It is often and disparagingly said that legal malpractice cases exist solely to get out of obligations to pay attorney fees.  Sometimes that appears to be true.   Popkin v Kopoulos  Decided on April 22, 2016  District Court Of Nassau County, First District  Fairgrieve, J. is the story of an attorney who prepared a retainer agreement for hourly rate work, performed some work, ran into non-payment, moved to be relieved, was relieved and then was awarded a charging lien.  When the attorney went to sue for the relatively small amount of fees, he was met with a counter-claim for legal malpractice.

“”[W]hen the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be found within the four corners of the contract, giving practical interpretation to the language employed and the parties’ reasonable expectations. Thus, a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” (Dysal, Inc. v. Hub Props. Trust, 92 AD3d 826, 827 [2d Dept 2012]). Furthermore, “[i]nterpretation of an unambiguous contract provision is a function for the court, and matters extrinsic to the agreement may not be considered when the intent of the parties can be gleaned from the face of the instrument. A court should not imply a term which the parties themselves failed to include” (2632 Realty Dev. Corp. v. 299 Main St., LLC, 94 AD3d 743, 745 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v County of Westchester, 99 AD3d 998, 999 [2d Dept 2012]).

Here, the retainer agreement, which was signed by the defendant on July 10, 2014, is clear on its face. The interpretation the defendant suggests, to wit: that the fees were capped at $5,000.00 is in direct contradiction of the plain language of the agreement. Nor, does the court find persuasive the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff’s representation of him in the Supreme Court action was somehow deficient, which would forgive his obligation to pay legal fees. In fact, in connection with that representation, the Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff a charging lien for those outstanding fees, when plaintiff moved by Order to Show Cause to be relieved as counsel on the ground of defendant’s “refusal to acknowledge his obligations” of payment (see Plaintiff’s Exhibits C and E). Accordingly, and having raised no other grounds in opposition, the defendant has failed to raise an issue of fact for trial.

In view of the foregoing, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Let judgment be entered in the sum of $10,214.50 with interest thereon from June 2, 2015, together with costs and disbursements.

The portion of the plaintiff’s motion which seeks to dismiss the defendant’s counterclaims, which assert causes of action for legal malpractice is granted. Said counterclaims are hereby dismissed.”