Contribution is the concept that one party might owe another party the obligation to share in the bad times…and to be financially responsible for a claim or verdict against the first party.  It matters whether the claim is for tort or contract.  In legal malpractice the lines are blurred, but when the contribution is for claims arising from a contract, there is no right to contribution.

Bloostein v Morrison Cohen LLP   2016 NY Slip Op 31309(U)  July 11, 2016  Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 651242/2012  Judge: Anil C. Singh, which we dicussed earlier this week has a nice opinion on contribution.

“Under New York law, there is no right to contribution in contract actions, either by common law or by the CPLR which limits contribution to “personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death. New York CPLR 1401. “[A] purely economic loss resulting from a breach of contract does not constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of CPLR 1401.” See, Bd. of Educ. of Hudson City Sch. Dist. v Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 71 N.Y. 2d 21, 26 (1987); Structure Tone, Inc. v Universal Servs. Grp., Ltd., 87 AD3d 909, 911 (1st Dept 2011). If “a plaintiffs direct claims … seek only a contractual benefit of the bargain recovery, their tort language notwithstanding, contribution is unavailable.” Trump Vil. Section 3 v New York State Hous. Fin. Agency, 307 A.D. 2d 891, 897 (1st Dept 2003). Although CPLR 1401 requires the existence of tort liability, independent of a breach of contract, the mere existence of a contract does not preclude the possibility of tort liability. Landon v Kroll Lab. Specialists, Inc., 91 AD3d 79, 83 (2d Dept 2011) (“A person is not necessarily insulated from liability in tort merely because he or she is engaged in performing a contractual obligation.”) (citations omitted). ”

“The case against Stonebridge hinges on whether Stonebridge breached a duty to the plaintiff investors independent of the Stonebridge/Investor agreement. Here, Morrison Cohen argues that Stonebridge breached a fiduciary duty to the investors because it acted as their advisor. Additionally, Morrison Cohen argues that Stonebridge owed the investors “an independent duty to exercise reasonable care” as an expert and a financial services provider. ”

“Morrison Cohen also argues that Stonebridge, as an expert and financial service provider, had an independent duty to exercise reasonable care in this transaction. Here, Morrison Cohen has not alleged an independent duty to exercise reasonable care. In Sommer, the court held that “[a] legal duty independent of contractual obligations may be imposed by law as an incident to the parties’ relationship … [p ]rofessionals, common carriers and bailees, for example, may be subject to tort liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, irrespective of their contractual duties.” Further, the Court observed that “the nature of the injury, the manner in which the injury occurred and the resulting harm” are all relevant factors in considering whether claims for breach of contract and tort may exist side by side. However, the Court of Appeals have declined to extend Sommer to cases involving only economic harm. New York Univ. v Cont. Ins. Co., 87 N.Y. 2d 308, 314 (1995). ”

“Moreover, the touchstone for purposes of whether one can seek contribution is not the nature of the claim in the underlying complaint but the measure of damages sought therein. Children’s Corner Learning Ctr. v A. Miranda Contr. Corp., 64 A.D. 3d 318, 324 (1st Dept 2009); Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp, 79 N.Y.2d 540 (1992) (“the determination of whether a claim is grounded in contract or tort is the damages the plaintiff seeks”); In Fid. and Deposit Co. of Maryland v Levine, Levine & Meyrowitz, CPAs, P.C., 66 A.D. 3d 514, 515 (1st Dept 2009), the court held that because plaintiff seeks to recover against defendants for actions and omissions explicitly covered in the scope of a contract, and both causes of action seek the same measure of damages, defendants may not seek contribution against the third-party defendants, whether the causes of action are labeled breach of contract or malpractice. Here, the damages sought by plaintiff in the main action are purely economic damages. “

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Andrew Lavoott Bluestone

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened…

Andrew Lavoott Bluestone has been an attorney for 40 years, with a career that spans criminal prosecution, civil litigation and appellate litigation. Mr. Bluestone became an Assistant District Attorney in Kings County in 1978, entered private practice in 1984 and in 1989 opened his private law office and took his first legal malpractice case.

Since 1989, Bluestone has become a leader in the New York Plaintiff’s Legal Malpractice bar, handling a wide array of plaintiff’s legal malpractice cases arising from catastrophic personal injury, contracts, patents, commercial litigation, securities, matrimonial and custody issues, medical malpractice, insurance, product liability, real estate, landlord-tenant, foreclosures and has defended attorneys in a limited number of legal malpractice cases.

Bluestone also took an academic role in field, publishing the New York Attorney Malpractice Report from 2002-2004.  He started the “New York Attorney Malpractice Blog” in 2004, where he has published more than 4500 entries.

Mr. Bluestone has written 38 scholarly peer-reviewed articles concerning legal malpractice, many in the Outside Counsel column of the New York Law Journal. He has appeared as an Expert witness in multiple legal malpractice litigations.

Mr. Bluestone is an adjunct professor of law at St. John’s University College of Law, teaching Legal Malpractice.  Mr. Bluestone has argued legal malpractice cases in the Second Circuit, in the New York State Court of Appeals, each of the four New York Appellate Divisions, in all four of  the U.S. District Courts of New York and in Supreme Courts all over the state.  He has also been admitted pro haec vice in the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Florida and was formally admitted to the US District Court of Connecticut and to its Bankruptcy Court all for legal malpractice matters. He has been retained by U.S. Trustees in legal malpractice cases from Bankruptcy Courts, and has represented municipalities, insurance companies, hedge funds, communications companies and international manufacturing firms. Mr. Bluestone regularly lectures in CLEs on legal malpractice.

Based upon his professional experience Bluestone was named a Diplomate and was Board Certified by the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys in 2008 in Legal Malpractice. He remains Board Certified.  He was admitted to The Best Lawyers in America from 2012-2019.  He has been featured in Who’s Who in Law since 1993.

In the last years, Mr. Bluestone has been featured for two particularly noteworthy legal malpractice cases.  The first was a settlement of an $11.9 million dollar default legal malpractice case of Yeo v. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman which was reported in the NYLJ on August 15, 2016. Most recently, Mr. Bluestone obtained a rare plaintiff’s verdict in a legal malpractice case on behalf of the City of White Plains v. Joseph Maria, reported in the NYLJ on February 14, 2017. It was the sole legal malpractice jury verdict in the State of New York for 2017.

Bluestone has been at the forefront of the development of legal malpractice principles and has contributed case law decisions, writing and lecturing which have been recognized by his peers.  He is regularly mentioned in academic writing, and his past cases are often cited in current legal malpractice decisions. He is recognized for his ample writings on Judiciary Law § 487, a 850 year old statute deriving from England which relates to attorney deceit.