In a very (very) unusual kind of opinion, Justice Weinmann of Supreme Court, Erie County holds in Hogan v Van Buren, 2025 NY Slip Op 25259 Decided on October 3, 2025 that a suspended attorney may not seek fees from the clients involved in the litigation which caused his suspension.

“Corey Hogan is a well-known western New York attorney who is presently suspended from the practice of law. He now wishes to represent himself in order to sue his former clients to recover legal fees, advances and disbursements for the work which was the rationale for his suspension. He now claims $1.177 million from his former clients.

The threshold issue for this Court to determine is whether Mr. Hogan —as a suspended attorney— has the legal right to represent himself, and furthermore, if he does, whether he has the legal right to sue his former clients for work which was the rationale for his suspension.

The defendants are farmers who sought representation and legal counsel in 2015 from plaintiff, the managing attorney of the Hogan Willig firm, a suburban law firm at the time with over 100 professionals including attorneys, paralegals, and administrative staff. Over the course of more than 2 years, plaintiff provided substantial legal services to defendants; assisted with refinancing efforts; defended against creditor claims; negotiated with creditors; and provided financial analysis to stabilize the business, including farm management services such as the collection of receivables from crop sales; payment of bills; marketing of farm products; coordinating digital mapping of farm fields; contact with customers regarding the sale of farm products; and bookkeeping and accounting services.

In addition, according to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department’s Decision (Matter of Corey J. Hogan et al. [2023 NY Slip Op 00612] [4th Dept 2023], Motion for Leave to Appeal [*2]denied [NY Slip Op 65344] [Court of Appeals 2023]), plaintiff provided his clients with financial assistance in the form of “advances” of funds, the majority of which were used to pay expenses associated with the operation of the farming business, including the purchase of supplies such as fuel, fertilizer, seed, equipment parts, and the payment of other expenses such as trucking costs, wages for farm employees, insurance premiums, land lease payments, and owners’ draws paid to the clients.

Moreover, added the Court, some of the advances of funds were used to pay marketing costs, delinquent balances on debt owed to vendors and creditors, and disbursements associated with lawsuits in which Hogan Willig was representing the clients. The sources of the advances were Hogan’s personal funds; Hogan Willig’s credit card accounts; Hogan Willig’s operating account; and an LLC that was created, solely owned, and funded by Hogan. Plaintiff provided no promissory notes or loan documentation; sale or purchase contracts; leases; or any other memorialization of the terms of repayment.

Furthermore, added the Court, plaintiff purchased 11 pieces of farming equipment, and filed a UCC financing statement listing the defendants as debtors to plaintiff’s LLC, and listing as collateral all crops, livestock, farming equipment and supplies. Finally, plaintiff arranged for 3 mortgages in the amount of $100,00; $150,000, and $250,000 listing Hogan Willig as the mortgagee and defendants as the mortgagor. As if all that were not enough, the Court found that plaintiff did not disclose to his clients the terms of the transactions, nor did he advise his clients of the potential of any conflict of interest, or the advisability of seeking independent legal counsel.

But the straw that broke the camel’s back was plaintiff’s advice to his clients that they file for bankruptcy, after he had steered them into $2.5 million in debt—which did not even include the $1.177 million they allegedly owed to plaintiff for all the good work that he did for them.”

“In 2022, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department issued a 7 page unanimous Opinion listing the aforementioned transactions and much more, and holding that plaintiff violated 5 specific Rules of Professional Conduct. They noted that plaintiff failed to express contrition or remorse and failed to sufficiently acknowledge “his substantial disregard of his ethical obligations . . . .” Accordingly, after due deliberation and consideration, the Court suspended Corey Hogan from the practice of law for a minimum of 2 years.

The Court issued a 2 page Order finding the plaintiff guilty of professional misconduct, and notably held:

“It is further ORDERED that Corey J. Hogan is hereby commanded during the term of [*3]

such suspension to cease and desist from the practice of law in any form either as principal or agent, clerk or employee of another, and his hereby forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission or other public authority, or to give another an opinion as to the law or its application, or any advice in relation thereto . . . (emphasis added).”

In a case of first impression, it is now up to this Court to determine whether the Order of the Appellate Division prohibits Mr. Hogan from representing himself in order to sue his former clients.”

“Applying both Sassower decisions to the facts at bar, it is evident that there is a significant factual distinguishing circumstance. At bar, the Fourth Department specifically and categorically issued an Order of the Court prohibiting Mr. Hogan from “the practice of law in any form either as principal or agent” (emphasis added). The first Sassower case, from a level below State Supreme Court and in another county of the state, did not reference the specifics, particularities, or actual terms in the Order of Suspension pertaining to Ms. Sassower. Likewise, the Second Department’s Opinion 4 years later also made no mention of the details, particularities, and terms of the Order of Suspension. But notably, the Court narrowed Sassower’s ability to self-represent. There the Court held she could self-represent as an individual, but not as president of her own P.C. (professional corporation). But again, there the facts are distinguishable from those at bar. There are no terms or particularities in the Order referenced. And again, the Second Department is a Court of different, concurrent jurisdiction to the Fourth Department, thus that decision is not controlling. And finally, there the suspended attorney was defending 2 lawsuits —not seeking to proactively file a lawsuit. In sum, the 2 cases cited, while arguably distinguishable, simply do not support any argument that Mr. Hogan may self-represent, in view of the Fourth Department’s extremely limiting and qualifying language in its Order of Suspension.

Finally, Mr. Hogan cited at oral argument the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for the proposition that courts may not prohibit even non-attorneys from self-representation. Further, he argued, that because he was suspended, and now acting as a non-attorney, he had the constitutional right to represent himself. However, even the U.S. Supreme Court has held that this constitutional right applies only in the realm of criminal law, where a defendant, made to respond to a criminal charge, has the right to self-representation (Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 [1975]). At bar Mr. Hogan seeks the opposite — not to defend, but to affirmatively file a lawsuit —and in a civil— not a criminal court. Thus even the U.S. Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court cannot help Mr. Hogan here.

In view of the aforementioned, this Court now holds that Corey J. Hogan, as an attorney suspended from the practice of law, may not represent himself in filing a lawsuit, whether against his former clients or otherwise.”

“Applying the doctrine of Unclean Hands and Levy, supra and McConnell supra, and Hytco, supra, plaintiff at bar shall not be “permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong.” Both equity and public policy, as described by the Appellate Division First and Third Departments and the Court of Appeals, therefore would prohibit Mr. Hogan from receiving compensation for his work for the farmers. Hogan’s representation clearly harmed the farmers to the tune of a more than $2 million debt, to say nothing of the ethical morass they could never have anticipated when they sought out assistance and counsel for their foundering farm.

Finally, counsel for the farmers ask this Court to sanction Mr. Hogan by awarding costs and legal fees for his allegedly frivolous conduct in launching this litigation, (22 NYCRR 130). “Frivolous” is defined by the statute as conduct that is completely without merit in law, and cannot be supported by reasonable argument . . . or is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another. At bar, applying extreme logic to the entire saga of events, it cannot be said that Mr. Hogan’s request to be paid for his representation of his clients is “completely without merit,” however unethical the services may have been. After all, there is an old adage that no one works for free. Most would agree that lawyers should be paid for their work. Thus it might be said that while Mr. Hogan’s attempt to get paid could arguably be better characterized as: audacious; ballsy; disingenuous; nervy; [*8]brazen; shameless; or greedy, it is not entirely accurate to characterize it as “frivolous,” as defined by the statute. Really the most functional characterization for Mr. Hogan’s conduct is arguably best described by a term that is not even considered part of the English language but comes from what has been described as one of God’s gifts to humanity, Yiddish. The term most appropriate to characterize Mr. Hogan’s conduct at bar is “chutzpah.” The great author Leo Rosten has described chutzpah as the criminal defendant standing in Court after being convicted of killing his parents, begging for mercy because he is an orphan. That is chutzpah. This Court therefore holds that while Mr. Hogan’s plea in seeking payment for decidedly unethical conduct which caused his suspension from the practice of law is not frivolous, it is unarguably a stunning and breath-taking example of chutzpah. The defendants’ application for sanctions is therefore denied.

For the above-sated reasons, it is therefore

ORDERED, that the defendants’ motion granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety, on the merits, and with prejudice, is GRANTED; “