Lindemon and Czar each moved to dismiss the suit against them, alleging that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Lindemon and Czar argued that the plaintiff had not filed Affidavits of Merit of professional negligence within 60 days of filing the complaint, as required by N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27. On April 12, 2011, the New Jersey District Court granted Czar’s motion and partially granted Lindemon’s motion (see SRC Const. Corp. of Monroe v. Atl. City Hous. Auth., No. 1:2010cv-3461, 2011 WL 1375680 [D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2011]). Two years later, Lindemon’s motion for summary judgment on the same issue was granted (see SRC Const. Corp. of Monroe v. Atl. City Hous. Auth., No. 1:2010cv-3461, 2013 WL 5771142 [D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2013]).”

“According to Plaintiff, on the eve of the arbitration hearing in 2017, he was informed that Defendant Caridi had just discovered that Czar was no longer part of the action (Doc. 85, Aff. of Condon ¶ 4). Plaintiff alleges that co-counsel, Robert Hantman, advised Plaintiff to put his malpractice carrier on notice, but, despite this, Plaintiff believed that the firm would continue as lead counsel for the arbitration (id. ¶ 5-6). Plaintiff alleges that he decided not to continue representing SRC after consultation with his legal malpractice carrier (id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff claims that Caridi was disappointed by Plaintiff’s decision to withdraw because Caridi did not want Plaintiff off the case (id. ¶¶ 9, 11).

According to Defendants, Plaintiff was terminated on October 10, 2017, based on Plaintiff’s failure to file the affidavits of merit in 2011 (see Doc. 90, Caridi Aff. ¶¶ 9-11). Defendant Caridi alleges that the lead arbitrator advised him that Plaintiff could not continue to represent SRC (see id. ¶ 10). Caridi alleges that, in addition to the failure to file the Affidavits of [*3]Merit, there were other breakdowns in the legal relationship. Specifically, Caridi claims that there were repeated failures to communicate, unauthorized consents to adjournments requested by ACHA, and an intentional misrepresentation of the reason for the dismissal of Czar and Lindemon from the action (see id. ¶ 12).

Plaintiff agreed to a settlement of $150,000 payable to Defendants by Plaintiff’s malpractice insurance carrier. SRC and Caridi individually each signed a General Release dated October 11, 2017, which states in relevant part:

Releasor . . . in consideration of the sum of $150,000 . . . release and discharge Condon & Associates, PLLC and Brian K. Condon, individually, [and their] . . . successors and assigns from all actions, causes of action, suits, . . . covenants, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, . . . damages, . . . claims, and demands whatsoever, in law, . . . or equity . . . which the Releasors . . . ever had . . . shall or may have for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of this Release.

(Doc. 89).

The arbitration was held and Defendants were awarded $2,294,074.85 in a Final Award dated June 20, 2018 (see Doc. 86; SRC Const. Corp. of Monroe v. Atl. City Hous. Auth., No. 1:2010cv-3461, 2019 WL 1238822 [D.N.J. March 18, 2019] (denying motion by ACHA to vacate arbitration award)). Notably, the arbitrators determined that ACHA did not meet its burden to have any of the damages assigned to the negligence of Lindemon or Czar, so no set off was awarded to ACHA (Doc. 86, p. 11).”

“Plaintiff filed the instant action on April 22, 2022, alleging entitlement to a legal fee of $777,731.34, per the terms of the Letter of Engagement. Defendants filed an answer with counterclaims on July 25, 2022, denying that any fees were owed to Plaintiff. Defendants moved to compel arbitration. By Decision and Order dated July 18, 2024, this Court denied Defendant’s motion because the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. A note of issue and certificate of readiness was filed on March 18, 2025. Trial was scheduled to commence on May 7, 2025.

On April 6, 2025, Defendants filed a motion seeking various relief, including summary judgment, vacatur of the note of issue pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.21(e), or, alternatively, leave to amend their answer. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on Defendants’ counterclaims and for leave to amend the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b). In a Decision and Order dated May 2, 2025, this Court denied Defendants’ motion in its entirety. (Doc. 63). Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the counterclaims was granted. Specifically, this Court held, “[v]iewing the papers of both parties in a light most favorable to the Defendants, the Court finds that Defendants’ negligence and malpractice counterclaims are barred by release and therefore summary judgment is warranted.” (id. at 5). The Court further stated:

Defendant Caridi, acting in his individual capacity and on behalf of Defendant SRC Construction Corp., expressly released Plaintiff and its successors from any and all claims arising out of or relating to the prior representation in the New Jersey Action, the same transactions and occurrences at issue in this legal fee action. Defendants cannot revive the negligence and malpractice claims in this action.”

“A release is a contract, and its interpretation is governed by contract law principles (see Kaminsky v Gamache, 298 AD2d 361 [2d Dept 2002] (citing Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 562 [1969])). A release “that is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” (Alvarez v Amicucci, 82 AD3d 687, 688 [2d Dept 2011]; see Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 NY3d 269 [2011]). “Whether or not a writing is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the courts” (W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162 [1990]). Finally, “[t]he meaning and coverage of a general release necessarily depends upon the controversy being settled and upon the purpose for which the release was given.” (Gale v Citicorp, 278 AD2d 197, 197 [2d Dept 2000]).

The Court finds that the language of the General Releases is not ambiguous. The releases refer generally to the matter of SRC Construction Corp of Monroe d/b/a SRC Industries Inc. v. Atlantic City Housing Authority, et al., and release any claims that Defendants ever had against Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court finds that General Releases preclude Defendants from raising the issue of alleged malpractice. Further, defense counsel is prohibited from attempting to adduce proof at trial that Plaintiff was terminated for cause based on any alleged malpractice that occurred.

Preventing Defendants from raising these matters as defenses is required by the General Releases and follows logically from the General Releases. While the General Releases do not explicitly refer to any waiver on Defendants’ part of defenses, it would be a mistake if this analysis did not go further. The practical effect of opening the door to Defendants to raise (1) malpractice and/or (2) for cause termination as defenses would result in Defendants attempting to prove those claims. While Defendants, of course, seek to distinguish having released affirmative claims against Plaintiff from retaining defenses in the legal fee litigation, that is a [*5]distinction without a difference.

These proposed defenses are, in reality, affirmative claims which would not only result in a prohibited “trial within a trial” but would clearly run afoul of the General Releases whereby Defendants released Plaintiff from all “claims”, “controversies” etc. These proposed defenses cannot be said to be anything other than those released “claims” or “controversies.” Thus, the General Releases not only protect Plaintiff against the claims being used as swords seeking affirmative relief, but also prevent these claims from being used to shield Defendants in this litigation.

Having previously determined that Defendants’ counterclaims alleging malpractice and for cause termination required dismissal, it follows that allowing introduction of evidence attempting to prove these claims must be precluded.”