In Law Offs. of D’amico & Assoc., PLLC v D’Elia ; 2011 NY Slip Op 21160 ; Decided on April 26, 2011 ; Appellate Term, Second Department  attorney (plaintiff) has sued client (defendant) for fees, while at the same time attorney (defendant) is being sued for legal malpractice in Supreme Court by Client (plaintiff.)  What happens to the Civil Court fee suit when the Supreme Court malpractice is dismissed.
The general rules of civil procedure apply.  While there may be application of res judicata and collateral estoppel there is also application of the rule that you may not bring up new arguments in reply.

"While plaintiff, in its initial moving papers, sought to dismiss defendant’s counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and CPLR 3211 (a) (7), it did not, in those papers, seek dismissal based upon res judicata pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), and it implicitly sought dismissal on res judicata grounds, if at all, only by letter to the District Court. New theories and arguments in support of a motion which do not appear in the initial moving papers should not be considered by the motion court (see e.g. Ritt v Lenox Hill Hosp., 182 AD2d 560 [1992] [reply papers should not be used to raise new arguments]). By granting plaintiff relief on the alternative ground implicitly raised by its letter, the District Court relieved plaintiff of its burden of demonstrating in its initial moving papers that the claims asserted against the D’Amico firm in the Supreme Court action were the same as those asserted against it in defendant’s counterclaims in the instant action, and deprived defendant of a meaningful opportunity to contest that issue (see Fergusson v Dumbacher, 21 Misc 3d 145[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52547[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]; Zarintash v Kopple, 5 Misc 3d 130[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51309[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2004]). Accordingly, it was error for the District Court to dismiss defendant’s counterclaims on the alternative ground of res judicata implicitly raised by plaintiff.

In view of the foregoing, the order is reversed, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for a new determination of the branch of plaintiff’s motion seeking to dismiss defendant’s counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and CPLR 3211 (a) (7). This disposition is without prejudice to plaintiff’s seeking dismissal of defendant’s counterclaims on the ground of res judicata upon proper notice. "

Plaintiff lives to fight another day, but is unlikely to win the war.

Legal malpractice litigation is a complicated matter, with the need to prove hypothetical outcomes, requirements for experts, and proofs that things would have come out differently.  It is not for the faint of heart.  Pro-se litigants do poorly here.

In Kovitz v Wenig, Ginsberg, Saltiel & Greene, LLP ;  2011 NY Slip Op 50768(U) ;  Decided on April 26, 2011 ;  Appellate Term, Second Department we see one such unfortunate outcome. "Plaintiff commenced this small claims action seeking to recover $2,000 as a result of defendant’s alleged legal malpractice. At the nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that he had retained defendant to commence an action for illegal eviction "done by lock-out without a warrant." Plaintiff stated that defendant had repeatedly failed to properly serve a necessary party to the action, which had resulted in the dismissal of that action. Plaintiff further asserted that defendant had failed to verify the necessary party’s residence or effectuate service through alternative methods. A partner in defendant’s firm testified that her firm could not properly serve the necessary party because plaintiff had provided the firm with the party’s incorrect addresses, and plaintiff had refused to pay the cost of an investigator to ascertain the party’s actual residence. The partner further contended that, in any event, defendant had failed to prove his damages. The Civil Court found that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice and dismissed the action. "

"The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court’s conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000])." "Since the court’s findings and conclusions are supported by the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (CCA 1804, 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams, 269 AD2d at 126). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed"

LOK PRAKASHAN, LTD. -v.- RALPH A. BERMAN, DAVIDOFF MALITO & HUTCHER, LLP,
No. 09-0136-cv; UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT;2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22988 is an example of the Court’s continued romance with the concept that litigation is an art and not a science.

What is a question of judgment? " "A complaint that essentially alleges either an ‘error of judgment’ or a ‘selection of one among several reasonable courses of action’ fails to state a claim for malpractice." Id.

The District Court concluded that "[b]ecause there is ample evidence in the record that Defendants’ omission of the specified document was a conscious and reasonable decision regarding trial strategy, not negligence, and the omission of the document was not the proximate cause of any loss, Plaintiff has failed to show the elements required to support a claim of legal malpractice." [*4] Order of November 1, 2005. We agree and, substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its well-reasoned orders of November 1, 2005 and December 12, 2008, find plaintiff’s arguments to be without merit."
 

We are often struck by the human element and how it interacts with the institutional element of litigation.  Schedules are packed, attorneys have many cases, court dates go unrecorded, attorneys just don’t show up for conferences, and yet the cases go on.  We believe that even in a successful case for one side or the other, a detailed inspection of the file or the record will demonstrate multiple mistakes by the winner.  In other words, there are often departures without proximity.

Even in legal malpractice litigation, where the stakes are at least conceptually raised, mistakes happen.  Here, in Hudson v Gouldbourne ; 2011 NY Slip Op 03548 ; Decided on April 26, 2011
Appellate Division, Second Department  we see a default, a motion for a default judgment, a judgment and now, a sanction. 

"An order relieving a party from a default may be conditioned on payment of a monetary sanction pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) (see Gissaro v Lessne, 300 AD2d 281, 282; Du Jour v DeJean, 247 AD2d 370, 371; Workman v Amato, 231 AD2d 627, 628; Coven v Trust Co. of N.J., 225 AD2d 576; Sasson v Sasson, 134 AD2d 491). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction in the sum of $3,000 as a condition to granting the defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment against her on the issue of liability. "

The hiring and firing of attorneys (or their reaction to being fired) is its own field of law.  Collection of legal fees and arguments over whether the client got good value for the monies paid is a constant meme in legal malpractice.

Good cause for termination is not the same as malpractice. Attorney malpractice, the deviation from good and accepted practice, which proximately damaged the party, in which, but for the negligence of the attorney there would have been a different or better result is not the same as good cause for termination. Termination for cause has arisen in many situations in which malpractice was not even discussed, much less claimed. Substantial delays in prosecuting the case, failure timely to obtain medical records, failure to retain an employment [which] contravenes specific legal requirements is sufficient, abandonment of a case, a conflict of interest, a refusal personally to try a case, a failure to disclose a settlement offer, are all examples of misconduct which does not amount to malpractice.

The difference flows logically from the question of damages. In malpractice there is a positive claim for damages, over and above fee considerations from the attorneys; in the question of termination for cause, there can be but a reduction of the fees paid, but no positive claim for damages. As one might expect, the burden of proof for malpractice requires much more than the burden of proof to decide between "good cause" and "no cause."
 

In this medical malpractice case (first cousin to legal malpractice) Judge Lobis of Supreme Court, New York County discusses how a seemingly good defendant’s Motion for Summary judgment fails and why battling about the Note of Issue was a waste of everyone’s time.

DeSantis v Zito  ; 2011 NY Slip Op 31059(U)  ; April 24, 2011;  Supreme Court, New York County
Docket Number: 109753/09;  Judge: Joan B. Lobis is a case about what might seem to be an obvious case of medical malpractice.  Doctor is performing a procedure for the prostate, and perforates the bladder.  Lifelong consequences ensue.  Doctor and facility are sued.  Is facility at fault?  Not yet.

"The Moving Defendants failed to meet their initial burden in demonstrating that they art entitled to summary judgment. Their expert’s affidavit was highly conclusory, failed to identify any standard of care, and failed to point to anything in the records to back up his vague statements that the Moving Defendants’ staff acted appropriately at all times. Additionally, the Moving Defendants’ papers were deficient in that they failed to annex any of Mr. DeSantis’ medical records to their motion, even though Dr. Waldbaum maintains that he reviewed and relied on those records in forming his opinion. Moreover, neither counsel for the Moving Defendants nor their expert addresses plaintiffs’ separate claims sounding in negligent hiring and supervision, lack of informed consent, or vicarious liability for the acts of Dr. Zito. As the movants failed to meet their initial burden, the court need not reach the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ opposition papers. Summary judgment is denied."
 

Plaintiff filed a note of issue during motion practice.  Does this merit a sanction?  Not yet.

"Given the fact that no one disputes that Dr. Zito was timely served with a copy of the note of issue, the court is not convinced, at this point, that plaintiffs’ alleged failure to serve the Moving defendants with a copy of the note of issue amounts to anything more than law office failure on the part of plaintiff "

Justice Judith Gische of Supreme Court, New York County presents a primer on attorney fee litigation and the disposition of counterclaims for legal malpractice in Hurley v. Bulah Church of God in Christ Jesus, Inc.  In this case the Church had gone through some hard times.  A pastor was accused of financial wrongdoing, and the Church was in Bankruptcy Court for taxes and other debts.  Attorney was retained, and worked on the case in what turns out to be an admirable fashion.  When the Bankruptcy was winding up, leadership of the Church changed, and he was no longer so admired there.  Effect?  The Bankruptcy court approved fees, and he was paid.  Nevertheless, there were post-discharge work and fees, and this dispute in state court followed.

Read for the excellent description of why and how an attorney is due fees. "an attorney who is discharged by a client for cause has no right to compensation or a retaining lien, notwithstanding a specific retainer agreement.  Teichner by Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, Inc., 64 NY2d 977 (1985).    On this motion plaintiff has successfully established that he: 1) owed unpaid legal fees; 2) was not discharged for cause, but withdraw as counsel with court approval; 3) deposited money into his attorney escrow account to be applied to post closing matters, like distribution of money to creditors, etc; and 4) Deacon Roberts was authorized to attend to the church’s financial matters with respect to the reorganization.  Thus, plaintiff has proved he is owed unpaid legal fees and other fees."

 ENGLAND and MIDWEST GEMS, INC., -against- . FELDMAN and FELDMAN LAW GROUP, Defendants.11 Civ. 1396 (CM) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK;  2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36382;  March 28, 2011, is as good a primer in the general and substantive laws of legal malpractice as one might read.  There, Judge McMahon tells us:

"Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action alleges a legal malpractice claim against Defendants. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts tending to show that Defendants were negligent or that Defendants caused Plaintiffs harm. Yes, they have."

"Thus, a plaintiff "must . . . establish[] that the attorney failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and diligence commonly possessed and exercised by a member of the legal community." Stokes v. Lusker, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23471, 2009 WL 612336, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2009) (quoting Hatfield v. Herz, 109 F. Supp. 2d 174, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).

"To [*10] establish the elements of proximate cause and actual damages for a claim of legal malpractice, the plaintiff must show that ‘but for the attorney’s negligence, what would have been a favorable outcome was an unfavorable outcome.’" Stonewell Corp., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (quoting Zarin v. Reid & Priest, 184 A.D.2d 385, 585 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)). "The failure to establish proximate cause requires dismissal of the legal malpractice action, regardless of whether it is demonstrated that the attorney was negligent." Schwartz v. Olshan Grundman Frome & Rosenzweig, 302 A.D.2d 193, 753 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
 

Plaintiffs allege facts tending to show that Feldman’s conduct in the Underlying Lawsuit fell below the standard of care and diligence commonly possessed by other members of the bar. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allege that Feldman’s negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ damages—specifically, the loss of certain trademark rights in the "Iceman" mark (Compl. ¶ 47), the inability to assert valid cross-claims and third-party claims against other parties (id. ¶ 40), and the payment of unnecessary legal fees (id. ¶ 47). Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to plead a claim for legal malpractice in New York as they allege facts tending to show attorney negligence by Defendants and that Defendants’ negligence is the proximate cause of the damage Plaintiffs’ suffered.

Under New York law, where a claim for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, or failure to disclose a conflict of interest are premised on the same facts and seek the identical relief as a claim for legal malpractice, these claims are "redundant and should be dismissed." Nordwind, 584 F.3d at 432-33 (quotation marks omitted); accord Amadasu v. Ngati, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19654, 2006 WL 842456, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2006) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, negligent performance, and gross negligence as duplicative). Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arise from the same facts as the legal malpractice claim in and do not allege any distinct damages other than the damages suffered as a result of the legal malpractice. See Financial Services Vehicle Trust v. Saad, 72 A.D.3d 1019, 900 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); [*14] see also Joyce v. Thompson Wigdor & Gilly LLP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43210, 2008 WL 2329227, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2008) (citing Norwind v. Rowland, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75764, 2007 WL 2962350, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2007)) (breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract).

Accordingly, Counts Two and Three are dismissed as duplicative of the legal malpractice claim."