Bad result suggests that a bad choice was made by the attorneys.  The bad result/choice suggests that a legal malpractice case might be indicated.  This is fair reasoning, but Courts often fail to join in the analysis, and point to a different cause of the bad result.  Put another way, lots of legal malpractice cases are dismissed on the “but for” portion of the equation.

Excelsior Capitol LLC v K&L Gates LLP  2016 NY Slip Op 02738  Decided on April 12, 2016
Appellate Division, First Department is one such example.  The First Department found, in essence, that it was the judge who decided the case wrongly, and the bad result was not proximately caused by attorney mistake.

“In the underlying action, the Second Department found that the trial court erred in dismissing Excelsior’s causes of action to recover upon the guarantor’s three personal guarantees, finding that a jury could have found that the guarantor consented to the extensions of said guarantees, and remitted the matter for a new trial on those causes of action (Excelsior Capital, LLC v Superior Broadcasting Co., Inc., 82 AD3d 696, 699 [2d Dept 2011] [internal citations omitted]). The trial court’s error in that enforcement action was “independent of or far removed from the [attorney’s] conduct,” and therefore constituted an intervening cause, breaking any proximate cause by the defendants (Kriz v Schum, 75 NY2d 25, 36 [1989], quoting Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 NY2d 308, 315 [1980]). In any event, plaintiff’s causation theory is speculative.

“[T]he selection of one among several reasonable courses of action does not constitute malpractice'” (Zarin v Reid & Priest, 184 AD2d 385, 387 [1st Dept 1992]). The issue in this case is a May 26 letter which merely reserved Excelsior’s rights while the parties worked out a possible forbearance agreement and redocumentation of the notes and guarantees, and did not ask the guarantor to reaffirm his guarantees. This was a reasonable course of action based on statements made by the guarantor’s attorney as to the continuing validity of the guarantees, and the fact that the parties were attempting resolution of this matter. More importantly, it was speculative to believe that the guarantor would have provided such a reaffirmance, since if[*2] prompt resolution was not reached, litigation was likely (see Sherwood Group v Dornbush, Mensch, Mandelstam & Silverman, 191 AD2d 292, 294 [1st Dept 1993]).”