Stfleur v Wallace 2025 NY Slip Op 34502(U) November 24, 2025 Supreme Court, Kings County Docket Number: Index No. 525973/2019 Judge: Ingrid Joseph delves into whether a defendant attorney can get her case severed from the plaintiff’s claims against others.

“In this matter, Denaka L. Perry, Esq. (“Perry”) moves (Motion Seq. 5) for an Order pursuant to CPLR 603 severing all claims against her from the within action. Marc Antoine Stfleur and Garfield M. Stfleur, individually and as Trustees of the Marie C. Souffrant Trust (“Plaintiffs”) have opposed the motion. Plaintiffs commenced this action primarily to compel determination of claims related to a piece of real property located at 146 Lenox Road, Brooklyn, New York 11226, (the “Subject Premises”) pursuant to RPAPL Article 15. Pursuant to the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that on September 20, 2010, Marie C. Souffant (“Decedent”) conveyed her interest in the Subject Premises to her children, Marc Stfleur, Garfield Stfleur, and Regina Wallace a/k/a Regina Stfleur (“Wallace”) as Co-Trustees of The Marie C. Souffrant Trust (the “Trust”). Plaintiffs assert that in addition to a Life Estate, Decedent reserved unto herself a Power of Appointment which allowed Decedent to alter the remainder of the Beneficiaries of the Trust within her sole discretion and without consent of any Trustee/Remainder beneficiary. It is alleged that pursuant to the terms of the Original Trust, Defendant Wallace was named as the sole beneficiary of the Subject Premises.”

“Therefore, according to the Amendment to the Trust, distribution of the Subject Premises was to be to the Plaintiffs and Defendant Wallace in three equal shares following the Decedent’s death. Plaintiffs allege that on that same day, Decedent also executed a new Will which reinforced Decedent’s intent for the distribution of the Subject Premises to be done in accordance with the Amendment. Plaintiffs claim that following Decedent’s death on June 26, 2017, that Plaintiffs and Defendant Wall ace sought the legal advice of Perry, as counsel, with respect to the sale and distribution of the Subject Premises. Pursuant to the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that in or around March of 2019, Plaintiffs and Defendant Wallace retained Perry to negotiate the terms of a Contract wherein demolition, excavation, and construction work was to be performed at the Subject Premises. Thereafter, on March 26, 2019, Marc Stfleur entered into a Retainer Agreement with Perry to handle the transfer of the title of the Subject Premises to the beneficiaries of the Trust, negotiate a sale of the Subject Premises, and to represent Marc Stfleur and the owners through the closing on the sale. Thereafter, Plaintiffs allege that upon the advice of Perry, that Plaintiffs agreed that the Subject Premises was to be moved from the Trust into three remainder beneficiaries individually as tenants in common. However, Plaintiffs allege that on April 6, 2019, Perry asked Plaintiffs to sign off on a deed transfer, which they did, wherein Plaintiffs signed away their interest in the Subject Premises entirely to Wallace, in violation of the terms of the Trust and the Amendment to the Trust. Plaintiffs contend that Perry did not explain that they were signing away their interest. The Deed was recorded by the Office of the City Register on April 6, 2019. Following the Deed transfer, Plaintiffs claim that on or about April 12, 2019, Perry contacted Marc Stfleur and informed him that the City was requesting the Tax EIN of the Trust in order to properly record the Deed, and that on or about April 24, 2019, Perry stated that the City would only accept a transfer from the Trust directly to Wallace. Plaintiffs allege that when confronted about the transfer, Perry stated that she was only Wallace’s attorney and to date has repeatedly refused to provide them with copies of everything that they had signed pertaining to the Subject Premises. Plaintiffs have asserted causes of action against Perry for fraud and legal malpractice, and against Wallace for breach of fiduciary duties. Wallace has asserted 12 counterclaims against Plaintiffs.”

“In support of her motion, Perry argues that severance is warranted in the interest of judicial economy and consistency of verdicts. Perry contends that disposition of Plaintiffs claims against Wallace and Wallce’s counterclaims would dispose of the claims against her entirely because if the Court finds that the counterclaims by Wallace fail or if the Amendment is deemed invalid then the deed transfer would revert back to be in accordance with the terms of the original Trust, which named Wallace as the sole beneficiary. Thus, the fraud and legal malpractice claims against Perry would fail because her transfer was proper. Additionally, Perry argues that severance is warranted because this action involves separate and distinct legal theories and questions of law. Perry claims that the causes of action against her are unrelated to the claims against Wallace and that she is not related to any matters involving Wallace because Perry only got involved in this dispute in 2019, whereas Plaintiffs and Wallace’s issues stem back to events that occurred as early as 2010. Furthermore, Perry argues that discovery is incomplete, and the matter should be severed to avoid prejudice towards her. Perry claims that Plaintiffs would not be prejudiced if severance is granted because their claims would still be fully preserved, and they would have an opportunity to pursue them. Moreover, Perry argues Plaintiffs opposition should be disregarded as untimely.”

“In furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice the court may order a severance of claims, or may order a separate trial of any claim, or of any separate issue (see CPLR 603; Adamow v Northport-East Northport Union Free School District, 235 AD3d 609 [2d Dept. 2025]; Mullen v Wishner, 178 AD3d 830 [2d Dept. 2019]). The grant or denial of a request for severance is a matter of judicial discretion, which should not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right of the party seeking severance (Adamow at 609; FPG CH 94 Amity, LLC v Pizzarotti, LLC, 218 AD3d 654 [2d Dept. 2023]). Severance is appropriate where “individual issues predominate, concerning particular circumstances applicable to each plaintiff … [ and there] is the possibility of confusion for the jury” (Adamow at 609; Belair Care Center, Inc. v Cool Insuring Agency, Inc., 180 AD3d 739 [2d Dept. 2020]; Gittino v LCA Vision, Inc., 301 AD2d 84 7 [3d Dept. 2003]). Severance is inappropriate where the claims against the defendants involve common factual and legal issues, and the interests of judicial economy and consistency of verdicts will be served by having a single trial (Nieto v I 054 Bushwick Ave, LLC, 219 AD3d 754 [2d Dept. 2023]; New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v McGee, 87 AD3d [2d Dept. 2011 ]). Here, the Court finds that Perry has not established entitlement to sever the fraud and legal malpractice causes of action asserted against her from the remaining claims and counterclaims asserted against parties herein. Contrary to Perry’s contentions, the causes of action asserted against all of the defendants present common factual and legal issues. Pursuant to the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the existence of a scheme by the Defendants to defraud them -the interest of judicial economy and consistency of verdicts would not be served if Plaintiffs had to maintain multiple actions herein (see Itzkowitz v Ginsburg, 186 AD3d 579 [2d Dept. 2020]).”