Matrimonial cases are unlike almost every other kind of case except a criminal plea. Get involved in a car accident and you will likely settle through your attorney with a release and a stipulation of discontinuance. Resolution of a breach of contract will follow the same paradigm, as will a battle over patents. However, settle a matrimonial action and you will be “allocuted” by the judge, and one of the questions will be whether you are satisfied with your attorney’s work. The answer to this question has manyfold consequences, as we see in Valentina v Beckerman 2025 NY Slip Op 04682 [241 AD3d 751] August 13, 2025 Appellate Division, Second Department.
“In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Donna-Marie E. Golia, J.), entered January 6, 2021. The judgment, upon an order of the same court entered December 21, 2020, granting the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint, and upon an order of the same court also entered December 21, 2020, denying, as academic, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint, is in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint. The notice of appeal from the orders is deemed to be a notice of appeal from the judgment (see id. § 5512 [a]), and the appeal from the judgment will be prosecuted under Appellate Division Docket No. 2021-00617 and not under Appellate Division Docket No. 2021-00618.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.”
“Here, in support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, a transcript of the court proceeding in the underlying action containing the plaintiff’s allocution conducted by the court regarding the settlement agreement, which conclusively established that the plaintiff was not effectively compelled to settle the underlying action (see Schiller v Bender, Burrows & Rosenthal, LLP, 116 AD3d 756, 757-758 [2014]). The plaintiff’s allegations that she was coerced into settling the underlying action were utterly refuted by her admissions during that proceeding that she authorized the defendants to prepare the settlement agreement, was satisfied with the defendants’ representation, was not forced to enter into the settlement agreement, and was not under the influence of stress or duress (see Glenwayne Dev. Corp v James J. Corbett, P.C., 175 AD3d at 474). Although the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendants failed to obtain temporary maintenance during the pendency of the underlying action, improperly advised her that the court was required to impute income to her, and advised her of the possible pitfalls of proceeding to trial rather than settling, those actions did not proximately cause any injuries to the plaintiff since the underlying action was settled and, in light of the plaintiff’s admissions in the underlying action, the “settlement of the [underlying] action was [not] effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). The fact that the plaintiff subsequently was unhappy with the settlement she obtained does not rise to the level of legal malpractice (see Floral Park Ophthalmology, P.C. v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, LLP, 216 AD3d 1136, 1137 [2023]; Williams v Silverstone, 215 AD3d 787, 789 [2023]). Accordingly, the legal malpractice cause of action was properly dismissed.
The causes of action alleging fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress were properly dismissed as duplicative of the legal malpractice cause of action insofar as they arose from the same facts and did not allege distinct damages (see Incorporated Vil. of Freeport v Albrecht, Viggiano, Zurich & Co., P.C., 226 AD3d 658, 660 [2024]; Kahlon v DeSantis, 182 AD3d 588, 590 [2020]). The remaining cause of action alleging sex discrimination was properly dismissed because such a cause of action arises only where an employer discriminates against an employee (see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 NY2d 326, 330 [2003]; Silvers v Jamaica Hosp., 218 AD3d 817, 819 [2023]) and, in any event, the plaintiff’s allegations with respect to that cause of action were conclusory and speculative (see 126 Main St., LLC v Kriegsman, 218 AD3d 524, 525 [2023]; Tong v Target, Inc., 83 AD3d [*2]1046, 1047 [2011]).”