Justice Schack’s decision in Taveras v American Tr. Ins. Co.; 2011 NY Slip Op 51831(U) ; decided on October 17, 2011 ;Supreme Court, Kings County ; Schack, J. is an eye-opener.  Basically put, this was a three car accident in which American Transit had two of the cars.  Each of the cars had a $ 100,000 policy.  The entire case could have been settled within policy limits, yet American Transit failed to offer the policies.  The verdict, even after reduction by the Appellate Division was $2.25 million.
 

The decision is well worth reading, as Justice Schack has lovingly quoted from the deposition transcripts and from the trial transcript. The effect is devastating.

One interesting sidelight was the preclusion of expert reports by defendants based upon late production.  We wonder if a legal malpractice case will follow this bad faith case.

"The first time AT weighed the comparative risk to its insured AMIR was on April 26, 2006, after defendants had been precluded from offering the testimony of ELRAC’s experts. (Jay Ellenberg EBT, pp. 86 – 87). AT admitted that it did not have the information necessary to evaluate the relative financial risk to its insured and failed to do so. (Jay Ellenberg EBT, p. 165, p. 169). Mr. Ellenberg testified that based upon the relative exposure of AMIR and AT, AT failed to put itself on equal footing with their insured at the time the damages phase of the trial commenced. (Jay Ellenberg EBT, p. 230)."

"Therefore, based upon applicable case law and AT’s own admissions, AT is estopped from denying that AMIR is its insured. Defendant AT has absolutely no good faith basis to deny AMIR is its insured. It is perfectly clear that AT represented and defended AMIR for nine years. Even after becoming aware, in 2009, of STEED’s death, AT did nothing to disclaim coverage and on a number of occasions admitted that AMIR is its insured. Further, it is disingenuous for AT to claim that it did not know STEED was dead while it actively represented him and assigned defense counsel to him. This is yet another example of AT’s pattern of gross disregard for the interests of its insureds. Obviously, AT would have learned of STEED’s death if AT fulfilled its obligation to communicate with its insureds at any point during the pendency of the underlying action.

Further, defendant AT, in its instant cross-motion, in a deliberate attempt to deceive the Court and harm its insured, AMIR, takes the absurd position that only the $100,000 PLATFORM/SINGH policy existed and was available to TAVERAS’ claim. This is an outrageous mischaracterization of the actual facts and another failure to handle the truth. Defendant AT’s counsel manufactured for the instant cross-motion the fiction that AT’s $100,000 settlement offer during the damages portion of the underlying trial was actually an offer of the entire coverage available. This is false and cannot be countenanced by the Court. The actual record of the underlying trial makes it clear that at no time during the trial did AT ever disclaim coverage for AMIR or limit their settlement discussion to only the $100,000 PLATFORM/SINGH policy. Both AT’s Vice President and Treasurer Richard Carroll and AT’s Claims Examiner Rick Persaud, in their sworn depositions, admit that the $100,000 offer to settle the underlying action, which Mr. Sands, in ¶’s 3 (d) and 26 of his affirmation in support of cross-[*36]motion, asserts was only the $100,000 PLATFORM/ SINGH policy, was in reality an offer of $50,000 each from the STEED/AMIR and the PLATFORM/SINGH policies. (Rick Persaud EBT, pp. 116 – 117; Richard Carroll EBT, p. 162). Accordingly, the $100,000 offered was not the total amount of available coverage. AT offered half of each of the two available policies. This proved to be inadequate, in light of AT’s own evaluation of the risks to its insureds and the economic damages presented in excess of $1,500,000 on behalf of TAVERAS.Therefore, in the absence of triable issues of fact, the Court denies defendant AT’s cross-motion for summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. "

Cases rarely are dismissed by the Court for reasons that have absolutely nothing to do with the merits, almost never sua sponte.  Here is an exception.  This plaintiff was enjoined from bringing any further litigation in either State or Federal court for anything to do with his former apartment.  Nevertheless…

RAFFAELE M. PANDOZY, Ph.D., Plaintiff, – against – DAVID A. GABAY, Defendant.;10 Civ. 3473 (PGG);UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK;2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112303;September 29, 2011, Decided ;September 30, 2011, Filed
 

"Pandozy has been enjoined from "commencing, without prior leave of court, any further federal court actions relating in any way (1) to the sale of his apartment; (2) to the numerous lawsuits concerning the sale of his apartment; or (3) to the individuals and attorneys who were involved in that transaction."1 Pandozy v. Tobey, No. 06 Civ. 12885(CM)(THK), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97901, 2007 WL 2815627, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007); see also Pandozy v. Segan, 518 F. Supp. 2d 550, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (enjoining Pandozy "from commencing, without prior leave of the Court, any federal action in this Court relating in any way to (1) the sale of the [*2] Pandozy’s cooperative apartment at 280 Lafayette Street, New York, New York (the ‘Apartment’) to Brock Wylan, (2) litigation related to the sale of the Apartment or the events surrounding that sale, or (3) the conduct in that transaction by individuals and attorneys involved in the litigation arising from such sale"). Gabay moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because this Court concludes that Pandozy’s complaint falls under the court’s previous injunction against filing such suits without leave, Pandozy’s complaint will be dismissed sua sponte and Gabay’s motion to dismiss will be denied as moot."

"The lawsuits [*3] concerning the sale of Pandozy’s apartment began when he placed his New York apartment up for sale and signed a contract with a buyer. (Am. Cmplt. ¶ 7) Pandozy claimed that the sale was never approved by the cooperative board, and attempted to cancel the contract. (Id.) The buyer sued Pandozy in state court and was awarded specific performance. See Wylan v. Pandozy, No. 600211/04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 27, 2004).

A series of lawsuits followed. Pandozy sued the cooperative and its general counsel, alleging intentional interference with contractual relations and breach of fiduciary duty; that case was dismissed on April 4, 2006. Pandozy v. Lafayette Studios, Index No. 600495/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 4, 2006). The buyer’s attorney, Lawrence Segan, then brought a successful action for libel against Pandozy in Segan v. Pandozy, Index No. 104238/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 2006). Pandozy also filed a federal action challenging the specific performance judgment and alleging fraud upon the court, Pandozy v. Segan, No. 06 CV 7153(VM) (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 18, 2006), which was dismissed on September 28, 2007. Pandozy then filed the action Pandozy v. Tobey, No. 06 Civ. 12885(CM) (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 2, 2006) [*4] , against the cooperative board, alleging conspiracy to harass him and oust him from the Apartment, malicious and frivolous prosecution, and discrimination on the basis of financial status; that action was dismissed on September 25, 2007. Finally, in Pandozy v. Robert J. Gumenick, P.C., No. 07 Civ. 1242(NRB) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 16, 2007), Pandozy asserted claims against five attorneys who represented him in various stages of his litigations, charging them with fraud, legal malpractice, breach of contract, and deceptive practices; this action was dismissed on May 23, 2008.

Gabay represented Pandozy in connection with two of these lawsuits — an appeal from the libel judgment in Segan v. Pandozy, Index No. 104238/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), and the malpractice action against Pandozy’s former attorneys in Pandozy v. Robert J. Gumenick, P.C., No. 07 Civ. 1242(NRB) (S.D.N.Y.). It is clear that both of these actions fall under the broad injunctions issued on September 24, 2007, Tobey, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97901, 2007 WL 2815627, at *1, and September 27, 2007, Segan, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 558. The injunctions apply to actions that relate "in any way" to the sale of Pandozy’s apartment, lawsuits concerning the sale of the [*5] apartment, or the attorneys involved. The libel action was brought by the buyer’s attorney, and Pandozy’s libelous statement was made in a letter he sent to the cooperative’s shareholders that discussed his pending appeals from the specific performance suit and asked the shareholders to submit affidavits to the judge in that action. (Am. Cmplt. Ex. 19) Clearly, the libel action — and the subsequent appeal from it — "relat[e] . . . (1) to the sale of [Pandozy’s] apartment; (2) to the numerous lawsuits concerning the sale of his apartment; [and] (3) to the individuals and attorneys who were involved in that transaction." Tobey, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97901, 2007 WL 2815627, at *1.

Similarly, Gabay’s representation of Pandozy in the legal malpractice action against five of Pandozy’s former attorneys falls squarely within the injunctions. The defendants in that action — Robert Gumenick, Victor Worms, Gary Adelman, Jeffrey Roth, and Sherwood Salvan — represented Pandozy in his previous suits stemming from the sale of his apartment: Gumenick was hired in connection with the specific performance action; both Worms and Adelman represented Pandozy at various points in the specific performance action; Roth represented Pandozy [*6] in the libel suit and the breach of fiduciary duty suit brought against the cooperative; and Salvan was hired to initiate a lawsuit for malpractice against Gumenick. (Am. Cmplt. ¶ 25) Accordingly, Pandozy’s malpractice action against these defendants for their alleged deficiencies in his prior cases involving the apartment "relat[es] . . . to the numerous lawsuits concerning the sale of his apartment . . . [and] to the . . attorneys who were involved in that transaction." Tobey, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97901, 2007 WL 2815627, at *1."
 

Plaintiff-.Attorney in this RICO action sues other attorneys who have brought legal malpractice cases, some against him.  Plaintiff was at one time a major player in the plaintiff’s legal malpractice world.  Now, in W. ROBERT CURTIS, Sc.D., J.D, CURTIS & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Plaintiffs-Appellants, – v – THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID M. BUSHMAN, ESQ., DAVID M. BUSHMAN, Attorney at Law, JANET CALLAGHAN, EILEEN DEGREGORIO, STEVI BROOKS NICHOLS, JEFFREY LEVITT, ESQ., Attorney at Law, HERBERT MONTE LEVY, ESQ., LAW OFFICES OF HERBERT MONTE LEVY, ESQ., JOHN DOE, ESQ., LAW OFFICES OF JOHN DOE, ESQ., JANE DOE, ESQ., LAW OFFICES OF JANE DOE, ESQ  the end of years of litigation appears.

"Plaintiffs-Appellants Curtis & Associates, P.C. and W. Robert Curtis (collectively "Curtis") appeal from a December 17, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Matsumoto, J.) dismissing with prejudice their complaint alleging civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), [*2] 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, denying leave to amend, denying motions to disqualify counsel, and denying sanctions against Curtis. Curtis alleges, in essence, that various of his former clients and those clients’ current counsel committed violations of RICO by bringing "counterfeit" malpractice claims and disputing fees earned by Curtis in his former representation of these clients."

"Curtis and defendants have been involved in numerous state court proceedings stretching back for many years. Curtis alleges that the underlying state court lawsuits between Curtis and defendants were part of the interconnected "schemes" of Defendants-Appellees the Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., David M. Bushman, Attorney at Law, and David M. Bushman, Esq. (collectively "Bushman") "to Defraud Curtis" and "to Obtain Money," 1 J.A. 2377, and that Bushman recruited and controlled Defendants-Appellees Jeffrey Levitt, Esq. and Jeffrey Levitt, Attorney at Law (collectively "Levitt"); Herbert Monte Levy, Esq. and Law Offices of Herbert Monte Levy, Esq. (collectively "Levy"); and Stevi Brooks Nichols ("Nichols") to execute his schemes. Curtis further alleges that in the course of those suits, defendants made, submitted, or suborned the submission to the courts of [*6] various false and misleading statements or evidence. He alleges as predicate acts of mail and wire fraud the transmission of court filings and other case-related communications in the underlying state court lawsuits.
"The alleged "schemes" require the coordination of the defendants: three counsel (Bushman, Levy, and Levitt) and three former Curtis clients (Defendants-Appellees Nichols, Janet Turansky Callaghan ("Turansky"), and Eileen DeGregorio). Levy is conclusorily alleged to have learned of Bushman’s schemes and become Bushman’s "surrogate" and "puppet" in representing DeGregorio and continuing the schemes. J.A. [*8] 2396, 2402. Curtis alleges that Levitt was recruited by and is "under the control of Bushman," id. at 2412, and "upon information and belief," Bushman continued to assist Levitt in "seamlessly implement[ing] the fraudulent schemes devised by Bushman," id. at 2411. With respect to the various clients, Curtis alleges, again "upon information and belief," that Bushman counseled Turansky that she could avoid paying fees owed to Curtis if she terminated Curtis for cause and that Bushman would represent her for "a nominal fee." Id. at 2406. Nichols, who is pro se, is alleged on "information and belief" to have been counseled behind the scenes by Bushman. Id. at 2384, 2415. There is a noted dearth of allegations suggesting that the clients were aware or joined in any sort of fraudulent scheme beyond their own individual cases. As these highlighted allegations indicate, the fraudulent "schemes" boil down to little more than speculative and conclusory allegations that the various defendants and others worked together under Bushman’s direction. There are no facts alleged to support these implausible allegations of an overarching scheme or schemes, nor is a common intent properly pleaded. Because [*9] Curtis has failed to plead a fraudulent scheme with the requisite particularity, we need not reach the issues of additional pleading deficiencies raised by defendants."

is it legal malpractice for an attorney to answer a information subpoena concerning his retainer agreement with a client if the answer does not contain privileged communications?  We will not know the answer to this question from GREGORY P. MORSON, Plaintiff, -against KREINDLER & KREINDLER, LLP, Defendant.09 CV 2994 (DRH)(ARL)UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112310;September 28, 2011, Decided because plaintiff waited too long to bring the action.
 

"Plaintiff’s claims arise out of events that occurred during defendant’s legal [*2] representation of plaintiff (or "Morson") and his sister, Vanessa Morson, (collectively, the "Morsons"), who served as the co-administrators of their mother’s estate. The subject representation involved a 1996 case brought in this District alleging wrongful death against the Libyan government for its involvement in the 1988 bombing of Pan American Airlines flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland (the "Lockerbie action").2 See Morson v. The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, No. 96 CV 2077 (TCP) (E.D.N.Y). In October 2002, a conditional settlement agreement was reached between the parties in that action that relied on the occurrence of three "triggering events," the details of which are not relevant for present purposes. (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 ("56.1 Stmt.") ¶¶ 20-21.) Kreinder & Kreindler LLP represented many of the victims’ families in the Lockerbie action. (Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 11.)

Prior to this conditional settlement, on December 26, 2001, judgment was entered against Morson for approximately $1.7 million in a separate lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 24, 27); See Palazzetti Import/Export, Inc. v. [*3] Morson, No. 98 CV 722 (FM) (S.D.N.Y.)(the "Palazzetti action"). The judgment was later affirmed on appeal at some point in 2002. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 28.) Kreindler & Kreindler LLP did not represent Morson in that action.

In late 2002, Morson and one Sergio Palazzetti began direct settlement negotiations without the aid of counsel regarding payment of the Palazzetti judgment. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 34.) During these talks, Palazzetti indicated that he "would be amenable to settle for $500,000 in cash," as a lump sum, (Deposition of Sergio Palazzetti ("Palazzetti Dep.") at 58-69, D’s Ex. I), though no final agreement was entered into by the two men at that time. (See Deposition of Gregory Morson ("Morson Dep.") at 46-47, D’s Ex. G; see also Palazzetti Dep. at 51 ("The only thing I remember is that when we actually sort of agreed on the 500,000 number.").)

Around that same time, Palazzetti discussed with his attorney, Debra J. Guzov, what Palazzetti had learned primarily through the news media, viz., that Morson was involved in the Lockerbie action, that settlement talks were underway between the parties, and that Morson was potentially entitled to a large payout in that case. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 22, 30; Palazzetti [*4] Dep. at 34-36.) Guzov then served Kreindler & Kreindler LLP with a "Restraining Notice," pursuant to N.Y. CPLR 5222, requesting that the firm complete an attached questionnaire concerning Morson’s current and potential assets. On January 15, 2003, James P. Kreindler ("Kreindler") completed the questionnaire and returned it to Guzov. (Pl’s Ex. 4.) In his response, Kreindler provided the following statement relevant to this suit: "We filed suit arising from the death of Eva I. Morson against Libya in 1996. We have a written settlement agreement which goes into effect when Libya complies with the United Nations requirements. Settlement not less than $5 million nor more than $10 million." (Pl.’s Ex. 5.)

Meanwhile, Palazzetti had informed his "trial counsel," Michael Regan (who had a lien on any judgment in the Palazzetti action), that he had discussed settling the Palazzetti action with Morson for $500,000. According to Palazzetti’s testimony, Regan informed him that he learned from Guzov that the Lockerbie action "would be resolved positively for the Morsons very soon," and that he should not settle for less than the judgment. (Palazzetti Dep. at 58) Shortly thereafter, Palazzetti communicated [*5] to Morson that he would no longer settle the judgment for $500,000. Palazzetti testified that he changed his position because he "was told that [he] could get the whole amount in a fairly short time." (Palazzetti Dep. at 9, 64.)

The Morson’s eventually recovered $10 million from the Lockerbie action (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 32; D’s Ex. L.), and Palazzetti collected the entire amount of his judgment from Morson, (Pl.’s Ex. 7)."
 

"As to the date of accrual of the malpractice claims, New York looks to the date in which the malpractice was committed, while Illinois and Massachusetts consider the date in which the plaintiff discovers his or her injury arising out of such misconduct. McCoy v. Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d 295, 301, 785 N.E.2d 714, 755 N.Y.S.2d 693 (2002) (A claim accrues "when all the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and an injured party can obtain relief in court." (citing Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 84 N.Y.2d 535, 541, 644 N.E.2d 1009, 620 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1994))); Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 N.Y.2d 164, 166, 750 N.E.2d 67, 726 N.Y.S.2d 365 (2001) (citing Glamm v. Allen, 57 N.Y.2d 87, 95, 439 N.E.2d 390, 453 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1982)("What is important is when the malpractice [*17] was committed, not when the client discovered it.")); Hester v. Diaz, 346 Ill. App. 3d 550, 553, 805 N.E.2d 255, 281 Ill. Dec. 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2004)("In Illinois, the statute of limitations for legal malpractice is two years ‘from the time the person bringing the action knew or reasonably should have known of the injury for which damages are sought.’" (citing 735 Ill. Compiled Statutes 5/13-214.3(b))); Lyons v. Nutt, 436 Mass. 244, 247, 763 N.E.2d 1065 (Mass. 2002)("The statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice claim begins to run when a client ‘knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained appreciable harm as a result of the lawyer’s conduct.’" (citing Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 473, 668 N.E.2d 799 (1996))). Here, the purported malpractice was committed by defendant, and the resulting injury was discovered by plaintiff in or around January 15-22, 2003. See discussion supra. Plaintiff’s malpractice claims therefore accrued under the law of all three states during that period."
 

When practitioners in Legal Malpractice stay in the area long enough, older cases they handled come back to save or haunt them. A prime example isDeNatale v Santangelo ; 2009 NY Slip Op 06398 ;; Appellate Division, Second Department . Here the defendant law firm wins dismissal based upon a now well known case. In that case, defendant attorney lost the motion and the appeal, here, based on the same law, defendant attorney wins.
 

The case in common is Barnett v Schwartz ;2007 NY Slip Op 09712 [47 AD3d 197] . Important language there: "The elements to be proved in a legal malpractice action have been subjected to various formulations. Thus, while it is clear that a plaintiff-client must prove negligence (i.e., that the defendant-attorney failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence commonly possessed and exercised by members of the legal community), some cases hold that the negligence must be "the" proximate cause of damages (Britt v Legal Aid Socy., 95 NY2d 443, 446 [2000]; see e.g. Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d 270 [1993]; Caruso, Caruso & Branda, P.C. v Hirsch, 41 AD3d 407 [2007]; Cohen v Wallace & Minchenberg, 39 AD3d 691 [2007]; Cummings v Donovan, 36 AD3d 648 [2007]; Kotzian v McCarthy, 36 AD3d 863 [2007]), while others hold that it must be "a" proximate cause of damages (Bauza v Livington, 40 AD3d 791, 793 [2007]; see e.g. Moran v McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone, P.C., 31 AD3d 725 [2006]; Terio v Spodek, 25 AD3d 781 [2006]; Pistilli v Gandin, 10 AD3d 353 [2004]). There are also cases from this Court requiring the damages to be a "direct result" of the negligence (Caruso, Caruso & Branda, P.C. v Hirsch, 41 AD3d 407, 409 [2007]; Kotzian v McCarthy, 36 AD3d 863 [2007]; Moran v McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone, P.C., 31 AD3d 725 [2006]). In the main, the cases from the Court of Appeals, including the most recent, do not expressly require that the negligence be either "the" or "a" proximate cause of damages, but require proof that, "but for" the negligence of the defendant-attorney, the plaintiff-client would have prevailed in the underlying action (in a classic lawsuit-within-a-lawsuit scenario) or would not have incurred damages (in an action alleging negligent advice, etc.) (see e.g. Leder v Spiegel, 9 NY3d 836 [2007]; Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438 [2007]; AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428 [2007]; Davis v Klein, 88 NY2d 1008 [1996]; Carmel v Lunney, 70 NY2d 169 [1987]). The defendants here, while not expressly describing the difference between proximate and "but for" causation, argue that the latter requires a greater, more direct degree of causation. However, we find no substantive{**47 AD3d at 204} import to the variations in the formulations discussed above, and hold that a plaintiff-client in a legal malpractice action need prove only that the defendant-attorney’s negligence was a proximate cause of damages. "

"Moreover, our reading of the case law does not reveal that a heightened standard for causation is actually being applied in legal malpractice cases. Rather, all results can be explained by application of general principles of proximate cause.""In sum, regardless of the formulation employed, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action need prove only that the defendant-attorney’s negligence was a proximate cause of damages. "

We’ve seen busses cloaked in ads, and we’ve seen big big Times Square building ads, but who knew there was a name for this style of billboarding?  Who knew there would be a legal malpractice angle to it?  We did not, until today. From Law.Com:

"Welcome to the latest round in what might be called the Battle over the Blanketing of Los Angeles.
Municipal authorities have in recent years clashed with a group of sign companies and property owners who defied a local ban on so-called supergraphics—the once-omnipresent multistory advertisement draped along the sides of some of the city’s biggest buildings.
Many of the offending signs began to fall last year after the city scored a decisive victory at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed a federal district court decision striking down the supergraphics ban on First Amendment grounds.
Now, one of the companies that led the supergraphics fight has filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, which represented the company during the litigation battle.
In the suit [PDF], filed Friday in Los Angeles County Superior Court, World Wide Rush and owner Barry Rush claim that Akin Gump committed professional negligence by, among other things, advising the company to put up as many of the controversial signs as possible after the lower court ruling struck down the ban.
As a result of following this advice, the complaint states, World Wide Rush and Barry Rush, personally, were targeted in criminal and civil suits brought by the state of California and the city of Los Angeles.
The complaint further alleges that Akin Gump is responsible for more than 30 other parties connected to World Wide Rush—including contractors and property owners—being targeted in similar suits as part of a campaign that was something of a cause célèbre for current Los Angeles city attorney Carmen Trutanich. (In February 2010, for example, a Hollywood property owner who allowed a supergraphic to be put on his eight-story building was jailed.)
World Wide Rush claims to have racked up more than $1 million in legal fees defending itself and some of its codefendants against the actions initiated by government officials. The complaint also claims that Akin Gump’s advice led to "the demise of WWR."
Citing the firm’s policy of not discussing pending litigation, Akin Gump spokeswoman Kathryn Holmes Johnson declined to comment on the suit. World Wide Rush and Barry Rush are being represented in the suit by Los Angeles–based firm Webb & Beecher, which also declined to comment.
The events leading up to the suit began April 2008. It was then, the complaint states, that World Wide Rush retained Akin Gump at rates of up to $1,050 an hour, in connection with "legal action on behalf of [the company] against the City of Los Angeles."
At that point, World Wide Rush was already embroiled in litigation with the city, having filed a lawsuit challenging the supergraphics ban in January 2007. (The lawsuit was initially filed on behalf of the company by Newport Beach, California–based Paul Fisher, who was later suspended and ultimately disbarred in May 2010 after pleading guilty to several felonies, including having sex with a minor.)
In its suit against Akin Gump, World Wide Rush alleges that the firm’s lawyers "held themselves out…as specializing in advising and directing clients such as [World Wide Rush] with regards to laws, ordinances, zoning, and other regulations of the City of Los Angeles and well-suited to advise [World Wide Rush] as to actions it should take with regard to its supergraphics and signage business in Los Angeles and also with regard to the litigation and scrutiny from the City of Los Angeles."
 

Fighting in the trenches during WW1 was said to be dirty and without any rules.  It often seems that the same situation obtains for third-party litigation between law firms, one of which was responsible for failing to file a mortgage.  Fighting over money is the domain of attorneys, it can be dirty, and seemingly without rules and has been for centuries.

in U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR ASSET BACKED PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-HE1, Plaintiffs, -against- ALAN C. STEIN, ESQ., GASTWIRTH, MIRSKY & STEIN, L.L.P., LAW OFFICE OF ALAN C. STEIN, P.C., ROBERT M. STEINERT and CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. ALAN C. STEIN, ESQ., GASTWIRTH, MIRSKY & STEIN, L.L.P. and LAW OFFICE OF ALAN C. STEIN, P.C., Third-Party Plaintiffs, -against- STEVEN J. BAUM, P.C., and STEVEN J. BAUM, ESQ., Third-Party Defendants. Index No.: 016919/08 we see one law firm pitted against aother.  In this particular round of engagements, one law firm now seeks re-argument after an appeal.
 

"On or about September 11, 2008, the Plaintiff, U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR ASSET BACKED PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-HE1 ("US Bank"), commenced this action against the Stein Defendants for legal malpractice alleging that the Defendants were negligent in failing to properly record a mortgage executed in favor of the Plaintiff on a certain parcel of land located at 112 Irving Avenue, Deer Park, New York (hereinafter "Premises"). The Stein [*3] Defendants subsequently commenced a third-party action against the Baum Firm for contribution alleging that the Baum Firm failed to timely intervene in the action which could have secured the Plaintiff an equitable lien on its incorrectly recorded mortgage. The basis of the Stein Defendants’ claim for contribution is that the Baum Firm was negligent/guilty of malpractice in that it knew or should have known of another mortgage on the same Premises in favor of T&V Construction Corp. (hereinafter the "T&V Mortgage"), and the Baum Firm’s failure to timely intervene in the T&V Mortgage foreclosure proceeding proximately caused damages to the Plaintiff, US Bank."

"The Baum Firm moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a) (7), claiming that there was no basis for a malpractice action since it was retained in a different matter and for a different purpose than were the Stein Defendants. Justice William R. LaMarca, prior to his retirement from the bench, denied the motion to dismiss, relying on Schauer v. Joyce, 54 N.Y.2d 1, 429 N.E.2d 83, 444 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1981) and Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), finding that the third-party complaint validly stated a claim for contribution.2 [*4] (See Short Form Order, LaMarca, J., 12/04/09). In affirming Justice LaMarca’s Order, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that, "[t]he Supreme Court properly determined that the Stein defendants stated [**4] a cause of action against the third-party defendant Steven J. Baum, P.C., by asserting, among other things, that Steven J. Baum, P.C., failed to timely correct the legal errors allegedly committed by the Stein defendants in their representation of the plaintiffs predecessor in interest, despite having sufficient time and an opportunity to do. The third-party complaint alleged sufficient facts which, if true, would establish that Steven J. Baum, P.C., may be liable to the Stein defendants for causing or contributing to the plaintiffs alleged damages"."

"A motion for reargument is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may be granted upon a showing that the court overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts or misapplied any controlling principles of law. Ito v. 324 East 9th Street Corp., 49 A.D.3d 816, 817, 857 N.Y.S.2d 578 (2d Dept. 2008). It is not designed, however, as a vehicle to provide an unsuccessful party with successive opportunities to rehash issues previously decided (Foley v. Roche, 68 A.D.2d 558, 567, 418 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1st Dept. 1979)), or to present arguments different from those originally presented. Giovanniello v. Carolina Wholesale Office Mach. Co., 29 A.D.3d 737, 738, 815 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dept. 2006).

The Court finds that, in rendering its previous decision, all of the arguments raised by the Stein Defendants herein were considered. Stein failed to show that the Court [*9] overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts or misapplied any controlling principles of law. As such, the Court adheres to its original decision and Stein’s motion to reargue is DENIED.
 

"

In this upstate 4th Department grievance/disciplinary case we see the effect an attorney can have on the lives of his clients.  Plaintiffs’ house burns down, and they retain this attorney to represent them.  He waits until the very last day to file, and then allows the case to be dismissed on discovery shortcomings.  The homeowners sue for legal malpractice and Judiciary Law 487, and win on default.  "Respondent did not contest the malpractice action, and a judgment was entered awarding the homeowners compensatory damages in the amount of $226,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $700,180.82. Respondent failed to appear in response to a subpoena for a judgment debtor examination and failed to respond to an order to show cause brought by the homeowners seeking an order finding him in contempt." 

Respondent raised as affirmative defenses and in mitigation of the misconduct that he began suffering from severe depression in 2005, but ignored advice to seek mental health treatment until 2007; that he did not contest the legal malpractice judgment, including the finding of intentional deceit, because he had been advised by a pro bono attorney to allow the homeowners to obtain a default judgment against him to enable them to recover damages from his malpractice insurer and he was unaware that they were seeking treble damages; and that he did not respond to the subsequent judgment debtor subpoena or order to show cause for contempt because he mistakenly believed that an agreement had been reached with the homeowners pursuant to which the default judgment would not be executed against respondent in his individual capacity. "

In determining an appropriate sanction, we have considered respondent’s previously unblemished record during his 22 years of practicing law and his expression of remorse. Respondent, however, has committed serious misconduct that caused harm to his clients. In particular, we have considered that respondent’s neglect of the fire insurance matter and his deceit in trying to conceal that neglect deprived the homeowners of an opportunity to retain new counsel who could have acted in a timely manner to preserve their claim for damages. Accordingly, after consideration of all of the factors in this matter, we conclude that respondent should be suspended for three years and until further order of the Court. "