Reading the decision in a case like this requires both a score card and a play diagram. In LZG Realty LLC v H.D.W. 2005 Forest LLC ;2010 NY Slip Op 50958(U) ;
Supreme Court, Richmond County ; McMahon, J. a series of real estate transactions led to mortgages, foreclosure and charges of professional negligence and fraud.
 

"These actions have been joined for trial and are brought by the first and second mortgagees to foreclose mortgages held against real property owned by defendant H.D.W. 2005 Forest LLC, ("H.D.W.") and guaranteed by defendant Eli Weinstein ("Weinstein"). Defendants Benjamin Hager, Esq. and Mallow Konstam & Hager, P.C. (collectively, the "Hager defendants") allegedly represented the mortgagor and Weinstein at the title closing and at both mortgage closings. "

"In its first claim against the Hager defendants, H.D.W. alleges that "[as] a result of Hager’s negligence . . . H.D.W. is now defending itself in the foreclosure action brought by LZG and Tissa, and the premises has two invalid mortgages placed against them (sic)."

In seeking summary judgment dismissing this claim, the Hager defendants allege that Benjamin Hager never purported to represent either H.D.W. or Wolinetz, and argue that the claim sounds in legal malpractice and therefore must be dismissed as there is no privity between Hager and either H.D.W. or its alleged principal, Wolinetz.[FN6] "

"However denominated, it cannot be gainsaid that the pleadings herein give the Hager defendants notice of the transaction out of which H.D.W.’s claim purports to arise. CPLR 3017 allows the Court to grant "any type of relief… appropriate to the proof whether or not demanded." Here, the third-party complaint sets forth sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and so long as that pleading can be read to embrace the elements of a provable claim, the fact that the pleading theorizes it as something else is immaterial (see e.g. McGinnis v. Bankers Life Co., 39 AD2d 393 [2nd Dept 1972]).

To that extent, so much of the Hager defendants’ motion for summary judgment addressed [*8]to the third-party claim of professional negligence and grounded on the argument that "H.D.W. cannot establish privity, a necessary element in order to prove legal malpractice" is denied. "
 

The art of pleading is sometimes overstated.  Is it sufficient, indeed even preferable, to state the cause of action in understated tone, or is it better to explode with vicious terms?  The jury is still out, but in Carr v Hayes ;2012 NY Slip Op 01184 ;Decided on February 16, 2012 ;Appellate Division, First Department , more was needed than good and strong language.
 

"Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that his ex-wife, Clements, and her divorce attorney, Hayes, who also represented plaintiff in the sale of the couple’s home, defrauded plaintiff out of his share of the proceeds of that sale, are insufficient to state a cause of action sounding in fraud and breach of trust (see CPLR 3016; see generally Pludeman v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 NY3d 486, 492 [2008]). Moreover, plaintiff’s unsupported assertions that all of the documentation regarding the sale of the home, submitted to the court below, was "fraudulent," "false" and "staged," are insufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for fraud, conversion and legal malpractice (see CPLR 3211[a][1]). "

Inscrutable decisions tell us the outcome, but do not enlighten the path to the outcome.  Here are two cases, recently decided by the Second Department in which plaintiff lost a motion for summary judgment in a legal malpractice case.  Why?  What was the shortcoming in proof?  We simply don’t and won’t know.

Verdi v Jacoby & Meyers, LLP ; 2012 NY Slip Op 01243 ; Decided on February 14, 2012 ;
Appellate Division, Second Department  and Schurz v Bodian ;2012 NY Slip Op 01235 ;
Decided on February 14, 2012 ;Appellate Division, Second Department  both tell us:

"The Supreme Court properly, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to its original determination denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, since the defendants failed to make the requisite showing of their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Bells v Foster, 83 AD3d 876; Alizio v Feldman, 82 AD3d 804; Ippolito v McCormack, Damiani, Lowe & Mellon, 265 AD2d 303; Ostriker v Taylor, Atkins & Ostrow, 258 AD2d 572). " and "Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff was unable to prove that she would have prevailed in the underlying action but for the defendants’ alleged negligence (see generally Zelenaya v Rosengarten, 301 AD2d 519, 520). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Levinnstim v Parker, 27 AD3d 698; see also Molina v State of New York, 46 AD3d 642; Williams v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 10 AD3d 653). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320). "

Barely submerged below the decisions of trial and appellate courts is the fear that if legal malpractice litigation is given full rein, there will be a legal malpractice case which immediately follows every trial of any nature.  After all, the one thing that legal malpractice always has are claims of attorney misrepresentation, and every trial has one or more attorneys.  So, in Kleinser v Astarita 2012 NY Slip Op 01130 ;Decided on February 14, 2012 ; Appellate Division, First Department  we see such a situation.  Plaintiff sues and loses a case, and then sues and loses a legal malpractice.
 

"We need not decide the statute of limitations issue, because even if timely commenced, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to his claims of legal malpractice and breach of contract. Plaintiff’s contention that defendants did not place before the trial court in the underlying action the evidence of his ownership interest in the "47BH Account" is unsupported in the record. The trial court in the underlying action expressly found that plaintiff had a 1/3 interest in the 47BH Account. Moreover, the court explained, in detail, that that 1/3 interest entitled plaintiff to recover only $37,108, not the much greater sums he sought. Plaintiff does not argue that the court’s calculation of damages was erroneous or a result of defendants’ negligence. Hence, he failed to show that any negligence on defendants’ part proximately caused him to recover less than he was otherwise entitled to (see Brooks v Lewin, 21 AD3d 731, 734 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 713 [2006]). To the extent plaintiff argues that defendants did not sufficiently emphasize his ownership in the 47BH account, the argument is unavailing, since an insufficient emphasis would be, "at most, a mere error in professional judgment not rising to the level of legal malpractice" (see Geller v Harris, 258 AD2d 421, 421 [1999]; Rubinberg v Walker, 252 AD2d 466, 467 [1998]).
As to his breach of contract claims, plaintiff failed to present evidence establishing the term of his alleged oral agreement with defendant Martin Kaplan whereby Kaplan agreed that defendant Gusrae Kaplan & Bruno would prosecute all appeals from the underlying judgment for no more than $50,000. "
 

Client hires law firm, law firm is said to have made mistakes, law firm is said to have made corrective motions based upon its own mistakes, and then charged client. Law firm sues client, and client answers without filing a counterclaim.

Its not evident from the decision but we guess that client then hired an attorney who seeks to change an affirmative defense to a counterclaim for legal malpractice. in addition, attorney seeks to add an employee of the law firm as a "third party" defendant, and asks for a copy of the file and discovery responses. How does Judge Gische of Supreme Court, New York County decide?

In Wagner Divs, P.C. v Gargano ; 2010 NYSlipOp 30156(U) Justice Gische decides:

a. In a regular case, retaining lien trumps need for file

b. In a case with a legal malpractice counterclaim, need for file trumps law firm’s retaining lien

c. Law firm has to allow photocopying

d. Defendant must pay for the copies

e. Amendment should be, and is, freely granted here.

We’ve noted in the past that legal malpractice cases sometimes have a history of legal malpractice within them. As an example, Moray v Koven & Krause, Esqs. 2010 NY Slip Op 07573 ;Decided on October 26, 2010 ;Court of Appeals ;Read, J. serves well. it involves a legal malpractice case levied against a former attorney who was involved in a real estate transaction gone bad. This case fared badly too, until Judge Read delivered the unanimous decision,
 

"On December 31, 2007, plaintiff Joseph Moray commenced this action for legal malpractice, breach of contract and professional negligence against defendant Koven & Krause, Esqs. by filing a summons with notice, which identified Warren Goodman, Esq. as plaintiff’s attorney. The summons with notice was apparently served on defendant on February 5, 2008.

On February 25, 2008, defendant served Goodman with a notice of appearance [*2]and a demand for a complaint. When the demand did not prompt a response, defendant on April 22, 2008 moved to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3012 (b).

By letter dated May 6, 2008, attorney Preston Leschins informed defendant’s professional liability insurance carrier that his office had been "consulted" by plaintiff "in connection with" plaintiff’s claim "with a view towards substituting for" Goodman. The letter characterized Goodman as plaintiff’s "former counsel" who was "no longer practicing law." Leschins asked for "the opportunity to speak with" the carrier about "resolution [of the matter] in an amicable fashion," and at the carrier’s "earliest convenience." Plaintiff was copied on this letter.

On May 23, 2008 — the motion’s return date — defendant’s counsel had a conversation with Goodman, "who advised that he had been suspended from the practice of law months earlier"; at Goodman’s request, defendant’s counsel agreed to adjourn the motion to dismiss until June 13, 2008. Later that day, he spoke to Leschins, "who confirmed that he had consulted with plaintiff weeks earlier," but "refused to state whether he would be appearing as attorney for plaintiff" in the lawsuit.

On or near the adjourned return date, Goodman — indicating that he was mindful that his license had been "suspended on or about January 24, 2008" and was therefore "being careful not to practice law" — submitted a "factual" affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Styling himself as plaintiff’s "former attorney," Goodman stated that he had "advised [his] former client in writing of [his] situation and told him to get new counsel"; however, he did not say when he did this. Goodman further represented that he "[understood] that [plaintiff had] been diligently pursuing new counsel," but had "not yet retained a new attorney" and was "still continuing to look for a new lawyer."

"On appeal, plaintiff was represented by counsel. His new attorney invoked CPLR 321 (c), which mandates that"[i]f an attorney dies, becomes physically or mentally incapacitated, or is removed, suspended or otherwise becomes disabled at any time before judgment, no further proceeding shall be taken in the action against the party for whom he appeared, without leave of the court, until thirty days after notice to appoint another attorney has been served upon that party either personally or in such manner as the court directs."

On May 12, 2009, the Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s order, concluding that the trial court "did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the action" (62 AD3d 765, 765 [2d Dept 2009]). The court observed that because "plaintiff’s contention that the action was stayed pursuant to CPLR 321 (c) [was] raised for the first time on appeal," it "[was] not properly before [the Appellate Division]." We subsequently granted plaintiff permission to appeal, and now reverse.

The command of CPLR 321 (c) is straightforward: if an attorney becomes disabled, "no further proceeding shall be taken in the action against the party for whom he appeared, without leave of the court, until thirty days after notice to appoint another attorney has been served upon that party either personally or in such manner as the court directs" (emphasis added). As the Practice Commentaries explain, CPLR 321 (c) brings about "an automatic stay of the action," which "goes into effect with respect to the party for whom the [disabled] attorney appeared" (Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR [*4]C321:3, at 183)[FN2]. As a result,

"[d]uring the stay imposed by CPLR 321 (c), no proceedings against the party will have any adverse effect. It lies within the power of the other side to bring the stay to an end by serving a notice on the affected party to appoint new counsel within 30 days . . . If, at the end of the period, the party has failed to obtain new counsel (or elected to proceed pro se), the proceedings may continue against the party" (id.).

The stay is meant to "afford a litigant, who has, through no act or fault of his own, been deprived of the services of his counsel, a reasonable opportunity to obtain new counsel before further proceedings are taken against him in the action" (Hendry v Hilton, 283 App Div 168, 171 [2d Dept 1953] [discussing Civil Practice Act § 240, the predecessor statute to CPLR 321 (c)]).
This lawsuit was automatically stayed by operation of CPLR 321 (c) on January 24, 2008, the date when plaintiff’s attorney was suspended from the practice of law. Defendant never acted to lift the stay by serving a notice upon plaintiff to appoint new counsel within 30 days. Thus, Supreme Court’s order dismissing the action must be vacated (see e.g. Galletta v Siu-Mei Yip, 271 AD2d 486, 486 [2d Dept 2000] ["Since the judgment entered upon the defendants’ default in appearing at trial was obtained without the plaintiff’s compliance with CPLR 321 (c), it must be vacated"]; McGregor v McGregor, 212 AD2d 955, 956 [3d Dept 1995] ["The record reveals no compliance with the leave or notice requirements of CPLR 321 (c). The appropriate remedy for a violation of CPLR 321 (c) is vacatur of the judgment"]). "
 

Attorney represents client in a divorce case and then after a period of time (more than three years) represents client in a life insurance matter.  In Verkowitz v Ursprung ;2012 NY Slip Op 30284(U);
February 2, 2012; Sup Ct, Nassau County; Docket Number: 665/11; Judge: Anthony L. Parga we see the back and forth between an attorney’s suit for fees and the client’s legal malpractice case.  Three cases are started, and at the end of the decision, only one remains, with serious questions over whether there was a retainer agreement, whether there were objections to the billing, and whether the attorney had been hired to do the appeal, or agreed to do it pro-bono.

Here, there are many allegations of wrongdoing.  There is the allegation of failing to disclose the existence of malpractice, failing to advise client of her legal position in the insurance matter, failing to advise the client of how to settle the case, improperly billing the client in order to increase the legal fees, failing to distinguish between the rights and obligations of the client as either a trustee or a beneficiary of a life insurance policy, and failing to advise of a conflict of interest. 

Each suffers, determined the court, from a logical or stated connection with a specific outcome, or in other words, the "but for" portion of the case.  "An attorney’s failure to disclose a conflict of interest and advise her clients to consult with an independent attorney as a result of a purported conflict of interest does not by itself state a legal malpractice cause of action."

At the end of this case, most of the brush cut back, two of three cases dismissed, summary judgment denied, and all are warned of sanctions.

Sometimes a legal malpractice case goes to the jury on the real question of whether plaintiff could have prevailed in the underlying case (the "but for" issue) and sometimes the legal malpractice case is ended at the motion stage.  Here is one that was ended early.

Magidson v Badash ; 2012 NY Slip Op 00935 ; Decided on February 7, 2012 ; Appellate Division, Second Department  is a legal malpractice case in which the underlying matter remains undescribed.  The legal malpractice suffered from infirmities in the underlying case, and failed the "but for" problem. 
 

"The complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice because the plaintiff neglected to plead that she would have prevailed in the underlying action, commenced in the Supreme Court, New York County, but for the defendants’ alleged malpractice in failing to file certain motions and appeal from certain orders issued in that action (see Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442; Kuzmin v Nevsky, 74 AD3d 896, 898; see also Weiner v Hershman & Leicher, 248 AD2d 193).

Moreover, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s cross motion for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendment was patently devoid of merit. The Appellate Division, First Department, concluded that the complaint in the underlying action was properly dismissed because the plaintiff commenced that action after the applicable statute of limitations had expired (see Magidson v Otterman, 57 AD3d 264, 264), and the proposed amendment, which did not include allegations that the defendants committed malpractice by failing to timely commence the underlying action, would not alter that result (see Matter of New York County DES Litig., 89 NY2d 506, 514; Byrd v Manor, 82 AD3d 813, 815).