Anderson v Armentano  2016 NY Slip Op 03690  Decided on May 11, 2016  Appellate Division, Second Department is another telling of a sad but familiar story in which a Workers’ Compensation attorney allows the client to think that it is handling all aspects of the personal injury case, but is only handling the WC portion.  Here, as in all versions of this story, the “third-party” action (against the landowner for example) is allowed to drift away.

“On September 17, 2010, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when he fell into a trench at the Hicksville Parking Facility, which was owned by the Town of Oyster Bay, while performing construction work for his employer. After the incident, the plaintiff sought legal representation from the defendant Grey and Grey, LLP (hereinafter G & G), and another attorney with respect to potential claims arising from the accident. On November 17, 2010, G & G and the plaintiff executed a New York State Workers’ Compensation Board “Notice of Retainer and Appearance-Additional Attorney,” which indicated that G & G had been retained to represent the plaintiff “in all proceedings concerning my claim.”

Neither G & G nor the other attorney filed a timely notice of claim against the Town. Although the plaintiff commenced a proceeding for leave to file a late notice of claim against the Town which the Supreme Court granted, this Court reversed the order granting the petition and dismissed the proceeding (see Matter of Anderson v Town of Oyster Bay, 101 AD3d 708).

The plaintiff then commenced this action to recover damages for legal malpractice against G & G and the other attorney. Prior to answering, G & G moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the basis that documentary evidence established that it had been engaged by the plaintiff only with respect to his Workers’ Compensation claim. The Supreme Court denied G & G’s motion. G & G appeals.”

“

What happens when you have good claims, but fail to enunciate them in the original pleading?  One might guess that you simply file another pleading and include them?  Not that easy.  As Hustedt Chevrolet, Inc. v Jones, Little & Co.  2015 NY Slip Op 04611 [129 AD3d 669]  June 3, 2015
Appellate Division, Second Department demonstrates in an accounting malpractice setting, timeliness plays a part.

“The plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), inter alia, for leave to amend their first amended complaint to supplement the cause of action to recover damages for accounting malpractice. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs’ proposed supplemental claims of accounting malpractice were time-barred (see CPLR 214 [6]). The plaintiffs, however, contend that these proposed supplemental claims relate back to the allegations contained in the accounting malpractice cause of action in the first amended complaint. Contrary to that contention, the allegations in the first amended complaint gave no notice of the facts, transactions, and occurrences giving rise to the proposed supplemental claims of accounting malpractice and thus, the relation-back doctrine does not apply (see CPLR 203 [f]; Fisher v Giuca, 69 AD3d 671, 673 [2010];Pendleton v City of New York, 44 AD3d 733, 736 [2007]; Sabella v Vaccarino, 263 AD2d 451, 452 [1999]; Bergman v Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 232 AD2d 271 [1996]; Smith v Bessen, 161 AD2d 847, 849 [1990]; Alpert v Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 AD2d 67, 72-73 [1990]). The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) which was for leave to amend the first amended complaint to supplement the cause of action to recover damages for accounting malpractice. Mastro, J.P., Chambers, Cohen, Miller and LaSalle, JJ., concur.”

Rochester: Harvey v Handelman, Witkowicz & Levitsky, LLP  2015 NY Slip Op 05794 [130 AD3d 1439]  July 2, 2015  Appellate Division, Fourth Department  is one of the first cases decided after Grace v. Law in which the question of a “likely to succeed” appeal is discussed.

“We note at this juncture that plaintiff has abandoned any issues related to the District (see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 984 [1994]). To establish a cause of action for legal malpractice, “a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant attorney failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence commonly possessed by a member of the legal community, (2) proximate cause, (3) damages, and (4) that the plaintiff would have been successful in the underlying action had the attorney exercised due care” (Phillips v Moran & Kufta, P.C., 53 AD3d 1044, 1044-1045 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442 [2007]). “In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a complaint for legal malpractice, a defendant must establish that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one necessary element of the legal malpractice action, i.e., that the plaintiff is unable to prove that he or she would have been successful on the underlying claim but for [the defendant’s] negligence” (Giardina v Lippes, 77 AD3d 1290, 1291 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 16 NY3d 702 [2011]). Where a client fails to pursue an appeal in an underlying action, in order to determine whether the failure to pursue an appeal, as opposed to defendants’ negligence, was the proximate cause of the client’s injury, we must determine whether an appeal in the underlying action was “likely to succeed” (Grace v Law, 24 NY3d 203, 210 [2014]).

Here, we conclude that defendants failed to meet their burden to establish as a matter of law that any alleged negligence on their part resulting in the March 21, 2011 order dismissing of the amended complaint against the County was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages (see Grace v Law, 108 AD3d 1173, 1176 [2013], affd 24 NY3d 203 [2014]). Thus, the court erred in granting the motion with respect to plaintiff’s causes of action arising out of defendants’ handling of the underlying personal injury action against the County. In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants’ own submissions established that the action against the County was commenced 51 days after the expiration of the limitations period. While the statute of limitations set forth in General Municipal Law § 50-i was tolled from the time plaintiff commenced the proceeding to obtain leave to file a late notice of claim until the order granting that relief went into effect (see Giblin v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 61 NY2d 67, 74 [1984]), the order granting such leave was effective when entered (see Toro v City of New York, 271 AD2d 523, 523-524 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 705 [2001]), and the appeal from that order provided no further toll (see Dublanica v Rome Hosp./Murphy Mem. Hosp., 126 AD2d 977, 977 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 605 [1987]). Thus, the limitations period expired on December 10, 2008, and the amended complaint adding the County was not timely when filed on March 4, 2010 (see generally Ambrus v City of New York, 87 AD3d 341, 345 [2011]). We therefore further conclude that an appeal from the order dismissing the action against the County on limitations grounds had no likelihood of success.“

Yesterday, we looked at Burbacki v Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman,  Eisman, Formatto, Ferrara & Wolf, LLP  2016 NY Slip Op 30749(U)  April 15, 2016  Supreme Court, Kings County
Docket Number: 509725/2015  Judge: David B. Vaughan and how bankruptcy affected plaintiff’s ability to litigate legal malpractice claims.

The situation was set off, in part, because of a retaining lien.  A common law retaining lien,  gives the attorney the right to keep the papers, documents and other personal property of the client that has come into the lawyer’s possession in his or her professional capacity so long as those items are related to the subject representation.

The Burbacki case seemed to be started when her attorneys refused to give up the file, setting off a series of events that were disasterous to Burbacki.

“The following facts are stated in the plaintiff’s complaint. Ella Burbacki was a named defendant in Gorelik et al v Burbacki, et al, Index No 18128-2008 in 2008 (“Gorelik matter”). She was initially represented in that action by Stuart Wachs, Esq, (“Wachs” or “first attorney”), who was recommended to her by her accountant Richard Kaplan (“Kaplan” or “accountant”). In 2011 Plaintiff sought to obtain new counsel and retained the defendant on December 14, 2011. Upon Burbacki’s failure to compensate her first attorney $80,000 and the accountant $20,000, they refused to turn over her files to her new counsel, the defendants in the instant matter. After the defendants made several appearances for plaintiff in court, Burbacki’s matter was set for trial for March 22, 2012. Unable to compensate either Wachs and Kaplan for their past litigation work or to pay her newly retained attorneys for litigation work going forward, Burbacki filed for bankruptcy. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Burbacki’s greatest concern was that her house be protected. On or about March 20, 2012, Burbacki filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York. ”

“On April 25, 2012 Burbacki learned that the bankruptcy trustee’s position was that Burbacki was a 100% owner of the house and that he was going to argue his position to the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee, Burbacki’s home became part of the bankruptcy estate and Burbacki moved to dismiss her own bankruptcy petition. Burbacki’s motion was opposed by the bankruptcy trustee, Gorelik, Wachs and Kaplan–creditors in the bankruptcy action. The trustee further argued to the bankruptcy  court that there was another potential creditor, the First National Bank of Jeffersonville, which had a large deficiency judgement against Burbacki. ”

As we discussed yesterday, Burbacki lost all of her legal malpactice claims because of the bankruptcy filing.

 

Plaintiff got herself into a world of money trouble, and did not seem to have a way out.  When Bankruptcy beckoned, she filed a petition.  In doing so, all of her legal malpractice claims were lost.  How did this happen?

Burbacki v Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formatto, Ferrara & Wolf, LLP  2016 NY Slip Op 30749(U)  April 15, 2016  Supreme Court, Kings County
Docket Number: 509725/2015  Judge: David B. Vaughan describes how bankruptcy affects prior claims.

“The main thrust of the plaintiff’s complaint is that she would have been successful in her claims and legal actions against Gorelik, the plaintiff in Gorelik et al v Burbacki, et al, Index No 18128-2008, Stuart Wachs, Esq (“Wachs” or “first attorney”)–her prior counsel, and Richard Kaplan (“Kaplan”)–her accountant, had it not been for thedefendants’ actions and/or omissions in advising her about the bankruptcy process prior to her filing for bankruptcy and in the preparation and filing of her bankruptcy petition. The following facts are stated in the plaintiff’s complaint. Ella Burbacki was a named defendant in Gorelik et al v Burbacki, et al, Index No 18128-2008 in 2008 (“Gorelik matter”). She was initially represented in that action by Stuart Wachs, Esq, (“Wachs” or “first attorney”), who was recommended to her by her accountant Richard Kaplan (“Kaplan” or “accountant”). In 2011 Plaintiff sought to obtain new counsel and retained the defendant on December 14, 2011. Upon Burbacki’s failure to compensate her first attorney $80,000 and the accountant $20,000, they refused to turn over her files to her new counsel, the defendants in the instant matter. After the defendants made several appearances for plaintiff in court, Burbacki’s matter was set for trial for March 22, 2012. Unable to compensate either Wachs and Kaplan for their past litigation work or to pay her newly retained attorneys for litigation work going forward, Burbacki filed for bankruptcy. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Burbacki’s greatest concern was that her house be protected. On or about March 20, 2012, Burbacki filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York. Burbacki’s
matter was set for trial for March 22, 2012. Unable to compensate either Wachs and
Kaplan for their past litigation work or to pay her newly retained attorneys for litigation work
going forward, Burbacki filed for bankruptcy. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Burbacki’s
greatest concern was that her house be protected. On or about March 20, 2012, Burbacki
filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York. ”

“Here, it is undisputed that at the time plaintiff switched counsel to the defendants she owed substantial amounts of money to several creditors including $100,000 to her former counsel Wachs and accountant Kaplan. Furthermore, the defendants’ could not obtain plaintiff’s legal file from Wachs and Kaplan, since they asserted a retaining lien for their fees, hindering their ability to represent Burbacki. Plaintiff was also unable to compensate her new counsel for their litigation work going forward. By plaintiff’s own admission in her pleadings, First National Bank of Jeffersonville had a large deficiency judgement against her. Furthermore, a unanimous jury returned a verdict against plaintiff and in favor of Gorelik in the amount of $331,423.04, which Justice Bayne refused to set aside. Besides filing for bankruptcy and settling the claims, as she did, plaintiff fails to articulate any theory as to how she would have compensated all her creditors or dealt with the situation she was in, when she admits she had no money to do so. The Court finds that Burbacki’s blanket assertion that she would not have filed for bankruptcy had she known that her house “was not safe” or that she would not have settled with Wachs, Kaplan and Gorelik but would have prevailed against them in court is mere speculation. Finally, a settlement where an outstanding amount is lowered in exchange of a general release is a common and generally accepted practice in litigation. Accordingly, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference the compliment, this Court rules that on its face, the complaint fails to Page 4 of 6 [* 4] 5 of 6 l. ‘ allege facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that the plaintiff would not have suffered any damages but for the defendants’ negligence. The Court also agrees with the defendants that Burbacki’s claims are the property of the bankruptcy estate and may not be maintained by the plaintiff in her individual capacity. Pursuant to 11 USC 241(a)(1), all the causes of actions that could have been brought on the date of filing a bankruptcy petition become property of the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of the petition. In re Costello, 255 BR 110, 113 (Bkrtcy, EDNY 2000). Pre-petition and filing malpractice claims fully accrue by the time the petition is filed and these claims become property of the estate. In re Strada Design Associates, Inc., 326 BR 229 (Bkrtcy, SONY 2005). Even if a cause of action accrues after the bankruptcy petition is filed, it still becomes property of the bankruptcy estate if there are “sufficient roots” in the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy activiites to warrant inclusion in their estate. Rivera v Ndola Pharmacy Corp., 497 F.Supp.2d 381, 396 (EDNY 2007) citing In re Strada Design Associates, Inc., 326 BR 229, 236 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y.2005). See, SegalvRochelle, 382 US 375 (1966). “

Genesis Merchant Partners, LP v Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC   2015 NY Slip Op 31080(U)  June 16, 2015  Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 653145/2014
Judge: Nancy M. Bannon  is a textbook example of how the statute of limitations is applied to a legal malpractice transactional case.  Defendant represented Plaintiff in series of loan transactions, where there were problems in collection.  Were these a series of unrelated transactions, albeit of the same nature or were they one course of legal representation, which would allow for continuous representation tolling?

“In the instant motion, Gilbride seeks dismissal of so much of the legal malpractice claim as pertains to Loan 2 and Loan 3, on the grounds that the legal malpractice claim, as it relates to these Loans, is time-barred, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(5). Gilbride argues that documentary evidence rebuts Genesis’ claim that Gilbride’s failure to record the mortgage in a timely manner proximately caused its losses. Gilbride also seeks dismissal of the remaining causes of action as duplicitive of the cause of action for legal malpractice. In opposition, Genesis argues that its claims are not time-barred and that the instant action was timely commenced in October 2014 because Gilbride continued its representation regarding Loan 2 and Loan 3 and represented it regarding Loan 4, which it contends is related, through December 2011. The Court notes that the day after Genesis’ opposition to the instant motion was submitted, Genesis filed an amended complaint, which, in addition to the existing four causes of action, asserted a fifth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Gilbride. Gilbride’s reply addresses both the original and amended complaint and the parties subsequently stipulated that the instant motion would be applied to both the original and amended complaint. ”

“An action for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of its accrual. See CPLR 214(6); McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 (2002). The claim accrues ‘”when all the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and an injured party can obtain relief in court.”‘ McCoy v Feinman, supra at 301, quoting Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541 (1994). That is, a claim accrues when the malpractice is committed, not when it is discovered. See McCoy v Feinman, supra; West Vil. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v Balber Pickard Battistoni Maldonado & Ver Dan Tuin. PC, 49 AD3d 270 (1st Dept 2008). ”

“In the present matter, Gilbride fails to establish that the legal malpractice claim accrued more than three years prior to the commencement of this action and is, therefore, time-barred. Genesis alleges in the complaint, filed in 2014, that the parties always anticipated Gilbride’s continuing oversight of the Loans through their maturity dates in June 2012. Indeed, Gilbride performed legal work on behalf of Genesis relating to the Loans through, at least, 2011. Specifically, Gilbride completed amendments to the Loans in 2010 and 2011, “crosscollateralized” Loan 4 with the Loans, and consolidated the Loans with Loan 4 in August 2011. Gilbride was responsible for reviewing and revising the Loan documents to ensure the perfection of the collateral for the Loans and using the presumably perfected Loan collateral to “cross-collateralize” with Loan 4. In addition, Gilbride represented Genesis in a suit in Connecticut against Progressive with regard to the Loans. Genesis and Progressive entered into a conditional settlement, drafted by Gilbride, in which Progressive was to pay the aggregate outstanding value of the Loans by June 2012, plus interim monthly payments commencing in January 2012. Such work was done in connection with the Loans and was not merely the continuation of a general professional relationship between the parties. See Transport Workers Union of Am. Local 100 AFL-CIO v Schwartz, supra. Further, some of the work done during this period, including recording a $1 million mortgage on property included as collateral on Loan 3 eighteen months after the closing, was performed to rectify the alleged act of malpractice, i.e. failing to secure the Loans. See Red Zone LLC v Cadwalader. Wickersham & Taft LLP, 118 AD3d 581 (1st Dept. 2014). In support of its motion, Gilbride fails to demonstrate that its representation terminated at some time earlier than the maturity dates of the Loans. Gilbride avers that the Loans were nothing more than a series of distinct, unrelated transactions. However, Gilbride does not dispute that it completed amendments to the Loans, “cross-collateralized” them with Loan 4, consolidated them, and represented Genesis it a suit regarding the Loans, all after the closing dates of the loans in 2008 and 2009. It is notable that Gilbride does not submit or cite to the retainer agreement in support of its contention that its representation ceased with the closings. See Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 (2001 ). The complaint, therefore, is sufficient to establish that there was mutual understanding that Gilbride’s representation would continue after the closings of the Loans and the continuous representation doctrine applies. See Lytell v Lorusso, 74 AD3d 905 (2nd Dept. 2010); West Vil. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v Balber Pickard Battistoni Maldonado & Ver Dan Tuin, PC, supra; cf. Scott v Fields, 85 AD3d 756 (2nd Dept. 2011 ). “

Albany:  Each of the four Appellate Division departments has its own case on the issue of whether a legal malpractice case may be brought after a settlement.  The standard is whether the settlement was “effectively compelled by mistakes of counsel.”  In the Third Department that case is Marchell v. Littman, 107 AD3d 1082.  In the Second Department it is Tortura v. Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo PC  and in the First Department it is Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co. 

In this marital case, we see the oft heard complaint that when the matrimonial attorney got to the point where the case had to be tried, he flinched.  “A viable cause of action for legal malpractice exists where a plaintiff demonstrates “that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused [the] plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages” (Arnold v Devane, 123 AD3d 1202, 1203-1204 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Hyman v Schwartz, 114 AD3d 1110, 1112 [2014], lv dismissed 24 NY3d 930 [2014]). Here, plaintiff alleged that during [*2]the pendency of the divorce action, she informed defendant that her husband had removed her name from their joint checking account, took more than $100,000 from his retirement account, removed marital assets worth approximately $75,000 from the marital residence,[FN1] transferred title of their vehicle to his name only and engaged in certain conduct in violation of a temporary order of protection. Further, according to plaintiff, defendant told her that he planned to have three people testify at the trial, but she learned the day before the scheduled trial date that defendant had not served trial subpoenas on these individuals. Plaintiff further alleged that, because he was not prepared on the day of trial, defendant negotiated a separation agreement with her husband’s counsel without explaining it to her and without her consent. As defendant concedes, plaintiff told defendant in advance of the trial that her priority was to remain in the marital residence, where she lived with her teenaged daughter and her elderly, infirm mother. Nonetheless, on the day of trial defendant told plaintiff that if she did not sign the agreement, the trial court would force her to vacate the marital residence within 10 days. Plaintiff acknowledges that she signed the agreement, then left the courthouse because defendant told her that it was closing for lunch and, when she returned, she was advised that her case had been called and the separation agreement had been placed on the record in her absence.

As the proponent of a motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, defendant was required to demonstrate with admissible evidence that plaintiff was unable to establish at least one of the elements of her claim (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Sevey v Friedlander, 83 AD3d 1226, 1226 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 707 [2011]). To this end, defendant submitted an affidavit wherein he claimed that he issued a subpoena to plaintiff’s husband’s paramour,[FN2] but did not serve two other individuals because it would not “enhance [plaintiff’s] case.”[FN3] He explained that he arrived at the courthouse on the day of plaintiff’s trial to learn that the trial judge had at least three trials scheduled and he planned to leave at 1:00 p.m. Defendant claimed that the judge told him that he had better “get [a settlement] done” before the noon recess or it would be scheduled for a trial at some adjourned date. Defendant explained that when he told the judge that plaintiff wanted to keep the marital residence, the judge informed him that he could order the sale of the property within 10 days. According to defendant, when he relayed this information to plaintiff, she “became highly emotional—hysterical—and bolted out of the . . . room . . . dropped to her knees in front of the . . . husband crying and sobbing and saying if he would agree to her staying there she would concede virtually anything and everything. At that time the initiative was gone, we had lost the staring contest. Hence I proceeded to make the best terms possible.” Review of the separation agreement confirms that the parties agreed to sell the marital residence and split the proceeds, but that plaintiff, her daughter and mother were allowed to remain in the home for approximately 60 days following the agreement’s execution. Otherwise, defendant does not provide any specific evidence with regard to the marital property, and the agreement only provides, in generic terms, [*3]that plaintiff and her husband equitably distributed their marital property.

Here, as defendant has not submitted any expert evidence with regard to whether the services before us provided to plaintiff met the applicable standard of care, “the issue . . . distills to whether defendant met his threshold burden as to the element of either proximate cause or damages” (Arnold v Devane, 123 AD3d at 1204 [2014]). We disagree with defendant’s argument that plaintiff cannot establish either of these elements because she settled the underlying divorce action. Where, as here, the underlying claim is resolved by agreement, this element may be established by evidence that the “settlement . . . was effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel” (Marchell v Littman, 107 AD3d 1082, 1083 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 856 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];see Lattimore v Bergman, 224 AD2d 497 [1996]). While defendant insisted that he negotiated the “best terms” possible, he fails to explain whether or to what extent defendant was familiar with the value of the marital property, whether he investigated plaintiff’s complaints that the husband had taken substantial marital assets in violation of Domestic Relations Law § 236, or whether he was prepared to present any evidence at trial with respect to the marital property on his client’s behalf. Rather, defendant cites the trial judge’s schedule and observations with regard to the marital residence and plaintiff’s “hyster[ia]” as the reason why he encouraged his client to settle the action on the terms that he negotiated.

Contrary to defendant’s brief, a directive from the trial court to explore a settlement does not require counsel “as an officer of the court” to forgo his or her client’s right to a trial. Moreover, as defendant acknowledged, an adjournment of the trial date was an available option given the time constraints on the court, and it is troubling that an adjournment was not pursued considering defendant’s own description of plaintiff as emotionally distraught. Without any indication that defendant was fully informed with regard to the marital property, we decline to credit his opinion that the settlement was the best that could be accomplished under the circumstances. When we view the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, as we must (see M & R Ginsburg, LLC v Segal, Goldman, Mazzotta & Siegel, P.C., 90 AD3d 1208, 1210 [2011]), we agree with Supreme Court’s finding that the record presents factual questions with regard to whether plaintiff was compelled to settle her divorce action by defendant’s negligence (see Shapiro v Butler, 273 AD2d 657, 660 [2000]). As such, defendant did not meet his burden on the issues of proximate cause and damages, and the burden never shifted to plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of fact (see Arnold v Devane, 123 AD3d at 1205; Angeles v Aronsky, 109 AD3d 720, 722-723 [2013]; Steven L. Levitt & Assoc., P.C. v Balkin, 54 AD3d 403, 406 [2008]).”

Architect malpractice follows many of the same rules, especially in the calculation of statutes of limitation as does legal malpractice.  What happens when an architect (or an attorney) handles a limited task and finishes.  Later there are some problems, and the professional looks at the situation and works on a solution.  How does that change the calculation of the statute of limitations?

In Bronstein v Omega Constr. Group, Inc.  2016 NY Slip Op 02951  Decided on April 20, 2016  Appellate Division, Second Department we see that helping out extended the statute.

“Regardless of whether they are framed as claims sounding in contract or tort, [*2]allegations of professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, are governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214[6]; Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 542; City School Dist. of Newburgh v Stubbins & Assoc., 85 NY2d 535, 538;Town of Islip v H.T. Schneider Assoc., 73 AD3d 1029, 1029-1030). Accrual of a claim to recover for professional malpractice occurs upon the completion of performance and the resulting termination of the professional relationship (see Vlahakis v Belcom Dev., LLC, 86 AD3d 567, 568; Heritage Hills Socy., Ltd. v Heritage Dev. Group, Inc., 56 AD3d 426, 427; Frank v Masz Group, LLC, 30 AD3d 369, 370). Where dismissal of a malpractice claim is sought pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) on the ground that it is time-barred, the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time within which to sue has expired, whereupon the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact as to whether the limitations period has been tolled or should not apply (see Schwartz v Leaf, Salzman, Manganelli, Pfiel & Tendler, LLP, 123 AD3d 901, 901-902; Kitty Jie Yuan v 2368 W. 12th St., LLC, 119 AD3d 674, 674; Bill Kolb, Jr., Subaru, Inc. v LJ Rabinowitz, CPA, 117 AD3d 978, 979).”In 2006, the plaintiffs entered into a contract with the defendant architect, Michael T. Cetera, inter alia, to prepare and file plans for the construction of an extension to their residence. Cetera filed the plans, which were approved by the New York City Department of Buildings (hereinafter the DOB). Cetera subsequently advised the DOB in a letter dated May 28, 2008, that he was withdrawing responsibility for conducting controlled inspections for the project. Cetera allegedly had no further involvement with the project until the plaintiffs notified him in September 2010 that the DOB had audited the filed plans and had determined that certain errors had been made in the calculation of elevations and floor area. Cetera allegedly rendered additional services, including research and analysis of relevant zoning provisions, the performance of further calculations, and the proposal of possible solutions, in an effort to remedy the problems. There is no indication in the record that these alleged communications and corresponding efforts extended beyond November 2010. The plaintiffs subsequently commenced this action in connection with the project against various individuals and entities who had been involved in its construction. In August 2013, they moved for leave to amend their complaint to add Cetera as a defendant, alleging, inter alia, that he had committed professional negligence in the services he rendered under the parties’ contract. Following the granting of the motion for leave to amend, and the filing and service of the amended complaint, Cetera moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that it was time-barred under CPLR 214(6). The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that the parties’ submissions raised a question of fact regarding whether the applicable limitations period had been tolled pursuant to the doctrine of continuous representation.

Contrary to Cetera’s contentions, in response to his prima facie showing that the action was commenced against him more than three years after his withdrawal, the plaintiffs succeeded in raising a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine is applicable so as to toll the running of the three-year statute of limitations. Under the circumstances, the evidence of continuing communications between the parties, and of efforts by Cetera to remedy the alleged errors or deficiencies in the filed plans, supported the denial of Cetera’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against him (see Regency Club at Walkill, LLC v Appel Design Group, P.A., 112 AD3d 603, 607; Pitta v William Leggio Architects, 259 AD2d 681; Greater Johnstown City School Dist. v Cataldo & Waters, Architects, 159 AD2d 784, 786-787).”

Klein v Rieff  2016 NY Slip Op 00482 [135 AD3d 910]  January 27, 2016  Appellate Division, Second Department is an interesting case in which all the lawyers, whether representing plaintiff or against him, were sued for legal malpractice and Judiciary Law § 487 claims.  The claims against plaintiff’s attorney survived but those against opposing counsel were dismissed.

“The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, and a violation of Judiciary Law § 487. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, in an underlying proceeding in which he was the petitioner, the defendant Samuel E. Rieff knowingly submitted to the court a witness statement on behalf of the respondents in that proceeding containing material misrepresentations for submission to the court, and that the defendants Eugene F. Levy, the defendants Matthew W. Naparty and Mauro Lilling Naparty, LLP (hereinafter together the Naparty defendants), the defendants Mark L. Hankin and Hankin & Mazel, PLLC (hereinafter together the Hankin defendants), and the defendant Stephen N. Preziosi, who, in succession, each represented the respondents, knowingly submitted Rieff’s affirmation and a fraudulent affidavit from their client, and made materially false statements to the court in their own right, causing the plaintiff damages.

The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the separate motions by Levy, the Naparty defendants, the Hankin defendants, and Preziosi which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 insofar as asserted against each of them, as the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that these defendants intended to deceive the court (see Shaffer v Gilberg, 125 AD3d 632, 636 [2015]; Schiller v Bender, Burrows & Rosenthal, LLP, 116 AD3d 756, 759 [2014]; Seldon v Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, 116 AD3d 490, 491 [2014]; Curry v Dollard, 52 AD3d 642, 644 [2008]; Michalic v Klat, 128 AD2d 505, 506 [1987]).

Similarly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the separate motions of Levy, the Naparty defendants, the Hankin defendants, and Preziosi which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging fraudulent misrepresentation insofar as asserted against each of them, as the plaintiff failed to adequately plead that these defendants knowingly made material misstatements to the court (see Mandarin Trading Ltd. v Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173, 176 [2011]). For the same reason, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of these defendants’ separate motions which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging legal malpractice insofar as asserted against each of them, as these causes of action were premised on the exception to the rule requiring the existence of an attorney-client relationship in the absence of fraud, collusion, or malicious acts (see Betz v Blatt, 116 AD3d 813, 815 [2014]; cf. Ginsburg Dev. Cos., LLC v Carbone, 85 AD3d 1110, 1111-1112 [2011]).

However, the Supreme Court erred in granting those branches of Rieff’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging legal malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, and a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 insofar as asserted against him. Rieff contends that he is entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff did not suffer any [*2]damages as the result of any alleged fraud that he committed by making knowing, material misstatements for submission to the court. Contrary to Rieff’s contention, he failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate damages proximately caused by his alleged conduct (see Bey v Flushing Hosp. Med. Ctr., 95 AD3d 1152, 1153 [2012]).”

Albany, NY:  The Third Department considered a pro-se appeal, and found against plaintiff. Neroni v Follender 2016 NY Slip Op 01527  Decided on March 3, 2016  Appellate Division, Third Department.  All in all, things turned out poorly for plaintiff.

“In 2007, defendant Jonathan S. Follender (hereinafter Follender) and his law firm, defendant Jonathan S. Follender, P.C. (hereinafter the law firm), commenced a breach of contract action on behalf of clients of the law firm against clients of plaintiff [FN1]. The action culminated in a default judgment against plaintiff’s clients and an award of sanctions for frivolous conduct against plaintiff; both determinations were affirmed by this Court (M & C Bros., Inc. v Torum, 101 AD3d 1329, 1330 [2012], appeal dismissed 21 NY3d 898 [2013]). Plaintiff then commenced this action against Follender, the law firm and the law firm’s clients in the breach of contract action, alleging that Follender and the law firm committed fraud upon the court in that action and a subsequent special proceeding to enforce the judgment, that the clients colluded with Follender and the law firm to commit fraud, deceit and collusion in violation of Judicial Law § 487, and that defendants committed defamation. Defendants moved [*2]to dismiss the complaint and sought sanctions and an order to preclude plaintiff from bringing further litigation against them. In December 2013, after extensive motion practice and correspondence, Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice, sanctioned plaintiff in the amount of $2,000 for frivolous conduct and awarded injunctive relief to defendants, as well as counsel fees and costs. Plaintiff then moved for recusal and to renew and/or reargue the December 2013 order, and defendants cross-moved for, among other things, a determination of the amount of counsel fees and costs. In April 2014, the court denied plaintiff’s motion and partially granted the cross motion by, among other things, setting the amount of counsel fees and costs awarded in the December 2013 order at $8,470. Plaintiff appeals from both orders.”

“Supreme Court properly dismissed the fifth cause of action, which alleged in conclusory terms that the law firm’s clients acted in collusion with Follender and the law firm to commit fraud, collusion and deceit. As the court correctly determined, the complaint included no specific allegations whatsoever of any fraudulent statements or other wrongdoing on the clients’ part, and Judiciary Law § 487, by its terms, does not apply to non-attorneys. Finally, we agree with the court that the cause of action alleging defamation and defamation per se did not describe the alleged defamatory statements with the requisite specificity (see CPLR 3016 [a]; Martin v Hayes, 105 AD3d 1291, 1293 [2013]), that the claim was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations as to all but one of the statements that apparently formed the basis of the allegations (see CPLR 215 [3]), and that the remaining statement was made in the course of the prior court proceeding and was therefore protected by an absolute privilege (see Black v Green Harbour Homeowners’ Assn., Inc., 19 AD3d 962, 963 [2005]). Plaintiff’s contention that the court should have granted leave to amend her complaint rather than dismissing it on the merits is unpreserved (see CPLR 5501 [a] [3]).”