Clients get the benefit of an extended statute of limitations under the principal of continuous representation.  It arose out of "continuing treatment" in the medical malpractice world.  In legal malpractice, there must be some evidence of a "continuing relationship of trust and confidence" between client and attorney.  Absent that, the statute begins on the day the mistake is made.  That’s what happened in Priola v Fallon  2014 NY Slip Op 03130 [117 AD3d 1489]  May 2, 2014
Appellate Division, Fourth Department. 

"Memorandum: In this legal malpractice action, plaintiff appeals from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint on the ground that, inter alia, the action was time-barred. Plaintiff contends that Supreme Court erred in granting the motion because the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine. We reject that contention. "A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when the malpractice is committed" (Elstein v Phillips Lytle, LLP, 108 AD3d 1073, 1073 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, defendants established that any malpractice occurred, at the latest, in 2003 and thus made a prima facie showing that the action was time-barred (see International Electron Devices [USA] LLC v Menter, Rudin & Trivelpiece, P.C., 71 AD3d 1512, 1512 [2010]). "The burden then shifted to plaintiff[ ] to raise a triable issue of fact whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine" (id.; see Macaluso v Del Col, 95 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]), and plaintiff failed to meet that burden inasmuch as he failed to present the requisite " ’clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney’ " to toll the statute of limitations (Kanter v Pieri, 11 AD3d 912, 913 [2004]; see Guerra Press, Inc. v Campbell & Parlato, LLP, 17 AD3d 1031, 1032-1033 [2005]). In light of our determination, we do not address plaintiff’s remaining contentions. Present—Smith, J.P., Peradotto, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ."

It’s a well known meme that real estate is close to the heart of New Yorkers.   "Location, location, location" is a phrase bandied about even by schoolchildren.  So, it’s no surprise that real estate transactions may figure in a legal malpractice setting.  Here, in Rojas v Paine  2015 NY Slip Op 01258  Decided on February 11, 2015  Appellate Division, Second Department we see what happens when the attorney does not compare the description of a property in a deed with that of the property purported to be sold.

"In April 2005, the plaintiffs entered into a contract to purchase a one-family house in the Town of Greenburgh from the defendants Andrew Paine and Karen Paine (hereinafter together the Paines). The house was situated on property designated as Lot No. 8 on a subdivision map filed in the Westchester County Clerk’s office. The plaintiffs were represented in the transaction by the defendants Paul Herrick and Rabin, Panero & Herrick, LLP (hereinafter together the Herrick defendants). The Herrick defendants ordered a title report from the defendant Statewide Abstract Corp. (hereinafter Statewide). The title report was issued by Statewide as agent for the defendant Stewart Title Insurance Company (hereinafter Stewart Title), which issued a policy of title insurance.

At the closing on June 6, 2005, the Paines delivered to the plaintiffs a bargain and sale deed reciting that the subject property was "the same property" as had been transferred to the Paines by two separate deeds, both recorded in the Westchester County Clerk’s office on March 4, 2005. However, the description of the property contained in Schedule A of the deed delivered on June 6, 2005, which had also been annexed to the contract of sale, contained only the description of the [*2]portion of Lot No. 8 set forth in one of the two deeds previously recorded on March 4, 2005.

In the fall of 2007, when the plaintiffs sought to sell the property to a relocation company, a title search revealed that the plaintiffs owned only a portion of Lot No. 8. As a result, the relocation company refused to take title to the property. Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced this action against several parties. With respect to the Herrick defendants, the plaintiffs alleged that they were negligent in failing to discover that the property had been illegally subdivided, permitting the delivery of the deed to only a portion of the parcel, and failing to discover the existence of the remaining parcel. In an order entered September 30, 2011, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the cross motion of the Herrick defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and the case proceeded to trial. Following the trial, a judgment dated June 12, 2013, was entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the Herrick defendants in the total sum of $349,247.47."

"ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with one bill of costs to the plaintiffs."

Where Plaintiff may sue the attorney is the question of venue.  Generally speaking, it is in the county where the plaintiff resides, or where the defendant resides.  PCs "reside" in the county where their principal place of business is.  However, the location of the attorney’s office need not be the county where the principal place of business is.  That county is designated by the corporate documents filed for the PC.

In Brion v Moreira   2015 NY Slip Op 30160(U)  February 3, 2015  Supreme Court, New York  County Docket Number: 155815/14  Judge: Donna M. Mills  we see Supreme Court analyze there the law firm may be sued.
 

Thereafter, it is defendant’s burden to establish that given the type of action, the venue chosen was improper. Id. Plaintiff must demonstrate that the venue chosen was proper. Id. A plaintiff forfeits the right to select the venue in an action if said plaintiff chooses an improper venue in the first instance. Kelson v. Nedicks Stores, Inc., 104 A.D.2d 315, 478 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1st Dept.1984).
Here, plaintiffs rely on defendant Moreira PLLC’s Articles of Organization that were filed with the New York Secretary of State on August 23, 2005 which designated New York County as is principal office. Additionally, a computer printout, dated May 21, 2014 from the New York State Department of State’s website also confirms that Moreira’s principal place of business is New York County. The law is clear that the sole residence of a limited liability company for venue purposes is the county where its principal office is located as designated in its articles of organization (see CPLR 503 (c); Limited Liability Company Law§§ 102 (s]; 203 [e) [2]; Graziuso v 2060 Hylan Blvd. Rest. Corp., 300 AD2d 627, 628 (2002); see also Mi/om v Marble Hall Apts., Inc., 37 AD3d 672 [2007]; Hamilton v Corona Ready Mix, Inc., 21 AD3d 448, 449 (2005)). Such office need not be a place where business activities are conducted by the limited liability company (see Limited Liability Company Law§ 102 [s)). Since the defendants failed to establish that the county designated by the plaintiffs in the first instance was improper, its motion to change the venue of the action from New York County to Queens County shall be denied.

Attorney 1 handles a case for a period of time, and then the case is turned over to Attorney 2.  At the time of transfer the case is active nor is under imminent threat of dismissal.  Later, while Attorney 2 is handling the case, something goes wrong, and a legal malpractice case is started against Attorney 1 and Attorney 2.  Attorney 1 says that since Attorney 2 took over, and the case was in good health, why blame me?

The Fourth Department recently considered this very situation in New Kayak Pool Corp. v Kavinoky Cook LLP  2015 NY Slip Op 01066  Decided on February 6, 2015  Appellate Division, Fourth Department. 

"Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this legal malpractice action against defendants, Kavinoky Cook LLP (Kavinoky) and Hodgson Russ, LLP (Hodgson), each having represented plaintiff The New Kayak Pool Corporation, now known as Kayak Pool Corporation (Kayak Pool) in a federal trademark infringement action. Seven months after Hodgson was substituted for Kavinoky as legal counsel for Kayak Pool, the federal action settled, and Kayak Pool received, inter alia, injunctive relief and $150,000 in full settlement of all its claims in that action. The settlement check was issued by an insurance company, and plaintiffs now allege that Kavinoky and Hodgson committed malpractice by failing to inquire as to the federal defendants’ insurance coverage. Plaintiffs further allege that, had Kayak Pool been aware that the federal defendants had insurance coverage, Kayak Pool would not have settled for only $150,000.

Following discovery in this action, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability, and each of the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and all cross claims asserted against them. We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motions."

"Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention with respect to Kavinoky, the court properly determined that Kavinoky’s failure to determine the existence of the federal defendants’ insurance coverage was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ alleged damages, which is a necessary element of a cause of action for legal malpractice (see Oot, 275 AD2d at 1023). As noted by the court, "[i]t is undisputed that Kavinoky was discharged as [Kayak Pool’s] counsel, and Hodgson was substituted in as [Kayak Pool’s] counsel, prior to the time that any settlement negotiations began and that Kavinoky had no role whatsoever in those negotiations." Moreover, although plaintiffs substituted Hodgson as their legal counsel only after the attorney who had initially represented plaintiffs left Kavinoky to join Hodgson (see New Kayak Pool Corp., 74 AD3d at 1852-1853), Kavinoky established that a different attorney at Hodgson overtook responsibility for representing plaintiffs once Hodgson was substituted as counsel. Therefore, despite the connection between the two law firms, there was no actual continuity of legal representation. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Kavinoky, through the actions of the first attorney, was negligent in failing to investigate the matter of insurance coverage, we note that Hodgson, through the newly assigned attorney, had over seven months in which to conduct its own investigation before settling the federal action on behalf of Kayak Pool. We thus conclude that Kavinoky established as a matter of law "that its actions did not proximately cause the plaintiffs’ alleged damages, and that subsequent counsel had a sufficient opportunity to protect the plaintiffs’ rights by pursuing any remedies it deemed appropriate on their behalf" (Katz v Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., 48 AD3d 640, 641; see e.g. Somma v Dansker & Aspromonte Assoc., 44 AD3d 376, 377; Golden v Cascione, Chechanover & Purcigliotti, 286 AD2d 281, 281; cf. Tooma v Grossbarth, 121 AD3d 1093, 1096-1097; Grant v LaTrace, 119 AD3d 646, 647), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

It’s rare for the AD to start off a decision with a recap of two earlier appeals.  In Dischiavi v Calli
2015 NY Slip Op 01116   Decided on February 6, 2015  Appellate Division, Fourth Department four different defense law firms have been making motions to dismiss, so far, without any success.  On this third try, they sought to preclude the evidence of continuous representation, and accomplish through the back door what they were unable to accomplish at the front door.

"This case has been before us on two prior occasions (Dischiavi v Calli [appeal No. 2], 68 AD3d 1691 [Dischiavi I]; Dischiavi v Calli, 111 AD3d 1258 [Dischiavi II]), both involving, inter alia, the motions of various defendants for summary judgment. In both appeals, at least some defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the legal malpractice cause of action based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations, and we rejected that contention in both prior appeals. Specifically, in Dischiavi I, we concluded that, "[w]ith respect to the legal malpractice cause of action, there is a triable issue of fact whether plaintiffs are entitled to the toll provided by the continuous representation doctrine" (68 AD3d at 1694). Again in Dischiavi II, we affirmed that part of the order on appeal that denied the various defendants’ motions for [*2]summary judgment on the ground "that plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact whether the doctrine of continuous representation tolled the statute of limitations" (111 AD3d at 1260-1261).

The matter progressed toward trial after this Court issued its decision in Dischiavi II. In the order on appeal, the court granted defendants’ motions to preclude plaintiffs from introducing evidence that any of the defendants represented plaintiffs with respect to any issue other than an issue in the context of a medical malpractice action against a physician. The effect of that order was to limit plaintiffs to introducing evidence that, in 1994, one of the defendants made a statement to Gary M. Dischiavi (plaintiff) indicating that the medical malpractice action was not viable.

We note at the outset that, although the parties do not address the appealability of this order determining a motion in limine, we conclude that plaintiffs may appeal from the order at issue (see Franklin Corp. v Prahler, 91 AD3d 49, 54). "Generally, an order ruling [on a motion in limine], even when made in advance of trial on motion papers constitutes, at best, an advisory opinion which is neither appealable as of right nor by permission" (Innovative Transmission & Engine Co., LLC v Massaro, 63 AD3d 1506, 1507 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Scalp & Blade v Advest, Inc., 309 AD2d 219, 224). This Court has noted, however, that "there is a distinction between an order that limits the admissibility of evidence,’ which is not appealable . . . , and one that limits the legal theories of liability to be tried’ or the scope of the issues at trial, which is appealable" (Scalp & Blade, 309 AD2d at 224). Here, the order precluded the introduction of the vast majority of the evidence on the issue whether defendants continued to represent plaintiffs so as to toll the statute of limitations, and thus it is appealable because it limits the scope of the issues at trial (see generally O’Donnell v Ferguson, 100 AD3d 1534, 1535-1536; Catanese v Furman, 27 AD3d 1050, 1051).

With respect to the substantive issue, we note that, after our determinations in Dischiavi I and Dischiavi II that there was a triable issue of fact whether the doctrine of continuous representation tolled the statute of limitations, the court granted those parts of defendants’ motions in limine seeking to preclude plaintiffs from offering evidence to establish that there had been such representation. Although the court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, we agree with plaintiffs that the court abused that discretion here. Defendants are correct that, "in the context of a legal malpractice action, the continuous representation doctrine tolls the [s]tatute of [l]imitations only where the continuing representation pertains specifically to the matter in which the attorney committed the alleged malpractice" (Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 168). The continuous representation doctrine is derived from the continuous treatment doctrine in medical malpractice cases (see Mercone v Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn., Inc., 90 AD3d 1698, 1699; Pollicino v Roemer & Featherstonhaugh, 260 AD2d 52, 54), however, and as the Court of Appeals explained later in Shumsky, "[i]ncluded within the scope of continuous treatment is a timely return visit instigated by the patient to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment" (id. at 170 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action is tolled where, as here, a "defendant continuously represented the plaintiffs during [the relevant] period by performing legal services related to the matter out of which the malpractice claim arose" (Kuritzky v Sirlin & Sirlin, 231 AD2d 607, 608).

Furthermore, in both prior appeals we concluded that there was a triable issue of fact whether the statute of limitations was tolled because, in opposition to the various defendants’ motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact whether one or more of the defendants continued to represent plaintiffs on a related matter (Dischiavi I, 68 AD3d at 1694; Dischiavi II, 111 AD3d at 1260-1261). We reached that conclusion because, in opposition to defendants’ motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs "adduced persuasive evidence establishing that [defendants] performed continuing legal services [throughout the time during which the statute is alleged to have been tolled] to correct [their] alleged failure to effectively" commence an action to recover damages for plaintiff’s injuries (N & S Supply v Simmons, 305 AD2d 648, 650). Here, the evidence that defendants sought to preclude was highly relevant to the issue whether the actions in question involved "an attempt by the attorney to rectify an alleged act of malpractice" that would constitute continuing representation sufficient to toll the statute of limitations (Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d 505, 506-507; see Weiss v Manfredi, 83 NY2d 974, 977, rearg denied 84 NY2d 848; DeStaso v Condon Resnick, LLP, 90 AD3d 809, 812-813)."

Husband and wife live and love for a long time, then things descend into divorce.  All of a sudden, money gifts  from the in-laws turn into loans, and the husband is asked to repay her parents.  He’s aghast, and fights back.  Eventually wife agrees that these were not loans at all.  Does the husband have a Judiciary Law 487 claim against her attorneys for putting this argument forward?

Not in Shaffer v Gilberg  2015 NY Slip Op 00865  Decided on February 4, 2015  Appellate Division, Second Department.  While the Court does not give much guidance, it seems to us that the attorneys got dismissal on the theory that they relied upon the affidavits of the parents, and did not independently try to deceive the court.  Anyway, the Court writes:

The plaintiff, who was a party to a highly contentious matrimonial action, contested the authenticity of 30 separate promissory notes and loans submitted by the wife in that action and reflected as liabilities in her net worth statement. The notes indicated that the wife owed her father, Gerald N. Gilberg, her mother, Frances Gilberg, and her mother and father’s corporations, The Gilberg Organization, Inc., and TGA of Palm Beach, Inc. (hereinafter collectively the Gilberg defendants), in excess of $446,000 which, with added interest, amounted to more than $669,000. The plaintiff maintained that each of the 30 loans had actually been a gift from his in-laws to him and his wife and their family during the course of a 12-year period. The plaintiff theorized that the wife and her parents were improperly attempting to reduce the marital estate in order to also reduce the plaintiff’s share of the marital estate.

In the matrimonial action, the plaintiff submitted documents which cast into doubt the authenticity of the notes. Shortly after the plaintiff submitted these documents, the wife’s attorney, James J. Nolletti, a partner with Collier, Halpern, Newberg, Nolletti & Bock, LLP (hereinafter together the Collier defendants), withdrew the attorney certification to the wife’s net worth statement.

Eventually, the plaintiff and his wife were able to reach a settlement agreement. As part of the agreement, the wife took responsibility for any debts in her name or guaranteed by her and the plaintiff was awarded a distributive award from the marital estate.

The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action against the Gilberg defendants and the Collier defendants, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud. In his complaint, the plaintiff did not allege that the marital estate was improperly diminished due to these allegedly fabricated notes and loans but, rather, alleged that he relied on the Gilberg defendants’ representations that the payments were gifts at the time that they were made. The plaintiff alleged that, as a result, he incurred debt and lived a lifestyle that he could not have otherwise afforded, and expended legal fees and suffered business losses determining whether the notes and loans were authentic. The Gilberg defendants moved to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and the Collier defendants separately moved to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The Supreme Court granted both motions and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. We affirm.

The Supreme Court properly directed the dismissal of the sixth cause of action, asserted against the Collier defendants, which alleged a violation of Judiciary Law § 487, which "requires, among other things, an act of deceit by an attorney, with intent to deceive the court or any party" (Curry v Dollard, 52 AD3d 642, 644). The plaintiff’s allegations regarding an act of deceit or intent to deceive are conclusory and factually insufficient. In any event, the evidentiary material the Collier defendants submitted in support of their motion disproved the plaintiff’s allegations (see Siskin v Cassar, 122 AD3d at 717; Maksimiak v Schwartzapfel Novick Truhowsky Marcus, P.C., 82 AD3d 652, 652; Curry v Dollard, 52 AD3d at 644; Lazich v Vittoria & Parker, 189 AD2d 753, 754)."

Settlement brings the end of a litigation, and sometimes bliss.  Other times settlement brings remorse.  Parties must sometimes be pushed into settlements, and an inherent conflict between the attorney and the client might surface when their interests diverge at settlement. 

In Salazar v Sacco & Fillas, LLP  2014 NY Slip Op 00980 [114 AD3d 745]  February 13, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department  the client puts forth a credible account of being bullied into settlement with false claims that he owed fees to the attorney and could be personally liable if he did not settle.

"The plaintiff retained the defendants Sacco and Fillas, LLP (hereinafter the law firm), and attorneys Tonino Sacco and Elias Nikolaos Fillas, who allegedly were partners in the law firm, to represent him as a plaintiff in a personal injury action and to represent two corporate entities that he controlled, Always First, Inc., and Always Fast, Inc. (hereinafter together the Always companies), in connection with certain commercial litigation.

The law firm settled the personal injury action on behalf of the plaintiff, and received certain settlement proceeds on the plaintiff’s behalf. Thereafter, the plaintiff and the Always companies, as "the client," and the law firm entered into an agreement (hereinafter the settlement agreement). The settlement agreement provided that, in exchange for the law firm’s agreement to "discount outstanding balances" due the law firm from the Always companies, "the client" agreed to give up all rights to certain sums due "the client" from three enumerated litigations.

The plaintiff thereafter commenced the instant action, seeking to recover damages he allegedly sustained as a result of the defendants’ legal malpractice, breach of contract, and fraud. The plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the defendants breached the retainer agreement relating to the personal injury action in that they intentionally failed to pay him the settlement funds from that [*2]action. The plaintiff also alleges that he was fraudulently induced into signing the settlement agreement. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). The Supreme Court, upon concluding that the complaint alleged intentional acts only, granted the defendants’ motion only insofar as it sought to dismiss the first cause of action, sounding in legal malpractice. The defendants appeal.

When assessing a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, "the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d 520, 521 [2013]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Treeline 990 Stewart Partners, LLC v RAIT Atria, LLC, 107 AD3d 788, 791 [2013]).

The complaint adequately states a cause of action against the defendants sounding in breach of contract.

To state a cause of action sounding in fraud, a plaintiff must allege that "(1) the defendant made a representation or a material omission of fact which was false and which the defendant knew to be false, (2) the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely upon it, (3) there was justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or material omission, and (4) injury" (Selechnik v Law Off. of Howard R. Birnbach, 82 AD3d 1077, 1078 [2011]; see McDonnell v Bradley, 109 AD3d 592, 592-593 [2013]). In the instant matter, the complaint alleged that Fillas, one of the attorneys representing the plaintiff and the Always companies, made certain false statements, including, inter alia, misrepresenting the amount of past-due attorney’s fees owed by the Always companies, and falsely stating, in effect, that he could sue the plaintiff personally for the sums allegedly owed by the Always companies. The complaint further alleged that these statements were known by Fillas to be false at the time they were made, and were intended to deceive, coerce, and induce the plaintiff into entering into the settlement agreement, and that the plaintiff relied on these statements to his detriment. Accordingly, these allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action alleging fraud against Fillas and the law firm (see Partnership Law §§ 24, 25, 26 [e]; Rabos v R&R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849 [2012])."

The basic rules of summary judgment, well understood and well settled must be followed.  Whether its the need for a person with knowledge to give an affidavit, or that you need to provide prima facie entitlement to get the court to look at your papers, the basics must be followed. 

Cullin v Spiess  2014 NY Slip Op 07975 [122 AD3d 792]  November 19, 2014  Appellate Division, Second Department is one example.   "The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, her former attorney, alleging, inter alia, that he committed legal malpractice, made negligent misrepresentations, and violated Judiciary Law § 487, in connection with the settlement of a contested probate proceeding in which the defendant represented the plaintiff. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the complaint and the defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the fourth, sixth, eighth, and twelfth causes of action, all of which alleged violations of Judiciary Law § 487 (1). The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted the defendant’s cross motion.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the complaint. The plaintiff failed to submit, with her moving papers, an affidavit by a person with knowledge of the facts (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Currie v Wilhouski, 93 AD3d 816, 817 [2012]; Menzel v Plotnick, 202 AD2d 558, 559 [1994]). The affirmation of the plaintiff’s attorney, who did not have personal knowledge of the facts, was without probative value, and the remaining exhibits were insufficient to support the motion for summary judgment (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563 [1980]; Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26 [2012]; 1911 Richmond Ave. Assoc., LLC v G.L.G. Capital, LLC, 60 AD3d 1021, 1022 [2009]; Menzel v Plotnick, 202 AD2d at 559).

In contrast, the defendant demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the fourth, sixth, eighth, and twelfth causes of action alleging that he violated Judiciary Law § 487, by establishing that there was no evidence of his alleged intent to deceive the plaintiff in connection with the settlement (see Dupree v Voorhees, 102 AD3d 912 [2013]; [*2]Boglia v Greenberg, 63 AD3d 973, 975 [2009]; Pui Sang Lai v Shuk Yim Lau, 50 AD3d 758 [2008]; Knecht v Tusa, 15 AD3d 626, 627 [2005]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint and properly granted the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the fourth, sixth, eighth, and twelfth causes of action. Skelos, J.P., Roman, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur."