In Hilpert v 16 Judge SPV LLC 2025 NY Slip Op 34683(U) December 4, 2025
Supreme Court, Kings County Docket Number: Index No. 522220/2025
Judge: Reginald A. Boddie the pro-se case ends in dismissal, sanctions and a vexatious litigant finding against the pro-se plaintiff. AI research may have had a part.

“Defendant David Koshers, Esq. ‘s motion seeking dismissal of all claims asserted against him, a declaration that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, sanctions for allegedly frivolous conduct and an award of costs and fees, together with plaintiffs cross-motion for a default judgment against David Koshers, Esq. on liability, are decided as follows:”

“This action arises out of an alleged coordinated scheme by defendants to orchestrate a
strategic foreclosure on a rent-stabilized property located at 16 Judge Street, Brooklyn, ew York (the “Property”), which is also a marital asset subject to orders in plaintiffs ongoing divorce proceedings. Pro se plaintiff Daniel Hilpert (“Hilpert”) alleges that his former attorney, David Koshers (“Koshers”), misused confidential information from a prior attorney-client relationship to assist 16 Judge SPY LLC and its principal, David Khaloyan, acquire a loan and commence foreclosure, obtain a second receiver ex parte in the foreclosure action despite an existing matrimonial receiver, and time everything to interfere with his divorce proceeding. Hilpert further contends that after the foreclosure receiver took over, they failed to update required New York City Housing Preservation & Development (“HPD”) registrations, performed unpermitted construction, ignored safety and rent-stabilization obligations, and allowed violations and fines to accrue while leaving him on record as the responsible party, exposing him to civil, criminal, and regulatory liability”

“Koshers now moves to dismiss all claims against him under CPLR 3211 and 3016(b). to
have Hilpert declared a vexatious litigant, and to obtain sanctions and $10,000 in fees and costs, arguing that: (1) this case is a duplicative second bite at the same dispute already pending in New York County titled Daniel Hilpert v. David Koshers Esq., Index No. 155934/2025 (the ‘”New York County Action”), so it is barred by the prior pending action doctrine; (2) Hilpert personally lacks standing because the Property is owned by 16 Judge LLC; (3) no attorney-client relationship ever existed between Hilpert and Koshers, so there is no fiduciary duty and no basis for any of the tort claims; (4) the pleaded causes of action are legally insufficient, duplicative of the New York
County Action, and not pied with the required particularity; and (5) Hilpert’s pattern of multiple overlapping suits and motions, including commencement of at least five proceedings and assertion of counterclaims in two other actions within the three months prior to Koshers’ filing of the instant motion, plus prior judicial findings about his conduct, warrants a finding of frivolous, harassing litigation and the imposition of sanctions, filing restrictions, and costs in Koshers’ favor.”

“Plaintiffs claims against Koshers rest fundamentally on the assertion that he and Koshers shared a long-standing attorney-client relationship through which Koshers purportedly obtained confidential information later used against him. Even affording the complaint a liberal construction and every favorable inference, the pleadings and exhibits fail to allege, and the documentary evidence affirmatively refutes, the existence of any attorney-client relationship between Hilpert and Koshers.
Plaintiff alleges that Koshers was ··an attorney who represented [him] in multiple legal
matters over more than a decade,” but the only specific engagement he identifies is a 2024 mezzanine loan transaction in Wyoming involving plaintiffs business partners. ln support, plaintiff relies on a North Hill Capital Management term sheet that references a generic ··Legal Deposit of $10,000,” but the document does not identify any attorney or law firm, does not mention Koshers, and contains no language suggesting that Koshers undertook to represent Hilpert personally (see NYSCEF Doc No. 70). Plaintiff provides no engagement letter, retainer agreement, billing records, or any other documentary evidence showing that Koshers undertook to represent him. Even if the “Legal Deposit of $10,000” was for Koshers to act as the attorney representing North Hill Capital Management on the mezzanine loan transaction, Koshers would only be the attorney to the entity, where Hilpert was the CIO (see NYSCEF Doc No. 119) and a
member (see NYSCEF Doc No. 120), not to Koshers in his individual capacity.
Nor do plaintiffs exhibits cure this defect. Plaintiffs exhibit labeled “Koshers Email”
consists of a January 16, 2025 settlement communication in which Koshers, expressly acting for 16 Judge SPV LLC, writes to Hilpert’s real-estate counsel, Anthony Simari, regarding potential resolution “prior to commencing any sort of enforcement action” (NYSCEF Doc No. I 0). In that correspondence, Koshers speaks of Hilpert as Simari ‘s “client,” plainly in the posture of opposing counsel, and nothing in the exhibit suggests he ever represented Hilpert. Likewise, the email chains submitted by plaintiff as “Koshers Communications” (NYSCEF Doc No. 71) and “Koshers Email to Plaintiff’ (NYSCEF Doc No. 121) show Koshers being introduced and treated throughout
as the “lender’s attorney,” coordinating diligence and discussing timing for documents in connection with the mezzanine loan. Those communications do not reflect an attorney undertaking to advise Hilpert personally or to protect his individual legal interests. Taken together, plaintiffs own exhibits demonstrate that Koshers was entity counsel, first for the lender on the Wyoming transaction and later for 16 Judge SPY LLC, and do not support the existence of an attorney-client relationship with Hilpert individually.”

“”Pursuant to Judiciary Law§ 487, an attorney who is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or
consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party is liable to the injured party for treble damages (Guliyev v Banilov & Assoc., P.C. , 221 AD3d 589,591 [2d Dept 2023] [ citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). “A violation of Judiciary Law § 487 requires an intent to deceive ‘ (id.). Additionally, to state a Judiciary Law § 487 claim, ” [ a ]llegations regarding an act of deceit or intent to deceive must be stated with particularity” (Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P. C, 164 AD3d 635, 63 7 [2d Dept 2018], affd, 3 5 NY3d 173 [2020] [ citations omitted]).

Here, plaintiff alleges that Koshers, “in the context of an attorney-client relationship,”
“obtained confidential and privileged information concerning the Property” but later “began representing Defendant Khaloyan and 16 Judge SPY LLC” in the foreclosure action and “provided or facilitated access to sealed or non-public documents .. . the memorandum of contract.” As discus ed above, plaintiff fails to establish any attorney-client relationship from which confidential information could arise, and the memorandum of contract was recorded and publicly available on ACRIS well before the foreclosure action. Plaintiff identifies no specific false statement, no deceptive act directed at any court, and no facts supporting the essential element of intent to
deceive. These conclusory assertions fall far short of the particularity required under CPLR 30 l 6(b ), and therefore the branch of Koshers’ motion seeking dismissal of the sixth cause of action for Judiciary Law§ 487 is granted.”

“Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, ‘”[t]he court, in its discretion, may award to any party or
attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees, resulting from frivolous conduct,” and that “[t]he court, as appropriate, may make such award of costs or impose such financial sanctions against either an attorney or a party to the litigation.”
22 NYC RR 130-1.1 ( c) further defines “frivolous conduct” as conduct that is “completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law,” or “undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another.”
Plaintiffs cross-motion here falls squarely within that definition. As detailed in Koshers’
opposition, plaintiff relies on a dozen of purported “cases” and numerous quotations that simply do not exist in any official reporter or legal database. For example, plaintiff cites “Loeb v Loeb, 84 AD2d 591 (2d Dept 1981 )” (NYSCEF Doc No. 64, ,-r 35) and asserts a legal decision purportedly drawn from that decision. However, upon review by the Court, the citation “84 AD2d 591” corresponds only to two unrelated Third Department decisions: Sanginario v Monroe County Pure Waters Div., 84 AD2d 591 (3d Dept 1981), and First Depot Corp. v State, 84 AD2d 591 (3d Dept 1981 ). Neither case involves the parties or subject matter plaintiff describes, and nor do the cases contain the quotation plaintiff attributes to the nonexistent “Loeb” decision.

A full list of the twelve nonexistent case citations and seven fabricated quotations plaintiff relies upon is identified in Koshers’ opposition papers (NYSCEF Doc No. 102). Despite this, plaintiffs 24-page reply, which was submitted in seemingly single- or 1.5-spacing, offers no explanation for the fabricated authorities. Hilpert’s only explanation is that he ··appear(s] prose and do[es] not have access to commercial legal research platforms such as Westlaw or Lexis,” and that his “research has relied exclusively on publicly available sources.” However, Hilpert provides no description or documentation of any such ‘publicly available sources” that could have yielded these nonexistent authorities. Hilbert further claims that ” [f]or this reply, [he] took [the] extra step
of cross-checking all case law to ensure proper citations,” but his 24-page reply contains not a single citation to any case law.
Plaintiffs reliance on fictitious authorities, without explanation or correction even after the issue was raised, constitutes frivolous conduct under 22 YCRR 130-1. l(c). Plaintiffs “prose status does not excuse his failure to check the legal citations that he offers to a court” (Dowlah v Professional Staff Congress, 227 AD3d 609, 610 [1st Dept 2024], lv to appeal denied, 42 Y3d 911 [2025]; see also, Will of Samuel, 82 Misc 3d 616 [Sur Ct 2024] [holding that “submitting document that contained fictional or erroneous citations … constituted frivolous conduct]).

Accordingly, the branch of Koshers’ motion for an award in Koshers’ favor against Hilpert for sanctionable and frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 YCRR 130.1-1 is granted to the extent that Hilpert shall reimburse Koshers for the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in preparing and submitting his papers (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 96-110, 113-114) in opposition to Hilpert’s cross-motion.”