Attorney client anger may fester for a very long time, and then erupt.  In Katz v Landsman
2016 NY Slip Op 30533(U)  March 30, 2016  Supreme Court, New York County   Docket Number: 161147/14 Judge: Carol R. Edmead we see sort of the opposite.  A dispute, a battle, 6 years go by, and then a second and decisive battle.

“This case arises from Landsman’s representation of Katz in a proceeding in Surrogate’s Court in a matter involving a trust created by Katz’s grandmother. While the complaint is short on dates, it is clear that the representation ended when Katz fired Landsman in November 2008. On November 19, 2008, Landsman sent Katz an email notifying him that he would not spend any more time on the matter until e paid an outstanding bill, and Katz responded, on the same day, stating that “[w]e concur that you are not to proceed any further on this case until the matter of your presented bill is resolved” (emphasis in original). Landsman, in an affidavit submitted with the motion to dismiss, stated that “[t]he fee issue was not resolved and I did nothing further on Plaintiffs behalf’ (Katz aff, if 3). There is no dispute as to whether Katz’s email constituted termination. Landsman subsequently, in September 2014, brought an action in this court, entitled Landsman v Katz, index No. 652770/14, to recover his fees. That action was before Judge Reed, who granted dismissal without prejudice because Landsman failed to satisfy 22 NYCRR 137. Specifically, Judge Reed held that while Landsman initiated an arbitration in December 2008, he failed “to submit documentary evidence or other proof that a hearing was held before an arbitrator as mandated by 22 NYCRR 137″ (Judge Reed’s September 30, 2015 decision and order). Shortly after, Landsman initiated the fees action and nearly six years after terminating him, Katz initiated this action by filing a summons with notice in November 2014. While Landsman brought his action for fees solely as an individual, Katz, in this action, has sued two legal entities associated with Landsman: Landsman & Funk and Landsman P.C. The first, Landsman & Funk, was iµinitially hired by Katz in 2005, but was succeeded by Landsman P.C. when Landsman’s partner left the practice of law in June 2007. ”

“A review of the complaint makes it equally as clear that Katz’s claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty are duplicative of his claim for legal malpractice, as they ·’ rely on the same set of facts and seek the same damages (see Katz’s complaint,~ 62 [seeking $685,000 plus $1,000,000 in punitive damages ‘for each of the four causes of action]). As these ~ – claims are duplicative of the malpractice claim,~ they must be dismissed (Raghavendra v Brill, 128 AD3d 414, 414-415 [1st Dept 2015]). Thus, Katz’s complaint must be dismissed as the “legal malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations and the breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims are duplicative of the legal malpractice claim. In an effort to avoid this result, Katz turns to a line of cases that holds that violation of the Judiciary Law§ 487, and other intentional torts; are not subsumed by legal malpractice claims  when they arise from the same set of facts (see e.g. Sabalza v Salgado, 85 AD3d 436, 438 [1st Dept 2011] [holding that dismissal of a claim under Judiciary Law§ 487 was “not duplicative of causes of action alleging legal malpractice, since the statutory claim requires an intent to deceive, 1i whereas a legal malpractice claim is based on negligent conduct”]). Katz argues this despite the ii i! fact that the complaint does not contain a claim for violation of Judiciary Law § 487. Instead, Katz claims that he could have brought such a claim. ‘ ,. Without moving for relief, Katz suggests that the court could grant him leave to amend the complaint to add claims that have a six-year.statute of limitations and an intentional ” component, such as violation Judiciary Law § 487 and fraud. While this issue is not properly raised, the court briefly points out that, while leave to amend is freely given under CPLR 3025 ·l (b ), “in order to conserve judicial resources, an examination of the underlying merits of the proposed causes of action is warranted,” and “[w]here a court concludes that an application to amend a pleading clearly lacks merit, leave is properly denied” (Eighth Ave. Garage Corp. v H.K.L. Realty Corp., 60 AD3d 404, 405 [1st Dept 2009] [internal citation omitted]). While Katz argues that the allegations in the complaint could sustain claims for fraud and a violation of Judiciary Law§ 487, that he has simply not labeled them as such, the allegations are far too conclusory to sustain a claim for either of these causes of action (see Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v Frankfurt Garbus Klein & Selz, P.C., 13 AD3d 296, 297 [1st Dept 2004] [holding that claims for fraud and violation of Judiciary Law § 487 “were not pleaded with sufficient particularity”]). Even if this were not the case, invoices show that Landsman & Funk stopped working on the case over seven years before Katz filed his summons. Thus, even under a six year statute of limitations, Katz’s speculative claims are also barred by the statute of limitations. “