Client has lost millions and goes to attorney.  Attorney arranges for a private investigator to work on the case.  So far so good?  The investigator’s contract called for payment of $ 350,000 plus 25% on success in locating assets.  Clients thought this too much.  Can a complaint for fraud adequately be stated on these facts?

In Moche v Srour  2013 NY Slip Op 32740(U)  October 26, 2013  Sup Ct, New York County
Docket Number: 157764/2012  Judge: Eileen A. Rakower tells us that the answer is yes.

"This action arises from the retention of a private investigator on Plaintiffs’ behalf by their attorney. In this action, plaintiffs Charles M. Moche and Ezra S. Moche (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), residents of New Jersey, contend they "were individuals who were victims of a real estate fraud scheme which caused them to lose millions of dollars." Plaintiffs allege that they thereafter "retained Deborah R. Srour, Esq. Srour and the law firm of Cox, Padmore Skolnick & Skarachy LLC to help regain the money they had lost." Plaintiffs further allege that Srour thereafter "took undue advantage of plaintiffs’ desperate situation because of their significant losses and entered into an agreement with defendant Patrol H.Y. Security (2007) Ltd. (Patrol) and Chaim Sharvit (Sharvit) purportedly obligating plaintiffs [sic] to pay Patrol $350,00 caused plaintiffs [sic] to give $225,000 to Patrol."
Plaintiffs allege, "Sharvit provided almost no services or work product to plaintiffs yet retained plaintiffs’ $225,000.00 and demanded the additional $125,000 purportedly due under Srour’s agreement." Plaintiffs further allege that "[u]pon information and belief, Sharvit shared those funds with Srour and/or Cox Padmore while Srour in fact during said period in question was purportedly representing plaintiff and had a fiduciary obligation to plaintiff."

"Here, accepting the allegations as true that Srour "at the time of entering into the agreement either acted as Patrol’s attorney and/or partner, and failed to disclose same to plaintiffs," "Sour also concealed that under the agreement … , Sharvit was not obligated to do anything," and "Upon information and belief, Sharvit shared those funds with Srour and/or Cox Padmore … ," Plaintiffs have stated claims for fraud and fraud in the inducement as against Srour and Cox Padmore.
 

The second cause of action of the Amended Complaint is for unjust enrichment. "[T]o prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, "a party must show that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at that party’s expense, and (3) that ‘it is against equity and good conscience to permit [the other party] to retain what is sought to be recovered."’ (Cruz v. McAneney, 31 A.D.3d 54, 59 [2006]). "The existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter." Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 N.Y. 2d 382, 399 [1987]. "[A] party is not precluded from proceeding on both breach of contract and quasi contract theories where there is a bona fide dispute as to the existence of a contract or where the contract does not cover the dispute in issue." Curtis Props. Corp. v. Greif Cos., 236 A.D.2d 237, 239 (1st Dep’t 1997). A bona fide dispute exists where a defendant alleges unconscionability or fraud. (Id.). Here, accepting the allegations that Plaintiffs paid Sharvit and Patrol $225,000 for services that were not adequately invoiced or rendered, that Srour and Cox Padmore shared those funds, and the contract entered by Srour with Patrol and Sharvit on Plaintiffs’ behalf was unconscionable, Plaintiffs have stated a claim for unjust enrichment.

The third cause of action of the Amended Complaint is for breach of fiduciary duty. The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty include (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) misconduct; and (3) damages caused by the misconduct. (Armentano v. Paraco Gas Corp., 90 AD3d 683, 935 NYS2d 304 [2nd Dept 2011]). Based on the allegations that Srour, as Plaintiffs’ attorney, "prepared the agreement with Sharvit to the benefit of Sharvit and the detriment of plaintiffs" and thereafter shared in those funds that Plaintiffs paid to Sharvit without Plaintiffs’ knowledge," Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of fiduciary as against Srour and Cox Padmore. The fourth cause of action of the Amended Complaint is for legal malpractice
stemming from Plaintiffs’ recommendation of Patrol and Sharvit. In order to prevail against an attorney on a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must first prove that the  attorney was negligent, that such negligence was the proximate cause of the loss sustained, and that actual damages resulted therefrom (see Tydings v. Greenfield, Stein& Senior, 2007 NY Slip Op 6734, *2 [1st Dept. 2007]). An attorney does not, except by express agreement, guarantee results. Weinberg v. Needelman, 226 A.D. 3,4-5 [1st Dept 1929], aff’d, 252 N.Y. 622 [1930]. "[A]n attorney is not held to the rule of infallibility and is not liable for an honest mistake of judgment, where the proper course is open to reasonable doubt. Thus, ‘selection of one among several reasonable courses of action does not constitute malpractice."’ Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co.,  P.C., 160 A.D.2d 428, 430 [151 Dept 1990]. Here, Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim is based on Srour’s recommendation which they followed in the retention of the private investigator. This allegation alone is insufficient to make out a legal malpractice claim."

Plaintiff is injured while at work as a teacher in NYC and goes to an attorney. The attorney advises her to bring a Workers’ Compensation Claim, and does so for her. More than 90 days passes, and lo and behold, it turns out that Teachers in NYC are not covered by WC, and are (must) bring a personal injury claim. It’s too late for plaintiff. Is this legal malpractice?

Supreme Court did not think so. The Appellate Division, however, did. Gaskin v Harris 2012 NY Slip Op 06123 ;  Appellate Division, Second Department .
 

"However, the Supreme Court should not have granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was to pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging legal malpractice. To recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff is required to show that the defendant attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession, and that the attorney’s breach of this duty caused the plaintiff to suffer actual and ascertainable damages (see Dombrowski v Bulson, 19 NY3d 347, 350; Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301-302; Gershkovich v Miller, Rosado & Algios, LLP, 96 AD3d 716, 717). When determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible [*2]inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Marom v Anselmo, 90 AD3d 622, 623), and "may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 88; see Berman v Christ Apostolic Church Intl. Miracle Ctr., Inc., 87 AD3d 1094, 1096-1097; Kopelowitz & Co., Inc. v Mann, 83 AD3d 793, 797). Further, a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted "only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law" (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d at 326; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 88; Robertson v Wells, 95 AD3d 862, 863; Magnus v Sklover, 95 AD3d 837, 837).

Applying these principles here, the complaint, as amplified by the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff, adequately states a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently advised her to seek Workers’ Compensation benefits for injuries sustained in the course of her employment as a substitute teacher, when he should have known, as an attorney specializing in this area, that New York City teachers and substitute teachers are not covered by the Workers’ Compensation Law. She further claims that the defendant advised her to pursue a baseless Workers’ Compensation claim instead of litigation, failed to advise her of the deadline for filing a notice of claim, and counseled her against accepting a mediator’s recommended settlement that would have afforded her some compensation for her injuries. Although the documentary evidence submitted by the defendant establishes that he promptly filed a Workers’ Compensation claim on the plaintiff’s behalf, and that the claim was denied on the ground that New York City teachers, including substitute teachers, are not covered by the Workers’ Compensation Law, this evidence does not conclusively establish a defense to the plaintiff’s asserted malpractice claims. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was to pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging legal malpractice (see Magnus v Sklover, 95 AD3d at 837; Ofman v Katz, 89 AD3d 909, 910; Thompsen v Baier, 84 AD3d 1062, 1063).
 

Last week we reported on the disbarment of Tom Bello of Staten Island in Matter of Bello ;2013 NY Slip Op 06859 ;  Decided on October 23, 2013 ; Appellate Division, Second Department  ;  Per Curiam.

Today, we see some of the after effects of his representation of other clients.  in Stein v Research Found. City Univ. of N.Y. ;  2013 NY Slip Op 51812(U) ;  Decided on October 28, 2013 ;  Supreme Court, Richmond County ;  Maltese, J.

"In or about September of 2006, the plaintiff was terminated by the Small Business Development Center (hereinafter "SBDC") located on the campus of the College of Staten Island. The SBDC is one of twenty four regional centers of the New York State Small Business [*2]Development Center and receives funding from the City and State Universities of New York."

"In the years following his termination, plaintiff contacted the Public Integrity Bureau of the New York State Attorney General’s office, the Civil Rights Center of the United States Department of Labor, the Department of Investigation for the City of New York, the United States Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before ultimately filing suit against the City University of New York, the SBDC, the College of Staten Island and Dean Balsamini in April of 2011.The plaintiff indicated that he, along with others from the college, retained the services of Attorney Thomas Bello to assist them in the legal proceedings. The record is unclear as to how long this relationship lasted, but the plaintiff’s submissions indicate Attorney Bello failed to file necessary documents even though he provided the plaintiff with notarized documentation and advised him the case was proceeding smoothly. Attorney Bello has previously been the subject of a legal malpractice suit brought by a different individual and is under investigation by the Staten Island District Attorney.[FN1] The record is also unclear as to the status of any proceeding brought by plaintiff against Attorney Bello concerning their relationship. However, on October 23, 2013 the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second Department in Matter of Thomas F. Bello, an attorney and counselor-at-law, discipline number D38484 issued an order accepting the resignation of Attorney Thomas F. Bello from the bar and thereby disbarred him and struck his name from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law.[FN2] "

"Moreover, the plaintiff’s instant action is not based on legal malpractice but instead is centered on the alleged actions of the Research Foundation. While the court recognizes the plaintiff may have a malpractice action based on Attorney Bello’s failure to appropriately file documents in the 2011 case before the statute of limitations period expired,[FN11] any such claim does not bear on the res judicata analysis since the malpractice suit is separate and apart from his claim against this defendant. The substance of his current claim against the Research Foundation is the same as his previous claim and thus cannot be re-litigated. The plaintiff’s claims against Attorney Bello would be best pursued in a separate action provided it is not filed outside the three year statute of limitation which runs from the date of the original malpractice.[FN12]
"

Client wants to open a business.  Client goes to attorney to make sure that the store she is building in NYC will meet all codes.  Attorney tells her no employee bathroom is necessary.  The City says it is necessary.  She loses the store as a result.  Legal Malpractice?

In Cavlak v Helbraun;  2013 NY Slip Op 32704(U);  October 25, 2013;  Supreme Court, New York County;  Docket Number: 103896/2012;  Judge: Richard F. Braun says that the legal malpractice claim remains, while all other causes of action are dismissed.

"This is an action sounding in negligence, legal malpractice, violation of Judiciary Law§ 487, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract, all arising out of the review by defendant David
Helbraun (defendant) of plaintiffs lease for plaintiffs storefront take-out window bakery/ cafe and
giving of advice in relation thereto. Plaintiff contends that she was not properly advised by defendant of the need for an available employee bathroom under the New York City Health Code. After receiving a number of citations for New York City Health Code violations, including one for the lack of an available employee bathroom, plaintiff maintains that she was forced to end the operation of her business, which caused her to lose her investment in the business. Defendant contends that the complaint should be dismissed, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7), based on the documentary evidence that he submitted and because plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action.·"

"Plaintiff has stated a cause of action for legal malpractice sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, insofar as she alleges that she was not properly apprised of the implications of a lack of an employee bathroom for the premises, which ultimately caused her to lose her business and her investment therein. Plaintiff effectively pleads that she was erroneously advised that a bathroom for employees was not required. Defendant contends that under then NYCHC § 81.29 (a) (now modified in § 81.22 [a]) a bathroom for employee use need not be in the actual store, but that some facilities must be available for employee use. Even assuming that bathrooms in nearby
restaurants could serve that function, bathrooms in those restaurants were not available at the time
of the New York City Department of Health inspection because the restaurants were not open and
thus seemingly would not ordinarily be available during plaintiffs prime morning hours. Had
plaintiff not been advised that a bathroom for employees was not required, as alleged, she would not have faced this dilemma. While defendant asserts that the violation could have been challenged and cured, that would involve a determination on proximate cause beyond the face of the pleading (cf Bernardi v Spyratos, 79 AD3d 684, 688 [2nd Dept 2010] [where the determination on causation was on a motion for summary judgment]). Indeed, plaintiff maintains that she obtained documents showing that she was authorized to use the bathroom in the restaurant next door and presented them at a hearing, apparently to no avail.

"Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a defense to a legal malpractice claim, but rather generally bars a judicial challenge to an administrative action (see Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]). While a failure to exhaust administrative remedies could be a factor in determining whether an attorney’s negligence was a proximate cause of a plaintiffs damages (cf Catuzza v Rodriguez, 93 AD3d 1214, 1214-1215 [4th Dept 2012] [the defendant attorneys in a legal malpractice action failed to establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff employee’s complaint against the county would have been dismissed on the ground that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies]), that too goes beyond the issue of the sufficiency of the pleading."

In a most ironic turnabout. a law firm is sued for not producing bills.  Often enough, it is claimed that legal malpractice cases start up when a law firm actually bills the client.  Not here, in TufAmerica, Inc. v Warshavsky  2013 NY Slip Op 32690(U)  October 24, 2013  Sup Ct, New York County  Docket Number: 157795/12  Judge: Anil C. Singh.   Plaintiff loses here on the statute of limitations.  Here is the back story:

"Plaintiff TufAmerica, Inc. ("TufAmerica") retained defendant Oren Warshavsky ("Warshavsky"), a New York attorney, to provide legal services beginning in August 1999 in connection with a lawsuit brought by Wardell Quezergue and Joseph Johnson against TufAmerica in federal district court in
New Orleans, Louisiana. Warshavsky also represented TufAmerica in connection with a second suit brought against TufAmerica by the same two plaintiffs in 2002, this one in state court in Louisiana. Warshavsky was admitted pro hac vice in connection with both lawsuits, and entered an appearance as counsel for TufAmerica in both lawsuits. In the federal court suit, the court in a December 11, 2000, decision awarded summary judgment to TufAmerica against another defendant, Joe Jones, for copyright infringement, and awarded TufAmerica its attorneys’ fees as to the claims against Joe Jones only."

When the time came, and TufAmerica had to produce bills so that they could be reimbursed, the bills could not be found.

"On May 31, 2006, plaintiff’s local counsel in Louisiana, Dino Gankendorff, sent the following e-mail to Warshavsky:
Oren:
I am still tring [sic.] to get in touch with you on the motion to compel.
I have called you everyday for almost two weeks now and have not
heard back. We have a hearing on this Friday, June 2, and face a
serious problem. In reviewing the file, we have already agreed to
produce certain documents, see your letter dated June 17, 2005.
Donald Hyatt reports that he never received these docs. nor has our
office. Frankly, I don’t see how I can go to court on Friday and
objection [sic.] to this production when we have already agreed to
produce these documents. In short, I need you to overnight me these
documents referenced in your letter dated June 17, 2006 today so we
can produce them at the hearing on Friday or I feel certain that the
Judge will cast us with attorney’s fees and sanctions. Please let me
hear from you immediately. Thanks  dino
(Pergament Affirmation, exhibit A).
 

"Later that day, Warshavsky replied:

I do not have any documents, and if Tuff City does not have the bills
then there is not much that can be done – sometimes there are no
documents found, and we can only give circumstantial evidence.
Essentially, they want back up data – sorry, it is gone. And the
company that generated the bills, Cobrin & Gittes, ceased operation
in April 2002."

The Surrogate of New York County has undoubtedly been presented with unique cases and big estates, but Matter of Eisenberg  2013 NY Slip Op 51713(U)  Decided on October 15, 2013
Sur Ct, New York County  Mella, J. presents some unusual issues.

  Start with an attorney who boldly proclaims her lack of knowledge of wills, trusts and estates law (""Further, I am not an experienced attorney relating to trust and estate matters given its challenges, whereby I am gaining competency as we go because I am required to do so on my own. ""With my full disclosure however, I do want to assure you that I can manage all such issues and its [sic] complexity as that is my specialty overall in practicing law where my skills are unique as a lawyer.")

End with the attorney seeing incompetency everywhere: "  "the record speaks to [sic] itself as to how much Petitioners have worked to make all parties on the record and this Court to understand the law and its duties for proper trust administration. In fact, it ought to be clear to this Court that it is Petitioners who have the greatest understanding of the laws of Trusts and Estates over all other attorneys assigned to these matters. The record speaks for itself that it is this Court who has no understanding of the record and the law over the course these [sic] entire matters . . . If this Court is not prepared to understand each and every legal detail and its implications being said and executed [sic], then this Court should not have ruled upon it to cause more harm. . . No staff has been assigned to understand the record and legal documents that are being ruled on, except for a single court attorney who does not possess enough knowledge to help resolve these matters effectively. . . Yet, Judge Glen ruled in her limited [*14]understanding . . ."
 

Continue to a claim in US District Court which is dismissed in its entirety’ "Finally, in January 2011, Law Offices of Seema Verma PLLC filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging eleven claims against defendants Citigroup, Inc., et al. The March 23, 2011 order of Judge Paul A. Crotty, dismissing the complaint, provides:

"The allegations . . . suggest that Citigroup and related entities have billions of dollars of clients’ assets and they exercise control over law firms, which are only too anxious to cooperate with the bank. The Complaint suggests that the bank controls and directs the New York Attorney General’s office; [sic] and improperly influences the New York County Surrogate’s Court. Finally, the Complaint alleges that as a result of Citigroup’s unlawful practices and conflict of interest relationships, Plaintiff lost her client and has suffered substantial financial losses and hardships (i.e., lost legal fees).

* * * * *
"The gravamen of the Complaint deals with certain actions involving a trust in a litigated Surrogate’s Court proceeding. Plaintiff believes that a large trust affects interstate commerce all by itself. This is quite wrong. While it is not clear how any facet of a proceeding pending before the Surrogate’s Court can be the subject of a monopoly claim under Sherman Act §2, the Complaint is barren of any allegation of a monopoly or any attempt to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states. . .

* * * * *
"Whatever else may be said concerning Plaintiff’s claim that she is entitled to her legal fees for representing a party in a contested Surrogate’s Court proceeding, it does not amount to a plausible anti-trust claim, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
"When the Court advised Plaintiff that she had failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act, and that if Defendants were forced to make a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court would permit a motion for sanctions, the Plaintiff decided to withdraw her Complaint."
 

In the end the attorney is treated quite well by Surrogate’s Court.  "Throughout these proceedings, Seema Verma, Esq., has demonstrated a clear want of understanding. The imposition of sanctions, in the instant case, would advance neither the [*15]punitive nor prophylactic purpose of sanctions.[FN19] Therefore, the court declines to impose costs and sanctions and so denies the motion of Citibank.

V.Ms. Hamada’s Motion for a Determination of the Attorney’s Lien of the Law Officesof Seema Verma PLLC:

Ms. Hamada has moved for a determination of the value of Verma’s attorney’s lien, so that Citibank, as trustee of the revocable trust, may make distributions.[FN20]

Even if the court were to assume, arguendo, that Verma had a right to a

charging lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475, upon her discharge by Ms. Hamada, Verma was limited, at most, to a fee based on quantum meruit for the reasonable value of its services (see Campagnola v Mulholland, 76 NY2d 38, 43-44 [1990]). The court having determined Verma’s SCPA 2110 petition, Ms. Hamada’s motion is moot, and, accordingly, it is dismissed. "

Plaintiff retains attorney to arrange for a tax free gift to her son.  The IRS cutoff for tax free gift v. taxable gift is $1 million.  She did not have a million in cash.  However, she owned a valuable building in Manhattan. So, the law firm selected a Real Estate appraiser and arranged for the transaction.  Problem?  The IRS challenged, and Plaintiff had to pay $ 180,000 in additional tax.  Was the law firm responsible for the mistake of the RE appraiser, or was the appraiser an independent contractor for whom they were not responsible?

Put another way, is this a Kleeman v. Rhinegold problem or not?  There the attorney was responsible for negligent process service.  Here, in Goldstein v Stern Keiser & Panken, LLC
2013 NY Slip Op 32666(U)  October 18, 2013  Supreme Court, New York County  Docket Number: 157177/12  Judge Joan A. Madden decided that the attorneys were not responsible.

From Kleeman : "The most often cited formulation is that a duty will be deemed nondelegable when "`the responsibility is so important to the community that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another’" (id., at 119, quoting Prosser and Keeton, op. cit., at 512). This flexible formula recognizes that the "privilege to farm out [work] has its limits" and that those limits are best defined by reference to the gravity of the public policies that are implicated (5 Harper, James and Gray, Torts § 26.11, at 73 [2d ed]; see also, id., at 76-77).

Viewed in the light of these principles, the duty at issue here — that owed by an attorney to his or her client to exercise care in the service of process — fits squarely and neatly within the category of obligations that the law regards as "nondelegable." Manifestly, when an individual retains an attorney to commence an action, timely and accurate service of process is an integral part of the task that the attorney undertakes (see, 5 Harper, James and Gray, op. cit., at 76-77; cf., Feliberty v Damon, supra, at 120). Furthermore, proper service of process is a particularly critical component of a lawyer’s over-all responsibility for commencing a client’s lawsuit, since a mistake or oversight in this area can deprive the client of his or her day in court regardless of how meritorious the client’s claim may be. Given the central importance of this duty, our State’s attorneys cannot be allowed to evade responsibility for its careful performance by the simple expedient of "farming out" the task to independent contractors.

The existence of an extensive and comprehensive Code of Professional Responsibility that governs the obligations of attorneys to their clients reinforces our conclusion. Under the Code, a lawyer may not "seek, by contract or other means, to 276*276 limit prospectively the lawyer’s individual liability to a client for malpractice" (DR 6-102, 22 NYCRR 1200.31). Moreover, the Code forbids lawyers from "[n]eglect[ing] legal matter[s] entrusted to [them]" (DR 6-101 [A] [3], 22 NYCRR 1200.30 [a] [3]), enjoins them to assist in "secur[ing] and protect[ing] available legal rights" (EC 7-1) and requires them to represent their clients as zealously as the "bounds of the law" permit (Canon 7). All of the latter ethical and disciplinary considerations are implicated when a client’s lawsuit is undermined — or even defeated — as a consequence of carelessness in the service of process.

Our conclusion is also supported by the perceptions of the lay public and the average client, who may reasonably assume that all of the tasks associated with the commencement of an action, including its formal initiation through service of   process, will be performed either by the attorney or someone acting under the attorney’s direction. While it may be a common practice among attorneys to retain outside agencies like Fischer’s to assist them in effecting service, that custom is not necessarily one of which the general public is aware. Even where a client is expressly made aware that a process serving agency will be retained, it is unlikely that the client will understand or appreciate that the process serving agency’s legal status as an "independent contractor" could render the retained attorney immune from liability for the agency’s negligence. Under established principles, the client’s reasonable expectations and beliefs about who will render a particular service are a significant factor in identifying duties that should be deemed to be "nondelegable" (see, Restatement, op. cit., § 429; see also, Feliberty v Damon, supra, at 120).

Finally, we conclude that permitting lawyers to transfer their duty of care to process servers would be contrary to sound public policy. In this State, licensed attorneys have been granted an exclusive franchise to practice law, with the understanding that they have both the specialized knowledge and the character required to represent clients in a competent, diligent and careful manner. Under this system, lawyers are authorized to hold themselves out as being uniquely qualified to manage their clients’ legal affairs, a task that unquestionably includes the commencement of lawsuits. While it is true that the State also licenses nonlawyers to perform certain discrete, law-related tasks such as service of process (see, General Business Law art 8), the existence of that licensing system certainly does not evince a governmental intent to 277*277 relieve attorneys of the responsibilities implicit in their franchise."

From Goldstein:   In the present matter, where there is no allegation that SKP was negligent in choosing JDM, where there is no non-delagable duty, or dangerous condition, the attorney defendants are not liable for JDM’s alleged negligence iri preparing the report.  Plaintiff has made no allegations which would establish that SKP I should be held vicariously liable for JDM’s  mistake. There is no showing that the attorney defendants’ negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, or that "but foru their handling of any duty owed to plaintiff, plaintiff would not have
been injured. Consequently, the attorney defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint is granted."
‘

Plaintiffs inIsaacson v Law Off. of Norman L. Horowitz, LLC    2013 NY Slip Op 32598(U) October 18, 2013;  Supreme Court, New York County;  Docket Number: 112174/2010;  Judge: Joan A. Madden were commercial tennants who became disenchanged with the building after a big burglary.  They had a ‘good guy" guarantee, and attempted to terminate their lease without penalty.  This attempt did not turn out well.  However, Supreme Court held that they could not prove exactly how the landlord would have handled the case, and could not show ascertainable damages.
 

"Upon instruction from defendants, plaintiffs sent the landlord written notice that they were vacating the premises as of July 31, 2009, with a line for the landord to countersign.  The landlord refused to do so, notifying plaintiffs of this fact in a letter to defendants, where the landlord also declined to accept surrender of the lease, and instructed defendants that the landlord would hold plaintiffs to their rent obligations.

Defendants apparently did not inform plaintiffs of this letter and continued to advise plaintiffs to move forward with vacating the premesis.

Plaintiffs retained their present counsel after the decision was rendered. On June 25, 2010, the court entered an order and judgment awarding the landlord $851,618.27 against the tenants,
representing unpaid rent, interest and penalties. An award of $595,235.92 was rendered against the guarantors, under the guaranty. However, plaintiffs’ new counsel eventually negotiated
a settlement of the entire matter for $500,000. In the present action, commenced on September 15, 2010,plaintiffs seek damages against defendants on the ground that, but for defendants’ faulty advice, plaintiffs could have settled with the landlord before vacating the premises, and before the
commencement of any lawsuits, at a much lower figure than the $500,000 settlement amount which was eventually reached. In the present motion, defendants move to dismiss the
complaint, on the ground that plaintiffs cannot prove that they would have fared better in settling the amount had they not heeded defendants’ advice."

"If proximate cause is not established, the action must be dismissed "regardless of whether it is demonstrated that the attorney was negligent." Schwartz v Olshan Grundman Frome & Rosenzweig, 302 AD2d at 198. Moreover, the damages claimed for legal malpractice must be "actual and ascertainable" resulting from the proximate cause of the attorney’s negligence. Ressis v. Wojick, 105 A.D.2d 565, 567 (3d Dept 1984), lv. denied 64 N.Y.2d 609 (1985)

Plaintiffs cannot prove that "but for" defendants’ advice they would have settled for less than $500,000. Specifically, there is no proof available that would show that the landlord would have discounted the rent in any amount, less a  specific amount, such as 41%. Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs’ position any testimony by the landlord’s representative would be insufficient to establish actual and ascertainable damages as he would be speculating as to what the landlord might  have done years earlier."