To be truthful, its son v. mom in one part of the case and son v. mom’s attorneys in the Judiciary Law 487 case.  It’s sort of a tragedy.  Mom had a medical malpractice case for bad breast reduction, and the case was started.  While the case was going Dad died in a small plane-instruction negligence case.  It appears he was flying with an instructor and crashed.  In the med mal case there was a loss of consortium claim which devolved to the estate and son had a part.  The wrongful death claim also had a recovery for son.  He obtained his funds but was unhappy about the annuity and payout.  Does he have a claim against the attorneys?  No.  In Sutch v Sutch-Lenz  2015 NY Slip Op 04692 [129 AD3d 1137]  June 4, 2015 Appellate Division, Third Department  the court writes

“We affirm. There is no question that a legal malpractice claim requires—in the first instance—”the existence of an attorney-client relationship” (Arnold v Devane, 123 AD3d 1202, 1203 [2014]). Plaintiff does not contend, and the record does not otherwise reflect, that he had a contractual relationship with defendants. Rather, plaintiff argues that because defendants represented Sutch-Lenz in her capacity as the administrator of decedent’s estate in both the medical malpractice and wrongful death actions and plaintiff, in turn, is a beneficiary of decedent’s estate, it necessarily follows that defendants were duty bound to represent plaintiff’s best interests in the context of those two actions. The flaw in plaintiff’s argument on this point is that “[i]n New York, a third party, without privity, cannot maintain a claim against an attorney in professional negligence, absent fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances” (Estate of Schneider v Finmann, 15 NY3d 306, 308-309 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Zinnanti v 513 Woodward Ave. Realty, LLC, 105 AD3d 736, 737 [2013]; cf. Leff v Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 78 AD3d 531, 532 [2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]). Although a limited exception has been carved out with respect to an action brought by the personal representative of an estate, “strict privity remains a bar against beneficiaries’ and other third-party individuals’ estate planning malpractice claims absent fraud or other circumstances” (Estate of Schneider v Finmann, 15 NY3d at 310; see Leff v Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 78 AD3d at 532).

[*3] Here, even affording plaintiff’s complaint a liberal construction, accepting the allegations contained therein as true and granting plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Snyder v Brown Chiari, LLP, 116 AD3d 1116, 1117 [2014]), the pleading is devoid of the requisite allegations of fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances necessary to maintain plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim against defendants. At best, plaintiff has alleged a generalized dissatisfaction with the terms of the structured settlement that he received in the context of the wrongful death action—the terms of which were subject to Snyder’s review in his capacity as plaintiff’s guardian ad litem and the payout provisions of which, according to Supreme Court, plaintiff subsequently and successfully renegotiated. Plaintiff further alleges that he did not receive his share of the award made with respect to decedent’s derivative claim in the medical malpractice action. Such allegations are insufficient to establish that plaintiff had an attorney-client relationship with defendants or to otherwise place him “within the ambit of the exception to the privity requirement” (Fredriksen v Fredriksen, 30 AD3d 370, 372 [2006]; see Estate of Schneider v Finmann, 15 NY3d at 309-310; Conti v Polizzotto, 243 AD2d 672, 672-673 [1997]). Absent an attorney-client relationship, plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim was properly dismissed.

Moreover, even assuming that such a relationship existed, those same allegations fall short of demonstrating, among other things, that defendants failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by members of the legal community (see Hinsdale v Weiermiller, 126 AD3d 1103, 1104 [2015]). Simply put, even assuming that defendants indeed played a role in the selection and purchase of the subject annuities, the mere fact that plaintiff did not get more of his money “up front” does not constitute legal malpractice. To the extent that plaintiff contends that he did not receive his share of the proceeds from the medical malpractice action, we need note only that it was the responsibility of Sutch-Lenz, in her capacity as decedent’s administrator, to collect estate assets and distribute them accordingly (see generally Matter of Manning, 244 App Div 9, 12-13 [1935], affd sub nom. Matter of Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co. v Fidelity & Deposit Co., 268 NY 690 [1935]; Matter of Scheuer, 94 Misc 2d 538, 543 [Sur Ct, NY County 1978]; Matter of Blaszkiewicz, 33 Misc 2d 884, 885 [Sur Ct, Richmond County 1962]). Therefore, plaintiff’s quarrel on this point lies with Sutch-Lenz, not defendants. We reach a similar conclusion with respect to plaintiff’s demand for an accounting (see SCPA 2205).”