Plaintiff says that this is not a legal malpractice case, but it is the death knell of a well known and long lived law firm in New York City.  150 Broadway N.Y. Assoc., L.P. v Shandell ;2011 NY Slip Op 30009(U); January 3, 2011; Supreme Court, New York County; Docket Number: 601950/09; Judge: Judith J. Gische discusses the story of what happens when a law firm closes.

"Plaintiff was the landlord for Shandell Blitz Blitz & Bookgon, LLP (SBSSB) which later became known as Shandell Blitz Blitz & Ashley, LLP (“Shandell Ashley”). Eventually the firm fell into arrears on its rent and plaintiff brought a nonpayment proceeding against SBB&B. Plaintiff obtained a money judgment against SBB&B for $257,378.72. The action at bar seeks to enforce the judgment the attorneys who personally guaranteed SBB&B’s obligations under the lease."

"Plaintiff has asserted a claim for “an accounting of prior monies received” against Shenwick, based on claims that Shenwick and Berenson (the CPA) “received various monies and properties belonging to [SBBSB and/or Shandell Ashley] without accounting” and that Berenson and or Shenwick distributed the funds “arbitrarily, unreasonably and capriciously to the detriment and harm of the Plaintiff.” Stating that it has only received a single payment of $5,000 payment, plaintiff states that it is entitled to a “pro-rata distribution of all the monies collected to date by Berenson and Shenwick”

"Plaintiff does not squarely identify its claim against Shenwick as being for circumstances, an attorney is not liable to third parties for caused by professional negligence (Ch ipello v. Nixon Harqrave et al., 15 AD3d 894 [4* Dept 20051). Furthermore, unless the attorney placed his or her own interests above that of his or fiduciary, the attorney is not liable for breach of fiduciary duty to a third party with whom s/he is not in privity (Chinello v. Nixon Harqrave et a I,, supra). Breach of Fiduciary Duty, on the other hand, is a tort. In deciding whether there is a fiduciary relationship, the a court will look to see “whether a party reposed confidence in another and reasonably relied on the other’s superior expertise or knowledge” (Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 241 A.D.2d 114, 12 [I9981 ). It is unrefuted that Shenwick was hired to assist Shandell Ashley in winding up its affairs and the partnership was his client (see Gaillard Realtv v. Man hattan Brass,  38 AD 84 [Ist Dept 1991). This is clearly stated in the Notice of Dissolution that -Shandell Ashley sent to plaintiff and other creditors. The Notice identifies Berenson as the liquidating agent and Shenwick’s firm as the par ,,iership’s attorneys. All of Shenwick’s interaction with plaintiff was as an attorney with the law firm acting on behalf of Shandlel Ashley. Even assuming Shenwick answered any of the liquidation agent’s legal inquiries, Shenwick provided such advice, direction, etc., on behalf of his client, Shandell Ashley, not for the particular benefit of the plaintiff or any other creditor. There is no claim by plaintiff that Shenwick acted out of self interest (Chinello v. Nixon Hargreve et al., supra).
Any claim by plaintiff that it had a fiduciary relationship with Shenwick is without any factual basis, since Shenwick and plaintiff did not have a relationship based upon confidence."

There are conflicting rules in the 4 departments of New York. In legal malpractice, it is plaintiff’s obligation to demonstrate that a hypothetical judgment could be collected in a legal malpractice case in the 2d, 3d and 4th departments. In the First Department, it is an affirmitive defense for defendant to prove.

Here is a procedural case from the 4th Department on the issue. Williams v Kublick
2007 NY Slip Op 04932 Decided on June 8, 2007 Appellate Division, Fourth Department .

"We conclude that Supreme Court erred in granting defendants’ motion, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. In granting the motion, the court determined, inter alia, that defendants established as a matter of law that plaintiff is unable to prove that defendants’ [*2]negligence is a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages (see Robbins v Harris Beach & Wilcox, 291 AD2d 797, 798). That was error."

"A necessary element of a cause of action for legal malpractice is the collectibility of the damages in the underlying action (see McKenna v Forsyth & Forsyth, 280 AD2d 79, 82-83, lv denied 96 NY2d 720; cf. Lindenman v Kreitzer, 7 AD3d 830, 835). Here, regardless of whether the value of the property was improperly considered by the experts, we conclude that the otherwise conflicting opinions of the experts concerning the value of the assets of the joint venture precluded the court from determining as a matter of law that defendants established that plaintiff is unable to prove that he could collect damages in the underlying lawsuits (see generally Simmons v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16 AD3d 1117; Herzog v Schroeder, 9 AD3d 669, 670)."

The Curtis law firm bills itself as "the only law firm[s] in the United States" to concentrate their practice on "representing clients injured by attorneys."   In this US District Court case we see legal malpractice attorneys suing legal malpractice attorneys under a very unconventional theory of law.

CURTIS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. and W. ROBERT CURTIS, Sc.D., J.D., Plaintiffs, – against – THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID M. BUSHMAN, ESQ.; DAVID M. BUSHMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW; DAVID M. BUSHMAN, ESQ.; JANET TURANSKY CALLAGHAN; STEVI BROOKS NICHOLS; JEFFREY LEVITT, ESQ.; JEFFREY LEVITT, ATTORNEY AT LAW; HERBERT MONTE LEVY, ESQ.; LAW OFFICES OF HERBERT MONTE LEVY, ESQ.; JOHN DOE, ESQ.; LAW OFFICES OF JOHN DOE, ESQ.; JANE DOE, ESQ.; LAW OFFICES OF JANE DOE, ESQ.; and EILEEN DEGREGROIO,

Its a 43 page decision, but we’ll try to cut to the chase here. "This understanding — that the alleged RICO predicate acts are no more than "litigation activities" alone — brings into focus plaintiffs’ rather striking theory of the case. Plaintiffs essentially allege that any client with the impudence to contest the Curtis Law Firm’s legal fees, and further, to litigate in court that client’s obligation to pay those fees or challenge through a malpractice action the professional conduct of the Curtis Law Firm, and any attorney who represents such a client, is a racketeer and liable for treble damages. The gravamen of the Complaint is thus that defendants’ have violated RICO by defending against plaintiffs’ fee claims or initiating malpractice [*44] actions against plaintiffs and thereby forcing plaintiffs to litigate allegedly "phony" and "frivolous" lawsuits in state court. This theory cannot withstand a motion to dismiss because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

First, persuasive authority in this and other jurisdictions suggests that the litigation activities alleged in this Complaint cannot properly form the basis for RICO predicate acts. See, e.g., Gunn v. Palmieri, No. 87-cv-1418, 1989 WL 119519, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1989), aff’d, 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1049, 111 S. Ct. 758, 112 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1991) (rejecting "untenable" interpretation of RICO which would permit litigation activities to be construed as RICO predicate acts). Thus, on similar facts, a number of courts have found that allegations such as those here more properly may be classified as claims sounding in abuse of process 21 or malicious prosecution. 22 See, e.g., Daddona v. Gaudio, 156 F. Supp. 2d 153, 162 (D. Conn. 2000) (finding allegations "at best amount to vague abuse of process or malicious prosecution claims" where complaint lists "a [*45] variety of ‘predicate acts,’ all of which involve the filing of complaints and other legal documents"); Nakahara v. Bal, No. 97-cv-2027, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 825, at *20-21, *27 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1998) (finding that plaintiffs’ mail and wire fraud claims are at most "a potential yet still inchoate claim for malicious prosecution or abuse of process" where "the gravamen of [plaintiffs’] Complaint . . . is patently directed at [the defendant’s] filing of, or participation in, the various legal actions pending against [plaintiffs]"); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 657 F. Supp. 1134, 1140-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that the "essence of the stated [fraud] claim" sounds in malicious prosecution where plaintiffs’ allegations "closely parallel[ed] the elements of malicious prosecution claim).
 

Further, and even more compelling than the persuasive authority discussed above, plaintiffs’ claims must be rejected because finding otherwise – and allowing malicious prosecution claims such as those attempted to be alleged here to suffice as RICO predicate acts – would lead to absurd results. First, if routine litigation activities such as defending against a fee claim or prosecuting a malpractice action against a former attorney is a violation of RICO, then almost every state or federal action could lead to corollary federal RICO actions. See Kashelkar v. Rubin & Rothman, 97 F. Supp. 2d 383, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Garden-variety pleading errors and the filing of routine motions do not constitute RICO predicate acts. To hold otherwise would turn every state court lawsuit into a predicate for a subsequent federal RICO action."). Plaintiffs’ interpretation of RICO is untenable and would result in the inundation of federal courts with civil RICO [*50] actions that could potentially subsume all other state and federal litigation in an endless cycle where any victorious litigant immediately sues opponents for RICO violations. See, e.g., Gunn, 1989 WL 119519, at *1 ("If serving and filing an answer or a motion by any defendant . . . could be considered . . . [a RICO predicate act], this Court would be flooded with motions to amend complaints by plaintiffs seeking to add RICO claims based upon mail fraud and obstruction of justice as soon as an answer was served. Such an interpretation of the RICO statute is untenable."

Leviton Manufacturing is a huge manufacturer of electrical and electronic items, and regularly patents new inventions.  Here, in LEVITON MFG. CO., INC.,  -against- GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP, et al.,09 Civ. 8083  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,  2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12884;9  ( December 6, 2010)  Magistrate Judge Katz decides whether successor attorneys may be questioned about attorney-client conversations.
 

"The attorney-client privilege affords confidentiality to communications among clients and their attorneys for the purpose of seeking and rendering an opinion on law or legal services, or assistance in some legal proceeding, so long as the communications were intended to be, and were in fact, kept confidential."

"The attorney-client privilege may be waived. Although Defendants’ rely primarily upon federal law in arguing the issue of waiver, Leviton correctly argues that it is New York law that provides the [*7] law of decision for Leviton’s claim of legal malpractice. See Chin v. Rogoff & Co., P.C., No. 05 Civ. 8360 (NRB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38735, 2008 WL 2073934, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2008) ("when a discovery dispute involves an attorney-client relationship with a New York attorney, New York privilege law applies"). Nevertheless, the parties cite both New York and federal law in support of their positions, and appear to hold the view that there is no material difference in New York and federal law on this issue. (See Pl.’s Br. at 2.)

Under Second Circuit law, waiver of attorney-client privilege may occur,when a client testifies concerning portions of the attorney-client communication, . . . when a client places the attorney-client relationship directly at issue, . . . and when a client asserts reliance on an attorney’s advice as an element of a claim or defense.
    In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Sedco Int’l S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982)). Courts have recognized that a party need not explicitly rely upon advice of counsel to implicate privileged communications. Instead, advice of counsel may be placed in issue where, for example, a party’s state of mind, such as his [*8] good faith belief in the lawfulness of his conduct, is relied upon in support of a claim of defense. Because legal advice that a party received may well demonstrate the falsity of its claim of good faith belief, waiver in these instances arises as a matter of fairness, that is, it would be unfair to allow a party to "use[] an assertion of fact to influence the decisionmaker while denying its adversary access to privileged material potentially capable of rebutting the assertion." John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 306 (2d Cir. 2003); accord County of Erie, 546 F.3d at 229; see also Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292; von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 103; Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. and Indem. Ass’n v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 232 F.R.D. 191, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

As the Second Circuit has cautioned, however, determinations of fairness must be decided on a case-by-case basis, in the specific context in which the privilege has been asserted, rather than on the basis of generalizations. See John Doe, 350 F.3d at 302. Moreover, in the Erie decision, the Second Circuit reined in what it perceived to be an overbroad invocation of the fairness doctrine, based on principles set forth in Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975). [*9] Under the Hearn standard, an implied waiver or forfeiture of privilege would be found if:
(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit by the asserting party; (2) through the affirmative act, the asserting party has put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) the application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to the defense.
Id. at 581. In Erie, the Second Circuit concluded that simply because privileged information is relevant to a claim or defense in the case does not give rise to an implied waiver; rather, to forfeit privilege, "the party must rely on privileged advice from his counsel to make his claim or defense." Erie, 546 F.3d at 229. The court declined, however, to specify what degree of reliance is required."
 

Egnotovich v. Katten Muchin Zavis & Roseman LLP, 604101/06 , Decided January 23, 2008 ,Justice Bernard J. Fried  NEW YORK COUNTY ,Supreme Court Plaintiffs joined a vacation club in which they each deposited $ 400,000, and the group was to purchase or lease apartments or houses in prime vacatiion spots. These spots included Paris, Mexico, Teluride, and other hot spots. More than $1.6 million was collected, and the Katten law firm drafted escrow agreements in which it was to hold 80% of the collections and pay them out when the club gave the law firm vouchers. The money was collected and paid out.

For reasons unstated [bad locations? no houses actually available?] some of the members sue the law firm for fraud and escrow violations. "Plaintiffs are former founding members of nonparty Havens, Inc. (Havens), a resort destination club in the business of acquiring vacation properties to be used by the club members. Funding for these property acquisitions was to be generated principally through the financial contributions of the founding members. To become founding members, plaintiffs were required to sign a membership agreement, and to pay $150,000 in membership dues. A portion of the membership dues was to be held as a deposit in escrow. Defendant Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, sued here as Katten Muchin Zavis & Roseman LLP (Katten), acted as escrow agent for the escrow account. In 2006, Havens failed as a going concern, and is now apparently without funds to pay damages suffered by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought this action against Katten seeking return of their deposits, and alleging wrongful release of escrowed funds and furtherance of fraud by the club’s sponsors. Katten now moves for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint1 on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action, and is contradicted by clear and unambiguous documentary evidence.

For the reasons set forth below, Katten’s motion is granted. "

"absolutely secured were not collateral to the Membership Documents (see e.g. Martian Entertainment , LLC v. Harris, 12 Misc 3d 1190[A], * 5 [representations underlying fraudulent inducement claim must be "collateral to the contract"]). To the contrary, the degree of security backing the Deposits is expressly provided by the Certificates (see Certificate, ¶1 [the membership deposits are subject to refund 30 years from the date of the Certificate and "pursuant to and subject to the terms and conditions of the Membership Agreement and the Membership Plan]"; id., ¶2 [the refund right "is backed by and subject to the availability of the assets of (Havens)"]). Indeed, it is plaintiffs’ own position that each of the Membership Documents "discusses Deposits and their use and repayment . . . and thereby implicates use of an escrow" (Pls Facts, ¶¶2, 4, 6). An issue "central" to a contract cannot be construed as collateral to that contract (PSI Intl., Inc. v. Ottimo, 272 AD2d 279 [1st Dept 2000]).

Moreover, even fraudulent inducement requires "misrepresentations of present Facts (rather than merely of future intent)" (Martian Entertainment, LLC v. Harris, 12 Misc 3d 1190[A], * 5). Plaintiffs allege that Havens promised that "deposits would be handled in a specified way," that they "would be held in escrow . . . for the protection and benefit of the Founding Members," and that "[Founding Members] would be protected by the continuing existence of cash on deposit or real estate available to fund repayment if the venture failed" (Opp Br., at 24, 25 [emphasis added]; Egnotovich Aff., ¶6 [emphasis added]; see also Loeb Aff., ¶¶4-5). To the extent, if any, that these representations made by Havens are untrue, they are broken promises, and not fraudulent statements of fact (see e.g. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP v. IBuyDigitial.com, Inc., 14 Misc 3d 1224[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50149[U], *7 [Sup Ct, NY County 2007] [dismissing counterclaim that plaintiff "fraudulently induced (defendant) into entering the engagement letter by stating that (plaintiff) would be personally involved in handling the IPO, that the fees would be capped at $425,000, that the IPO would be consummated by March 2005 and that the legal fees charged would be limited to work on the IPO"] [emphasis added]; Ullmann v. Norma Kamali, Inc., 207 AD2d 691, 692-693 [1st Dept 1994] ["cause of action for fraud does not arise" based on "failure to perform promises of future acts"] [citation omitted]).

Consequently, the aiding and abetting fraud claim must be dismissed."
 

On Appeal:

" Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, the "Punta Esmeralda" development agreement was an authorized purpose because it constituted a binding contract. It contained an exchange of promises and "all of the essential terms of the contract" (Conopco, Inc. v Wathne Ltd., 190 AD2d 587, 588 [1993]). Accordingly, the escrow agreement authorized those disbursements. Moreover, the escrow agent properly disbursed some escrowed funds before the parties had fully satisfied their obligations under the Punta Esmeralda agreement or other payment triggers had occurred (see e.g. Roan/Meyers Assoc., L.P. v CT Holdings, Inc., 26 AD3d 295, 296 [2006]), since the escrow agreement required that defendant disburse "the amount evidenced by such agreements" for "contractually committed expenditures."

The economy stalls, the stock market falls, big investment schemes become exposed, and huge real estate projects run into problems.  This weekend’sNY Times discussed how big name real estate players can run into problems, but it is the investors who lose the money.  Here, in GSO RE Onshore LLC v Sapir ;2010 NY Slip Op 52138(U) ;Decided on November 24, 2010 ;Supreme Court, New York County ; Fried, J.  we see how one of the big players got into some problems.
 

"On October 24, 2006, GSO, as lender, and SDS William Street Mezz LLC (SDS), as borrower, entered into an agreement under which GSO would loan SDS a principal amount of up to $65.5 million, at an interest rate of 18% per year. SDS sought the loan to fund the development and construction of a building of condominium apartments, with ancillary parking [*2]and retail, at 15 William Street, New York, New York (the Project). The loan was evidenced by an October 24, 2006 note made by SDS to the order of GSO, obligating SDS to pay GSO the principal sum of $58 million, plus interest. "

"As a condition for making the loan, GSO required that it be personally guaranteed by someone with the ability to repay it in the event of SDS’s default. SDS offered Sapir, an investor in the Project, as the guarantor. On October 24, 2006, Sapir and GSO entered into a guaranty (the Guaranty) in which Sapir personally and unconditionally guaranteed payment and performance of all of SDS’s obligations under the Loan Documents. In paragraphs 3 and 10 of the Guaranty, Sapir agreed to waive any defenses that he might have to an action against him under the Guaranty, except for the defense of actual timely performance of his obligations under the Guaranty. Sapir further agreed to waive any right to notice of default or demand for payment. "

"In opposition to the motion and in support of the cross motion, Sapir’s son, Alex Sapir (A. Sapir) submits an affidavit in which he explains that he is the president of the Sapir Organization and a member of The Sapir Group LLC (the Sapir Group), a privately held, New York-based real estate holding and development firm. Sapir is the chairman of the Sapir [*3]Organization. A. Sapir states that he ran the Sapir Group’s day-to-day negotiations of the loan transactions underlying this action.A. Sapir explains that, in 2005, the Sapir Group started to develop the Project. In connection therewith, the Sapir Group partnered with an entity controlled by S. Lawrence Davis and an entity controlled by the Sapir Group’s attorney in connection with the Project, Robert J. Ivanhoe (Ivanhoe) of the law firm Greenberg Traurig LLP. Ivanhoe formed Strategic William Street LLC, the entity through which he was a partner in the Project, with a 5% interest therein. A. Sapir states that Ivanhoe continued to represent SDS, including the Sapir Group (which holds a 90% interest in the Project) in the negotiation of the terms of the loan, including the Guaranty.

A. Sapir contends that GSO knew from the beginning that Ivanhoe was representing the Sapir Group in connection with the loan as well as Sapir in connection with the Guaranty. According to A. Sapir, GSO realized that Ivanhoe, as a partner in the Project, had a conflict of interest. A. Sapir explains that, in the stronger economic times of 2006, the parties predicted profits in the Project that would have netted Ivanhoe’s company $15 million, such that GSO knew that Ivanhoe had a strong incentive to complete the deal. According to A. Sapir, because of this knowledge, GSO presented the one-sided Guaranty to Ivanhoe, who then presented it to Sapir. A. Sapir asserts that GSO was aware that a disinterested lawyer without a conflict of interest would not advise Sapir to sign the Guaranty. In his affirmation, Sapir’s attorney, Stephen B. Meister, states that it is unheard of for investors such as GSO to earn such high rates of return when there is no risk involved because the returns are guaranteed by a net worth guarantor."

"GSO has established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because the undisputed facts establish GSO’s underlying loan to SDS, Sapir’s personal guaranty thereof and the failure to make payment in accordance with their terms. E.D.S. Sec. Sys. v Allyn, 262 AD2d 351, 351 (2d Dept 1999); see also Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v Mitchell, 63 AD3d 447, 448 (1st Dept 2009).

Sapir has not established the existence of any defense to GSO’s prima facie case, because the Guaranty contains a waiver-of-defenses provision. Such a provision in a guaranty is valid and enforceable, and bars, as a matter of law, any defenses a guarantor might otherwise assert in an action to recover under its guaranty. Citibank v Plapinger, 66 NY2d 90 (1985); Red Tulip LLC v Neiva, 44 AD3d 204, 209-10 (1st Dept 2007).

"I stated at oral argument, without opining on the merits, that Sapir may have a claim against Ivanhoe. GSO also notes in its papers that Sapir, if he can prove his claims, may seek to bring a separate damages action against Ivanhoe for alleged breach of fiduciary duty and/or legal malpractice, and against GSO for allegedly aiding and abetting Ivanhoe’s alleged breach. Any such possible claims, however, can not be asserted as defenses to an unconditional guarantee. "

Criminal defense legal malpractice cases are so rare that the 4th Department found but a single case to discuss in the decision in Dombrowski v Bulson  ;2010 NY Slip Op 09625 ; Decided on December 30, 2010 ;Appellate Division, Fourth Department .  Plaintiff was convicted, lost on appeal, argued ineffective assistance of counsel, lost, tried to take an appeal to the AD, lost, finally got to US District Court and gained habeas relief.  He was not retried, and the case was dismissed.
 Dombrowski discusses two aspects of damages in legal malpractice cases.  One is whether one might receive compensation for the incarceration and whether one may receive compensation for lost wages.  Plaintiff won on the first prong, which is the exception to the rule that one may not obtain non-pecuniary damages in legal malpractice.

"It is well settled that non pecuniary damages are not recoverable in a legal malpractice action involving the negligence of an attorney in a civil matter (see e.g. Wolkstein v Morgenstern, 275 AD2d 635, 637; Dirito v Stanley, 203 AD2d 903). Here, however, the issue before us is whether that rule should also apply to legal malpractice actions where the underlying matter is criminal rather than civil in nature. The only New York appellate court decision on point is that of the First Department in Wilson v City of New York (294 AD2d 290), which held that recovery of nonpecuniary damages is not permitted. In our view, the reasoning of the First Department in Wilson is not persuasive, and we therefore decline to follow the holding in Wilson.

"It is fundamental to our common-law system that one may seek redress for every substantial wrong. The best statement of the rule is that a wrong-doer is responsible for the natural and proximate consequences of his [or her] misconduct’ " (Battalla v State of New York, 10 NY2d 237, 240; see Derby v Prewitt, 12 NY2d 100, 105-106). Where emotional or other nonpecuniary loss is a direct result of a defendant’s breach of duty, a plaintiff may recover damages for such loss (see generally Martinez v Long Is. Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 70 NY2d 697, 699; Kennedy v McKesson Co., 58 NY2d 500, 504-506). The risk of imprisonment is a direct result of attorney malpractice in a criminal case and, indeed, it is the primary risk involved in most criminal cases. In our view, a cause of action for criminal legal malpractice is analogous to causes of action for false arrest and malicious prosecution, both of which allow recovery for the plaintiff’s loss of liberty resulting from the plaintiff’s wrongful incarceration (see Strader v Ashley, 61 AD3d 1244, lv dismissed 13 NY3d 756; Lynch v County of Nassau, 278 AD2d 205; see generally Britt v Legal Aid Socy., 95 NY2d 443, 448). We thus conclude that a plaintiff who establishes that he or she was wrongfully convicted due to the malpractice of his or her attorney in a criminal case may recover compensatory damages for the actual injury sustained, i.e., loss of liberty, and any consequent emotional injuries or other losses directly attributable to his or her imprisonment. "

In an otherwise garden or varietal attorney fee dispute with a legal malpractice defense, we ran across the "French Person" defense to attorney fees for the first time.  Justice Gische, in Singer v Adler ;2010 NY Slip Op 33439(U); December 13, 2010; Sup Ct, NY County gave it short shrift. 

"This action is based upon claims for legal services rendered by plaintiff, Stephen Sayre Singer, to defendant, Joel A. Adler. Adler brings a pre-answer motion to dismiss the verified complaint against him on the basis that it is barred by the statute of limitations and alternatively, he is a “French person” and a New York Court does not have personal jurisdiction over him, pursuant to Article 14 of the Civil Code of the Republic of France. Both parties are attorneys at law and each is self represented in this action."

"Defendant generally claims there is no personal jurisdiction over him because he  is a “French person.” Whether this argument pertains to long arm jurisdiction or service of process, it fails.
CPLR 5 302 provides that a court may assert jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the non-domiciliary “transacts any business within the state” and the cause of action arises out of that business. See CPLR 302 (a)(l). In order to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it is essential that the suit against the non-domiciliary have some “articulable nexus” to the business transacted. See McGowan v, Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 272 (1981). The basis of plaintiffs complaint, premised on plaintiffs performance of legal services for defendant, and the non-payment of legal fees, while defendant was domiciled in New York, amounts to “transaction of business within the state” and has an “articulable nexus” to the business transacted, specifically the provision of legal
services. Therefore, personal jurisdiction over defendant is proper. "