Once in a while a case captures your interest.  This was the situation in Gevorkyan.  Sure, this was outside of legal malpractice and professional liability, but a former client came to us with a problem.  He had been arrested for financial crimes, and bail was set at $2 Million.  He paid a bail bond premium, but never got out of jail.  Because he never “made bail” his bail bond premium was never at risk, and there was no way he could fail to return to court, since he never left jail.  He wanted his $ 120,560 premium back, and the bond guy just wouldn’t listen to him.

The case progressed through the US District Court, and then to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals. The New York Court of Appeals decided that a bail bondsman has to return the premium when the accused goes to a hearing and is not release after trying to post bail.

Today the New York State Department of Financial Services notified bail bond agents and companies of a change in the regulations.  Reported in the New York Law Journal by Josepha Velasquez, the Gevorkyan rule is now in effect.

 

 

New York is full of real estate stories, and has been since Dutch times.  Whether it was acquisitions in Old Breuckelen, or in the narrow streets of the lower east side, real estate and development has always been a New York sort of activity.

180 Ludlow Dev. LLC v Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP   2017 NY Slip Op 31780(U) August 22, 2017 Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 651473/2013  Judge: Debra A. James arises from the same urge.  A new hotel, built in an unusual cantilever method would require air rights from the neighboring tenements.  The neighboring building had its own history as well.  As one might guess, the project did not fare well.

“In this legal malpractice action, plaintiff 180 Ludlow Development LLC (Ludlow) moves for an order granting partial summary judgment of liability on its complaint against defendant Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP (Olshan) . Olshan cross-moves for an order of summary judgment dismissing the complaint. ”

“In late 2006, Ludlow, a real estate developer, retained Olshan, a law firm, to represent Ludlow with respect to the acquisition of air rights over a parcel of land owned by Ithilien Realty Corp (Ithilien) that adjoined the property that Ludlow owned and was developing as a hotel at 180-184 Ludlow Street, on the Lower East Side of Manhattan (Project).

There is no dispute that Ludlow retained Olshan as its transactional lawyer to prepare documents for the Project, under which, among other things, Ludlow would purchase air rights from Ithilien, and Ithilien would consent to Ludlow’s construction of a cantilever over Ithilien’s parcel and its building (Building) thereon. Ludlow hired other lawyers, who provided consultations on light and air easement issues, including a land use attorney, who at Ludlow’s request, reviewed Olshan’s draft of the contract of sale and the Zoning Lot Development Agreement (ZLDA, including the cantilever provision, prior to their execution. Ludlow also retained other professionals in connection with the Project, including an architect; a building consulting firm; a building expediting service company; a land use planning consultant; and a specialist .on regulatory issues, including the zoning code.”

“In March 2007, seven months before execution of the ZLDA, Ludlow’s architects and consultants exchanged e-mail messages that stated that were the cantilever structure built over the courtyard on Ithilien’s parcel thereby enclosing such courtyard as then proposed, it would block the light and windows that provided the ventilation for Ithilien’s Building. All such messages show that Ludlow was copied on these emails, but Olshan was not. In one such message sent tb Ludlow’s regulatory/building code consultant on March 21, 2007, Ludlow’s building consultant wrote: “We need to briefly review this issue and advise if it is possible to cover (enclose) the courtyard and inform us of any provisions required by such. If we are unable to utilize these air rights, we will not purchase.” In an e-mail sent on that same day to Ludlow and all of its consultants, except Olshan, Ludlow’s regulatory/building code consultant replied: “We have briefly looked at the plot plan, and it loo~s like you can cantilever on other areas over the adjoining building but you can not cantilever over the court. The court is being used for existing building light and ventilation windows and can not be covered. Unless you are able to alter the existing building and remove all the rooms that open to that court. (sic)” ”

“Olshan was unable to obtain Ithilien’s consent to the proposed installation of permanent mechanical ventilation on its Building. Ludlow asserts that, because it was unable to resolve the issue of whether the construction of cantilever rendered the Ithilien Building in violation of· the building code, which would thus jeopardize Ludlow’s ability to obtain a certificate of occupancy, Ludlow halted the Project construction work on December 3, 2008. Ludlow served a Notice to Cure dated October 20, 2008 (Notice to Cure) upon Ithilien asserting that Ithilien breached the ZLDA § 8(a) in neither curing nor allowing Ludlow to cure the Violation resulting from Ludlow’s construction of the cantilever in a manner that blocked the light and window ventilation to Ithilien’s Building, specifically, to the residential units therein. ”  (The decision explains, in great detail, the court’s reasoning)

“Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment of liability is denied; and it is further ORDERED that the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted and the complaint is dismissed with costs and disbursements to defendant as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment. ”

 

Legal malpractice cases encapsulate the entire world.  In this short story, money, fashion, greed and cruelty combine into a fairy tail of tragedy.  Oleg Cassini was wildly successful.  He died in 2006 with an estate of about $ 60 Million.  He had a child from an earlier marriage with actress Gene Tierney, which ended in divorce in 1953.  The divorce required him to leave 25% of his estate to his daughter, Christina.

The required 25% bequest was not made, and Christina had to sue.  Page Six of the Post tells us that she never collected any money, and died in poverty from ovarian cancer.  She succeeded in the suit, but the widow (stepmother?) succeeded in fending off collection.

Even though the money was never paid to Christina, the executor sued attorneys who defended Christina’s suit in Nestor v Putney Twombly Hall & Hirson, LLP  2017 NY Slip Op 06284 Decided on August 23, 2017  Appellate Division, Second Department. “The executor of the decedent’s estate subsequently commenced this legal malpractice action based on the failure of the estate’s attorneys to raise in the Surrogate’s Court proceeding the defense that Christina’s claim was barred by California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 337.5 and 366.3. The defendants Putney Twombly Hall & Hirson, LLP, William M. Pollak, and Philip H. Kalban (hereinafter collectively the Putney defendants) moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to [*2]dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.”

“Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 337.5 and 366.3 were inapplicable to this action, and that pleading those statutes would not have resulted in a determination that Christina’s claim was barred.

“New York courts will generally enforce a clear and unambiguous choice-of-law clause contained in an agreement so as to give effect to the parties’ intent” (Matter of Frankel v Citicorp Ins. Servs., Inc., 80 AD3d 280, 285). Although this rule applies to “matters of substantive law,” procedural matters “are governed by the law of the forum” (id. at 285 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “Significantly, the law of the forum normally determines for itself whether a given question is one of substance or procedure” (id. at 286 [internal quotation marks omitted]). In determining whether a statute is procedural or substantive, the other state’s classification of its statute “is instructive and should not be ignored,” but “New York is not bound by, and principles of comity do not prompt [a New York court] to adopt” the other state’s classification (Tanges v Heidelberg N. Am., 93 NY2d 48, 54).”

“Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the complaint failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211[a][7]), and thus, properly granted the motion of the Putney defendants to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them.”

Last week we reported on the reappearance of Dupree v. Vorhees  in the Judiciary Law § 487 pantheon.  Today, we see that Melcher v Greenberg Traurig LLP   2017 NY Slip Op 31727(U)
August 15, 2017 Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 650188/2007  Judge: O. Peter Sherwood has similarly bobbed up.

Melcher has a fascinating backstory, with documents disappearing  and then reappearing, only to be accidentally burnt.  Melcher v Greenberg Traurig, LLP  2014 NY Slip Op 02213 [23 NY3d 10] . The case set the statute of limitations at 6 years.
But, onto today.  Judge O. Peter Sherwood decided several interesting evidentiary points. The most important is that no expert  testimony is necessary to show deceit to a jury. The services of two of the most preeminent ethics attorneys was dispensed with by motion.  “The testimony sought to be admitted through the “expert” testimony of Patrick Conner and Roy Simon intrudes on areas reserved to the court (see id.) and it is also likely to confuse the jury. The jury is being called upon to determine whether Leslie Corwin, an attorney, engaged in deceit or colluded with an intent to deceive the court or a party. The jury is not being asked to resolve whether or not he violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code) where the applicable standards are different than those involved here. Moreover, the concept of deceit is readily understandable and does not require interpretation by experts. “

Evidence of whether an attorneys’ conduct is deceitful is also not the fodder for experts. “Although evidence concerning the role of the lawyer in the adversary system may be useful background, issues as to whether and when a lawyer has an obligation to speak are legal questions reserved to the court. Expert testimony is neither helpful nor permitted. “

In a part of the decision less universal, the court precluded damages other than the cost of attorney work in the case.  No loss of value in the underlying settlement and non-payment due to deceit was permitted. “Regarding damages, the testimony plaintiff seeks to offer as to what he might have been able to collect in the Apollo action had he been able to obtain a judgment during the time that Apollo Medical Fund was in better financial health versus the amount be obtained in settlement years later but for the deceit, is entirely speculative. ”

“Plaintiff cannot show that defendant’s alleged deceits were the proximate cause of any injury, except perhaps “excess legal expenses” incurred in the Apollo action (see Melcher v Greenberg Traurig LLP, 135 AD3d 547, 554 [Pt Dept 2016]; see also Zimmerman v Kohn, 125 AD3d 413 [1st Dept 2015] [cited in Melcher]). ”

Finally, the judge cast doubt on how to prove those excess legal expenses. “Defendants’ fees expert, Beth Kaufman, proposes to opine on the standards for legal fees damages in a Section 487 action but relies on the standards applicable to statutory fee shifting cases were, unlike this case, there rarely is any direct evidence of the reasonableness of the fees being sought. Further in fee shifting cases, claimants are on notice prior to commencement of the action that they will be required to show the reasonableness of the fees being requested and therefore must keep time records with a level of detail that a paying client might not require. Here, there is direct evidence of the “reasonableness” of the fees, specifically the amount the client paid for the services performed. The rate plaintiff paid his lawyer in the underlying action cannot be met by purported “expert” testimony as to what a court might award in a fee shifting case. The rate which is reasonable here was fixed by the marketplace. Although courts routinely require lawyers in fee shifting cases to detail how time claimed was spent, paying clients often do not. To require plaintiff to break out their fees separating those earned on any given day between those associated with routine prosecution of the case and excess fees devoted to meeting alleged deceitful evidence is neither feasible nor required. Accordingly, the approach taken by Kaufman is unsupported and will not be permitted. ”

 

Sure, you avoided motions to dismiss.  Sure, you avoided a motion for summary judgment.  Sure, you got a jury verdict.  Enough already?  Nope.  In Michael v He Gin Lee Architect Planner, PLLC  2017 NY Slip Op 06177  Decided on August 16, 2017, the  Appellate Division, Second Department looks at plaintiff’s jury verdict and reverses, then dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff did not even get a new trial.

“ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

A motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside a jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law will be granted where there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial (see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499; Ross v Northern Westchester Hosp. Assn, 74 AD3d 1047).

Where, as here, the causes of action submitted to the jury hinge on allegations of professional malpractice against an architect, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to present expert testimony to support them (see 530 E. 89 Corp. v Unger, 43 NY2d 776, 777). Specifically, the plaintiff in this case alleged that the defendants committed professional malpractice by submitting defective plans to the New York City Department of Buildings (hereinafter the DOB), and by failing to diligently pursue the approval process and timely deal with objections raised by the DOB. Such questions are not within the competence of untutored laypersons to evaluate, as “common experience and observation offer little guidance” (id. at 777).

The only expert proffered by the plaintiff conceded that he “didn’t see” the defendants’ plans, and when asked, for instance, to opine on whether the defendants’ plans “would have caused a problem” regarding the roof’s ability to bear the weight of certain HVAC equipment, [*2]he demurred, answering, “No, I only work for myself.” Moreover, the expert offered no opinion regarding the defendants’ alleged delay in getting their plans approved by the DOB. Given the absence of any expert testimony that the defendants departed from accepted architectural standards of practice (see Bruno v Trus Joist a Weyerhaeuser Bus., 87 AD3d 670, 672; Kung v Zheng, 73 AD3d 862, 863), the jury lacked any rational basis for its finding that the defendants committed professional malpractice (see 530 E. 89 Corp. v Unger, 43 NY2d at 777-778; Tucker v Elimelech, 184 AD2d 636, 637-638). Accordingly, that branch of the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) which was to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted, and the complaint dismissed.”

 

Schmidt v One N.Y. Plaza Co. LLC 2017 NY Slip Op 06047 Decided on August 8, 2017
Appellate Division, First Department is not a legal malpractice case, but it is a well written decision setting forth how experts battle in a summary judgment case.  Plaintiff slips/falls from a ramp while at work.  His job is to lead a security dog in examining trucks.

“Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that plaintiff could not establish that his accident took place as the result of any negligence on the part of defendants in the design or maintenance of the service ramp. In support of their motion, defendants submitted an architect’s report from their expert which concluded that the design and construction of the ramp did not violate the New York City Building Code or any industry-wide standard.

In opposition, plaintiff averred that its expert would testify that the service ramp was defective and that the defects were in violation of “good, proper, and accepted building and engineering standards” for ramps in equivalent buildings and were in violation of the New York City Building Code and industry standards at the time of construction.

The motion court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment and found that they failed to establish a prima facie entitlement in that defendants’ expert affidavit only addressed the Building Code and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations, and failed to address other types of industry-wide standards that might be applicable to determine whether defendants were negligent.

On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence sufficient to eliminate any material issue of fact (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). The facts must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” (Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, [*2]18 NY3d 335, 339 [2011]). Summary judgment should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of triable issues or there are any issues of fact (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Here, defendants established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by establishing that the ramp was not designed in a negligent manner and was not in violation of any rules, or standards applicable at the time of construction.

Defendants’ expert report stated that the Building Code applicable to the premises, which was enacted in 1968 (see 1968 Building Code of City of NY [Administrative Code of City of NY] tit 27), was silent concerning the components of a loading dock, delivery truck parking, material loading and unloading, and in regard to an access ramp between the truck parking floor and the top of the loading dock. As a result, the expert concluded, the ramp did not violate the Building Code. The expert also concluded that because the service ramp was not part of the required egress from the loading dock area, those parts of the Building Code applicable to “Means of Egress” did not apply.

Based on his conclusion that the Building Code did not contain sections specifically applicable to the instant facts, defendants’ expert reviewed the standards promulgated by OSHA. He concluded, however, that no section of OSHA applied to the instant facts. He also found that National Fire Protection Agency “Life Safety Code” did not apply to the instant facts. Defendants’ expert opined that the portion of the curb of the ramp where plaintiff was alleged to have tripped was not a foreseeable pedestrian path, since it runs parallel, not across the path of pedestrians walking up and down the ramp. He noted that the use of bright yellow paint to alert pedestrians to the presence of walkway conditions was proper and in compliance with the American Society for Testing and Materials. Overall, defendants’ expert concluded that plaintiff had not cited to any valid authority in support of his contention that the ramp caused the accident, and established that the ramp did not violate any standards referenced by plaintiff’s expert in his expert exchange.

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to any negligence on the part of defendants (see Hotaling v City of New York, 55 AD3d 396, 398 [1st Dept 2008], affd 12 NY3d 862 [2009]).”

New York has no applicable statute of limitations longer than 6 years, and this case was brought too late.  That is the holding in Epiphany Community Nursery Sch. v Levey  August 7, 2017
Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 654655/2016  Judge: Shirley Werner Kornreich.  This shocking story of monies siphoned off by an unfaithful husband from the wife’s New York school is one where a discovery statute of limitations in fraud does not work.

“The Gruppo Levey Defendants are currently before this court in an unrelated action, styled Pensmore Investments, LLC v Gruppo, Levey & Co., Index No. 650002/2014 (the Pensmore Action), concerning their default on a settlement agreement. The underlying case and settlement resulted in protracted litigation over their alleged financial improprieties. See Pensmore Action, Dkt. 495 (granting summary judgment on claim to pierce corporate veils of GLC, GLH and another related entity).3 An externality of the Pensmore Action was the public revelation that Hugh and Claire, longtime business partners, were having an affair. Predictably, the aftermath was an acrimonious divorce proceeding between Hugh and his now ex-wife, nonparty Wendy Levey (Wendy),4 which recently settled. Part of the fallout is the instant dispute over Hugh’s involvement with the School, a New York not-for-profit corporation that operates a kindergarten and nursery school on Manhattan’s Upper East Side.

The School’s complaint contains well pleaded allegations of serious financial improprieties committed by Hugh. Nonetheless, while this case would have survived a motion to dismiss had it been commenced years ago, at this juncture, the claims in this action are dismissed because they are time-barred. ”

“The first scheme occurred in 2002 and 2003, more than a decade before this action was commenced in 2016. There is no applicable New York statute of limitations longer than 6 years. See CPLR 213 (claims with 6-year statute of limitations, including breach of contract, fraud, and accounting) & 214 (claims with 3-year statute of limitations, including conversion and malpractice). 11 The School recognizes this, but relies on CPLR 213(8), which provides that in “an action based upon fraud[,] the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the_ person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (emphasis added). It is well settled that “[t]he inquiry as to whether a plaintiff could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud turns on whether the plaintiff was possessed of knowledge of facts from which [the fraud] could be reasonably inferred.” Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 (2009) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted); see Aozora Bank. Ltd. v Deutsche Bank Secs. Inc., 13 7 AD3d 685, 689 (1st Dept 2016) (“Where the circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence the probabi,Iity that he has been defrauded, a duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits that inquiry when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts which call for investigation, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him.”) (emphasis added), quoting CIFG Assurance N. Am., Inc. v Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC, 128 AD3d 607, 608 (!st Dept 2015), and citing Gutkin v Siegal, 85 AD3d 687, 688 (I st Dept 2011) (“The test as to when fraud should with reasonable diligence have been discovered is an objective one.”) (emphasis added).”

 

Dec v BFM Realty, LLC  2017 NY Slip Op 05936  Decided on August 2, 2017 Appellate Division, Second Department.  Summary judgment is granted below, and the AD affirms.  In a short opinion, little light is shed.

“The plaintiff commenced this action alleging two causes of action. The first cause of action, alleging fraud, was asserted against the defendants BFM Realty, LLC, and Abraham Lichtenstein. The second cause of action, alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487, was asserted against the defendants Goldberg & Rimberg, PLLC, Israel Goldberg, and Brad Coven (hereinafter collectively the attorney defendants). The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) to dismiss the first cause of action and for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action. In an order dated January 8, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals.

“Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same. It is not necessary that the precise legal theories presented in the first action also be presented in the second action so long as the relief is the same or substantially the same” (Swartz v Swartz, 145 AD3d 818, 822 [citations omitted]; see Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731, 732). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) to dismiss the first cause of action alleging fraud on the ground that there was another action pending for substantially the same relief.

The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487. “Judiciary Law § 487 exposes an attorney who [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion . . . with intent to deceive the court or any party’ to criminal (misdemeanor) liability and treble damages, to be recovered by the injured party in a civil action” (Melcher v Greenberg Traurig, LLP, [*2]23 NY3d 10, 12-13, quoting Judiciary Law § 487[1]). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the attorney defendants did not commit deceit or collusion upon the court or any party (see Lawrence Ripak Co., Inc. v Gdanski, 143 AD3d 862, 863; Klein v Rieff, 135 AD3d 910, 912; Specialized Indus. Servs. Corp. v Carter, 131 AD3d 1162). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Judiciary Law § 487 claims do not generally get to a jury.  In Dupree v Voorhees 
2017 NY Slip Op 06062  Decided on August 9, 2017  Appellate Division, Second Department a 12 year old case, which long ago raised new issues in Judiciary Law § 487 ended with a non-jury verdict.

In Dupree,  the 487 claims were dismissed, then re-instated on re-argument after the Court of Appeals decided Amalfitano v Rosenberg, 12 NY3d 8.  The Appellate Division took a look at the case and reinstated the 487 claim against a partner, on a vicarious liability analysis. Now, a verdict.

“The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for violation of Judiciary Law § 487 against, among others, Karyn A. Villar and Villar’s law partner, Dorothy A. Courten (hereinafter together the defendants). The plaintiff alleged that in an underlying divorce action, in which Villar represented the plaintiff’s former husband, Villar made misrepresentations in applying for a receivership order and that she intended to deceive the court in connection with that application. The plaintiff alleged that because the defendants were partners of the same law firm, Courten was vicariously liable for the damages she sustained as a result of Villar’s actions. After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court determined, among other things, that the plaintiff failed to establish that Villar violated Judiciary Law § 487 and that the action should be dismissed.

“In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, this Court’s power to review the evidence is as broad as that of the trial court, and this Court may render a judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that due regard must be given to the trial court, which was in a position to assess the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses” (L’Aquila Realty, LLC v Jalyng Food Corp., 148 AD3d 1004, 1005; see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499; Broderson v Parsons, 106 AD3d 677, 679).

Judiciary Law § 487(1) provides that “[a]n attorney or counselor who . . . [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party . . . [i]s guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor by [*2]the penal law, he [or she] forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action.” “A violation of Judiciary Law § 487 requires an intent to deceive” (Moormann v Perini & Hoerger, 65 AD3d 1106, 1108; see Judiciary Law § 487[1]; Ginsburg Dev. Cos., LLC v Carbone, 134 AD3d 890, 893; Dupree v Voorhees, 102 AD3d 912, 913). Here, the evidence adduced at trial, including the testimony of Villar, supports the trial court’s determination that Villar did not act with the requisite “intent to deceive the court or any party” in applying for the receivership (Judiciary Law § 487[1]).

In any event, to succeed on a cause of action to recover damages under Judiciary Law § 487, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she “suffered . . . damages which were proximately caused by the deceit allegedly perpetrated on him [or her] or on the court” (O’Connor v Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., 265 AD2d 313, 314; see Manna v Ades, 237 AD2d 264, 265; Di Prima v Di Prima, 111 AD2d 901, 902). The evidence adduced at trial also supports the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish that she suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the alleged deceit. Therefore, we decline to disturb the trial court’s determination.”