During the housing run-up there was a frenzied buy-and-sell atmosphere.  Buyers were looking to maximize a purchase with an eye to a large profit.  Not all transactions went well, and as always, when commercial transactions fail, there will have been representation by attorneys, and later claims of attorney malpractice.

Here, in Humbert v Allen ;2011 NY Slip Op 08125 ; Decided on November 9, 2011 ; Appellate Division, Second Department  we see the situation in which buyer deposits downpayment and then applies for a mortgage.Events go down-hill from there.  When they are sued by seller, who wants to retain the downpayment, they third-party their own attorney.

"The defendants third-party plaintiffs, Allison E. Allen and Robert T. Allen (hereinafter together the Allens), entered into a contract to purchase a condominium unit from the plaintiff for a total purchase price of $475,000. Upon signing the contract, the Allens deposited a down payment in the sum of $47,500 into an escrow account managed by the Allens’ lawyer, the defendant Luigi Rosabianca, and his law firm, the third-party defendant Rosabianca & Associates, PLLC (hereinafter together the appellants). The contract of sale contained a mortgage contingency clause that entitled the Allens to a refund of their down payment if they could not secure a commitment for a mortgage loan in the amount of $427,500, after making a good faith and diligent attempt to obtain such a commitment. The Allens proceeded to apply for a mortgage loan in a far greater amount, intending to purchase another condominium unit in addition to the unit owned by the plaintiff. Although the Allens received a "counteroffer" commitment from a bank for a loan in the amount of $846,000, they instructed the appellants to cancel the contract of sale with the plaintiff in accordance with the mortgage contingency clause.

The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the Allens and Rosabianca, alleging breach of contract and seeking to receive and retain the down payment as liquidated damages. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the Allens had violated the terms of the mortgage contingency clause and forfeited their down payment by failing to make a diligent application for a mortgage loan in the amount of $427,500. The Allens asserted, inter alia, a cross claim against Rosabianca and a third-party cause of action against Rosabianca & Associates, PLLC, alleging legal malpractice.

The plaintiff and the Allens ultimately entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which each of them received a portion of the down payment. By stipulation, the plaintiff discontinued her claims against the Allens and Rosabianca. The Allens, however, maintained the aforementioned cross claim and third-party cause of action against the appellants, alleging that they were negligent in failing to tender written notice of cancellation to the plaintiff in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale, that this negligence was a proximate cause of the Allens’ damages, and thus, that the appellants were liable for the portion of the down payment that the Allens forfeited to the plaintiff. "
 

"Here, the Allens did not meet their prima facie burden of establishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the cross claim and the third-party cause of action alleging legal malpractice insofar as asserted against the appellants. They failed to demonstrate that the appellants’ alleged malpractice (the failure to tender written notice of cancellation of the contract of sale) was a proximate cause of their damages (see Bells v Foster, 83 AD3d 876, 877; compare Logalbo v Plishkin, Rubano & Baum, 163 AD2d 511). The Allens did not establish, prima facie, that they would have been entitled to the return of their down payment, but for this alleged malpractice (see Kluczka v Lecci, 63 AD3d 796, 797). As the record indicates, and the Allens do not dispute, they applied for a mortgage loan in an amount far greater than that which was specified under the express terms of the mortgage contingency clause, and they received a "counteroffer" commitment from a lender for a loan in an amount almost double that which they needed to secure pursuant to the terms of the contract of sale. Under these circumstances, the Allens did not have grounds to cancel the contract of sale pursuant to the terms of the mortgage contingency clause (see Post v Mengoni, 198 AD2d 487; Silva v Celella, 153 AD2d 847, 848). Thus, regardless of any malpractice on the part of the appellants in allegedly failing to tender written notice of cancellation, the Allens independently breached the contract of sale and forfeited their down payment to the plaintiff as liquidated damages (see Post v Mengoni, 198 AD2d 487; Silva v Celella, 153 AD2d at 848). "

Macaluso v Pollack , 2010 NYSlipOp 30276(U) , Justice Diamond, Nassau County, presents an interesting story of how a case can get dismissed. Beyond the storyline, the case presents analysis of liability of predecessor/subsequent attorneys, how the dissolution of a partnership affects legal malpractice litigation, what subsequent attorneys can accomplish in the Second Circuit, and potential liability of associate attorneys.

The original attorneys were to represent plaintiff in an employment discrimination case, but negligently failed to follow court orders in US District Court. Eventually, the case was dismissed by the US District Judge, on one particular day in which the attorneys did not appear for a conference. This was apparently the last straw, as there had been many previous late filings, etc. So case is dismissed. Attorneys for plaintiff at that point were a partnership of two attorneys. These attorneys then file an appeal to the Second Circuit, but leave out several essential filings which dooms the appeal.

Plaintiff hires set two of attorneys, who try to fix the appeal, but fail. The appeal is dismissed by the Second Circuit. This firm consists of attorneys and an associate attorney who are sued. Who is at fault? . In the end, first attorneys remain in the case, second attorneys are out, and the associate is out, too.

"On or about September 25 , 2007, the plaintiff then retained defendant Jason R. Corrado, P. C.
and Jason R. Corrado, Esq. (refereed to hereafter collective as Corrado). Plaintiff met with Corrado
at his law office in mid October, 2007. He advised her that the appeal that Pollack failed was defective because she failed to fie Forms C and D. On January 7 2008 she signed another retainer agreement with Corrado. The plaintiff retained Corrado to seek to restore the appeal to the  appellate calendar, reversal of the dismissal of the Federal discrimination case from the trial calendar and restoration to the trial calendar. Plaintiff asserts she paid a retainer of$5 000.00 and neither Corrado nor Rizzuto took any legal action with regard to the appeal. Plaintiff alleges that due to the legal malpractice of defendants law firm, Pollack, Kotler, Corrado and Rizzuto, she suffered the loss of right to litigate and would have prevailed in her underlying sexual harassment and  employment  discrimination case. Moreover she asserts each defendant breached the respective duty owed to her resulting in damages."

"The Corrado defendants argue that the dismissal of the discrimination action was caused solely by the action of defendant Pollack. Corrado asserts a motion to vacate had already been made
and a second motion could not be made while an appeal was already pending. Corrado contends that only where an aggrieved client can establish the presence of "extraordinary circumstances" would there be a chance of prevailing on the appeal and Judge Spatt had expressly ruled that "extraordinary circumstances" were not present.  The two dismissals of plaintiffs lawsuit (at district court and at the appellate level) were the result of the actions of plaintiff s initial counsel, co-defendant Pollack. For almost two years, plaintiff and her prior counsel, co-defendant Pollack failed to provide court-ordered discovery and even failed to appear at court-ordered conferences. Judge Wall, in his lengthy 48 page order concluded that co-defendant Pollack’ s behavior was "undeniably negligent." . Plaintiff appealed Judge Wall’ s order to Judge Spatt who adopted Judge Wall’ s order and reiterated that defendant Pollack was negligent. In so holding, Judge Spatt used language such as "numerous late filings persistent failures  ‘counsel’ s negligence , " irrational and bizarre claims" and "reckless manner Appeals were taken by co-defendant Pollack and once again, co-defendant Pollack failed to file the appropriate forms. The appeal was dismissed. (See Exhibit " , motion-in-chief). In July 2007, plaintiff appealed the Order of Dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by notice filed by Pollack. However, Pollack failed to fie Forms C and D that were required to be filed with the appeal. In October 2007, the Second Circuit issued an order to show cause which provided that the appeal would be dismissed for failing to file Forms C and D. Corrado, who was retained by plaintiff after her case had been dismissed, to try and undo the harm caused by Pollack. The Second Circuit denied the application and as such Corrado was unable to reverse the dismissal of the action caused by Pollack’ s actions. "

Quantum Meruit Claims: Is Interest Mandatory or Discretionary? by Joseph H. Einstein and Jonathan Gardner provides a well written analysis of whether pre-judgment interest is available to attorneys who prevail in a quantum meruit claim for fees.  The cases are all over the board, with differences between the Appellate Divisions and even within each individual Appellate Division.

From the article : "Quantum meruit claims are based on a hybrid of law and equity. There is no express contract between the parties, but one is implied because of the course of dealings between them. The cases are in conflict as to whether interest is mandatory or discretionary and the Court of Appeals has yet to weigh in on the issue. In this era, where cases may be pending for years, substantial dollars are at stake."
 

"Not only is there no consistent jurisprudence resolving this issue to be found in either the state or federal courts, but different panels within the same department have reached different conclusions. Thus, in Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart P.C. v. Albany Steel Inc.,3 the plaintiff law firm sued to recover fees, alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, and account stated. The causes of action based on contract and account stated were dismissed, but a recovery was obtained on the quantum meruit claim. On the issue of interest, the Third Department stated:

Turning to the issue of interest, we reject defendant’s categorization that plaintiff’s claim is "equitable" and, therefore, any award of interest was discretionary (see, CPLR 5001[a]). Plaintiff’s quantum meruit action is essentially an action at law, inasmuch as it seeks money damages in the nature of a breach of contract, "notwithstanding that the rationale underlying such causes of action is fairness and equitable principles in a general rather than legal, sense" (Hudson View II Assocs. v. Gooden, 222 A.D.2d 163, 168, 644 N.Y.S.2d 512). Thus, Supreme Court correctly determined that it was required to award interest (see, CPLR 5001[a]).

Notwithstanding, seven years later in Precision Foundations v. Ives,4 the plaintiff obtained a recovery in quantum meruit for certain work performed on the defendant’s premises. On the issue of interest, without mentioning its prior decision in Ogletree, Deakins, the Third Department stated:

Turning to the Supreme Court’s award of preverdict interest to plaintiff, we note that such awards are discretionary for a quantum meruit claim (see CPLR 5001[a]). Here, as already indicated, plaintiff waited almost four years after having rendered its services to bring this litigation. Under the particular circumstances herein, we do not find a sufficient basis for a discretionary award of preverdict interest on plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim and, accordingly, reverse that award.

No explanation is offered as to why or how the "required" award in the first instance became "discretionary" in the second.

First Department cases also are at odds. In Ash & Miller v. Freedman,5 the court held that "an award of interest would be mandated in an action by an attorney to recover under a retainer agreement or in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of legal services rendered." However, in Hugh O’Kane Elec. Co., LLC v. Master North America Inc.,6 in affirming an award of interest, the court stated: "This is an action for breach of contract and not, as defendant asserts, an action sounding in quantum meruit." This clearly implies that interest on a quantum meruit claim should not be awarded as a matter of right. And in Leroy Callender, P.C. v. Fieldman,7 the court awarded prejudgment interest on a quantum meruit claim from the date payment was demanded, noting that "we find that plaintiff has established its entitlement" thereto, again suggesting a discretionary, not mandatory, approach."
 

One aspect of legal malpractice litigation is the failure to follow developments in the law. Rules change and not keeping up with the changes leads to mistakes, criticism and, later, litigation. The rules for non-party discovery have undergone some changes over the years, and today’s decision is worth reading.

In Kooper v Kooper ; 2010 NY Slip Op 04147 ;Decided on May 11, 2010 ;Appellate Division, Second Department ;Angiolillo, J., J. the Court lays out an arc of procedure for non-party discovery. Prior to 1984 a motion was required. The rule was amended and then in 2002 the rule was amended again to allow for subpoenas instead of motions when seeking documents from a non-party. Now the rule again changes:
 

"Subsequent to Dioguardi, many of our cases involving nonparty discovery continued to hold that "special circumstances" must be shown (see e.g. Katz v Katz, 55 AD3d 680, 683; Moran v McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone, P.C., 31 AD3d 725, 726; Attinello v DeFilippis, 22 AD3d 514, 515; Tannenbaum v Tenenbaum, 8 AD3d 360; Lanzello v Lakritz, 287 AD2d 601; Bostrom v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 285 AD2d 482, 483; Tsachalis v City of Mount Vernon, 262 AD2d 399, 401; Mikinberg v Bronsther, 256 AD2d 501, 502; Matter of Validation Review Assoc. [Berkun- Schimel], 237 AD2d at 615; Wurtzel v Wurtzel, 227 AD2d 548, 549), while many of our most recent cases have avoided the "special circumstances" rubric (see e.g. Cespedes v Kraja, 70 AD3d 622; Step-Murphy, LLC v B & B Bros. Real Estate Corp., 60 AD3d 841, 843-844; Tenore v Tenore, 45 AD3d 571, 571-572; Smith v Moore, 31 AD3d 628, 629; Matter of Lutz v Goldstone, 31 AD3d 449, 450-451; Thorson v New York City Tr. Auth., 305 AD2d 666). In light of its elimination from CPLR 3101(a)(4), we disapprove further application of the "special circumstances" standard in our cases, except with respect to the limited area in which it remains in the statutory language, i.e., with regard to certain discovery from expert witnesses (see CPLR 3101[d][1][iii]). On a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum or for a protective order, in assessing whether the circumstances or reasons for a particular demand warrant discovery from a nonparty, those circumstances and reasons need not be shown to be "special circumstances."

Whether or not our cases have applied the "special circumstances" standard, however, they contain underlying considerations which the courts may appropriately weigh in determining whether discovery from a nonparty is warranted. We look, then, to the reasoning in our cases to find guidance with respect to the circumstances and reasons which we have considered relevant to the inquiry with respect to discovery from a nonparty. Since Dioguardi, this Court has deemed a party’s inability to obtain the requested disclosure from his or her adversary or from independent sources to be a significant factor in determining the propriety of discovery from a nonparty. A motion to quash is, thus, properly granted where the party issuing the subpoena has failed to show that the disclosure sought cannot be obtained from sources other than the nonparty (see Moran v McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone, P.C., 31 AD3d at 726; Tannenbaum v Tenenbaum, 8 AD3d at 360; Lanzello v Lakritz, 287 AD2d at 601; Tsachalis v City of Mount Vernon, 262 AD2d at 401; Matter of Validation Review Assoc. [Berkun-Schimel], 237 AD2d at 615), and properly denied when the party has shown that the evidence cannot be obtained from other sources (see Cespedes v Kraja, 70 AD3d at 722; Tenore v Tenore, 45 AD3d at 571-572; Thorson v New York City Tr. Auth., 305 AD2d at 666; Bostrom v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 285 AD2d at 483). Our cases have not exclusively relied on this consideration, however, and have weighed other circumstances which may be relevant in the context of the particular case in determining [*6]whether discovery from a nonparty is warranted (see Abbadessa v Sprint, 291 AD2d 363 [conflict in statements between the plaintiff and nonparty witness]; Mikinberg v Bronsther, 256 AD2d at 502 [unexplained discontinuance of the action against the witness, formerly a party]; Patterson v St. Francis Ctr. at Knolls, 249 AD2d 457 [previous inconsistencies in the nonparty’s statements]).

We decline, here, to set forth a comprehensive list of circumstances or reasons which would be deemed sufficient to warrant discovery from a nonparty in every case. Circumstances necessarily vary from case to case.

A criminal defendant is convicted and takes an appeal.  He loses.  Criminal defendant makes a CPL 440 motion.  He loses.  Now he finds out that no one seems to have his grand jury indictment.  Is that grounds for a successful appeal?  We don’t know, but in Lee v Pierre
2011 NY Slip Op 32911(U); November 1, 2011; Supreme Court, New York County;Docket Number: 403536/10; Judge: Anil C. Singh was faced with this question, and a motion to dismiss.

Was this a breach of contract or legal malpractice?   Here, the attorney filed an appeal, while the correct act was to file a motion seeking leave to appeal.  The outcome was negative.  Is this grounds for a legal malpractice case?  Justice Singh said no.

"“A cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice requires proof of three elements: (1) that the defendant failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence commonly possessed and exercised by an ordinary member of the legal community, (2) that such negligence was the proximate cause of the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) that, but for the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff would have been successful in the underlying  action” (Cummings v, Donovan, 36 A.D.3d 648, 643 [2d Dept 20071). “Furthermore, to state a cause of action for legal malpractice arising from negligent misrepresentation in a criminal proceeding, the plaintiff must allege his or her innocence or a colorable claim of  innocence of the underlying offense” (u)(se e also Ben-zvi v, Kronish Lieb Weiner & Hellman LLP, 278 A.D.2d 167 [lStD ep’t 20001; Daly v. Peace, 54 A.D.3d 801 {2d Dep’t 20081; Boomer v. Gross, 34 A.D.3d 1096 [3d Dep’t 20061). After careful consideration, the Court finds that the documents exhibited by defendant are sufficient to make out a prima facie case in favor of defendant. The Court finds further that plaintiffs conclusory, self-serving affidavit is insufficient to establish the existence of any genuine issue of material fact or otherwise rebut defendant’s prima facie case."
 

We often wonder whether legal malpractice cases are treated with a type of royal exasperation by judges.  Often the feeling in the air is that legal malpractice cases maybe should not be brought, or that its somewhat shameful to bring one, or that perhaps attorneys are due a little extra consideration.  We wonder if that’s what happened in Burbige v Siben & Ferber ;2011 NY Slip Op 07794 ; Decided on November 1, 2011 ; Appellate Division, Second Department. 
 

Did the judge just want to get this case over with? 

"The plaintiff commenced this legal malpractice action alleging, inter alia, that the defendants were negligent in failing to diligently prosecute a products liability action against the manufacturer of a ladder which broke while the plaintiff was descending it. After the conclusion of opening statements, the defendants’ counsel moved, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for an offer of proof. The trial court reserved decision. However, before the close of the plaintiff’s case, the court granted the defendants’ motion based upon the plaintiff’s failure to make an offer of proof that he would have been successful in the underlying products liability action by offering expert testimony that the ladder from which he fell was defective.

The trial court erred in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law, and dismissing the action before the plaintiff rested (see CPLR 4401; Greenbaum v Hershman, 31 AD3d 607; McGhee v New York City Hous. Auth., 243 AD2d 544; Goldstein v C.W. Post Ctr. of Long Is. Univ., 122 AD2d 196). A motion for judgment as a matter of law is to be made at the close of an opposing party’s case or at any time on the basis of admissions (see CPLR 4401), and the grant of such a motion prior to the close of the opposing party’s case generally will be reversed as premature even if the ultimate success of the opposing party in the action is improbable (see Cass v Broome County Coop. Ins. Co., 94 AD2d 822; see also Canteen v City of White Plains, 165 AD2d 856; Goldstein v C.W. Post Ctr. of Long Is. Univ., 122 AD2d at 197; Page v City of New York, 79 AD2d 573; Cetta v City of New [*2]York, 46 AD2d 762; Budner v Giunta, 16 AD2d 780; cf. Clifford v Sachem Cent. School Dist. at Holbrook, 271 AD2d 470, 470-471). Therefore, the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted to the plaintiff. "

Plaintiff and a buddy go to attorney to start a business. Attorney is retained, and eventually Plaintiff is the odd-person out. Attorney’s retainer agreement names only the buddy, and even though attorney sends letters to both Plaintiff and buddy, and creates documents which plaintiff and buddy sign, it is Buddy who comes out with 75% of the business. Is there a breach of fiduciary duty, and if so, what is the statute of limitations, 3 years or 6?

Some answers are found in Schlissel v Subramanian ;2009 NY Slip Op 52188(U) ; Decided on October 26, 2009 ; Supreme Court, Kings County ; Demarest, J. As to Breach of Fiduciary Duty:
 

""In order to establish a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship, misconduct by the defendant, and damages that were directly caused by the defendant’s misconduct" (Kurtzman v Bergstol, 40 AD3d 588, 590 [2d Dept 2007]).

"An attorney stands in a fiduciary relation to the client" (Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v Moskovitz, 86 NY2d 112, 118 [1995]). As a fiduciary, an attorney "is charged with a high degree of undivided loyalty to his [or her] client" (Matter of Kelly v Greason, 23 NY2d 368, 375 [1968]). "In this case, plaintiff alleges that Van Epps was her attorney, that he unilaterally advanced Wasan’s interests over those of plaintiff, that he prepared certain corporate documents for the purpose of diluting and diminishing plaintiff’s interest in T & T, and that he concealed material information from plaintiff concerning the adverse contents of these documents (Stark Affirmation in support of the Cross Motion, Ex. 2, Proposed Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 46-47). In opposition, Van Epps contends that he was not plaintiff’s attorney and that, in any event, his representation of her had ended by the time she signed the corporate documents.

There is no set of rigid rules that must be followed to form an attorney-client relationship (see McLenithan v McLenithan, 273 AD2d 757, 758 [3d Dept 2000]). It may exist without an explicit retainer agreement or payment of fee (see Tropp v Lumer, 23 AD3d 550, 551 [2d Dept 2005]). "Rather, to establish an attorney-client relationship there must be an explicit undertaking to perform a specific task. In determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship, a court must look to the actions of the parties to ascertain the existence of such a relationship," (id., at 551 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]) [*8]bearing in mind that plaintiff’s unilateral belief does not confer upon her the status of defendant’s client (see Volpe v Canfield, 237 AD2d 282, 283 [2d Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 802 [1997]). "

"Ultimately, the evidence as to the alleged existence of an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and defendant Van Epps is inconclusive, depends on a fact-finder’s [*11]assessment of the parties’ credibility, and thus is outside the scope of the court’s review on a motion to dismiss. Assuming the truth of her affidavits, plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Van Epps represented conflicting interests at the time plaintiff signed the corporate documents (see Shumsky, 96 NY2d at 168). Plaintiff thus adequately alleges the first element of her breach of fiduciary duty claim — the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Furthermore, having alleged misconduct by defendant by his alleged simultaneous representation of adverse interests, and damages directly caused by his misconduct (Proposed Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 47-50), plaintiff adequately pleads the other two elements of her claim. Defendant’s motion seeking dismissal of the breach of a fiduciary duty cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (7) is denied. Defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is also denied inasmuch as defendant’s affidavit and the documents attached thereto do not definitively and "conclusively establish[ ] a defense to the asserted action as a matter of law" (Leon, 84 NY2d at 88); the documentary evidence merely raises numerous issues of fact, rather than finally dispose of them (see Bernstein v Oppenheim & Co., P.C., 160 AD2d 428, 435 [1st Dept 1990]). "

"Defendant contends that plaintiff’s claims against him are in the nature of professional malpractice and, therefore, are barred by the three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 (6), which is applicable to legal malpractice actions. Defendant asserts that by formulating her proposed amended complaint using language such as fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff is attempting to circumvent the three-year limitations period applicable to legal malpractice claims pursuant to CPLR 214 (6) regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort. However, as discussed, plaintiff adequately pleads a distinct cause of action for fraud against Van Epps which goes beyond ordinary malpractice (see Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 453 [1978][finding that an independent cause of action for fraud against a professional may be established when exposure to liability "is not based on errors of professional judgment, but is predicated on proof of the commission of an intentional tort, in this instance, fraud"]; see also Mitschele v Schultz, 36 AD3d 249 [1st Dept 2006]). Defendant’s malpractice argument fails, as the gravamen of plaintiff’s suit is fraud. The motion to dismiss the action is therefore denied. "
 

In Hirsch v Fink ; 2011 NY Slip Op 07699 ; Decided on November 1, 2011 ; Appellate Division, First Department  we see an unusual situation.  Attorney-client sues his own attorney after an attorney-based litigation for legal malpractice.  In this particular case plaintiff-attorney loses on res judicata and subsequent attorney grounds.
 

Subsequent attorney grounds

"As defendant did not represent plaintiff in the underlying accounting action at the time the conditional order of preclusion was issued or in the next 30 days, during which plaintiff was to provide outstanding discovery, he was not responsible for plaintiff’s answer being stricken (see Maksimiak v Schwartzapfel Novick Truhowsky Marcus, P.C., 82 AD3d 652 [2011]). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, his attorney-client relationship with defendant did not continue indefinitely simply because it was not terminated in writing (see Leffler v Mills, 285 AD2d 774, 776-777 [2001]). The record contains no "indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship" between plaintiff and defendant (see Muller v Sturman, 79 AD2d 482, 485 [1981]), particularly where plaintiff engaged another lawyer. Nor could defendant have moved timely, i.e., within 30 days, to reargue the order to permit plaintiff to disregard overly broad discovery requests (see CPLR 2221). "

Res judicata grounds

"To prevail in this legal malpractice action, plaintiff would have to show that but for defendant’s negligence he would have obtained a better result in the underlying accounting action (Barbara King Family Trust v Voluto Ventures LLC, 46 AD3d 423, 424 [2007]). To make that showing, plaintiff would have to litigate the issues of which cases belonged to the alleged partnership between himself and the underlying plaintiff and the fees to which he was entitled. However, those issues were raised and decided against plaintiff in the underlying action (Frankel v Hirsch, 38 AD3d 712 [2007]), where he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them, and he is precluded by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel from re-litigating them in this action (see Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984]). "