Gopstein v Bellinson Law, LLC 2023 NY Slip Op 33476(U) October 4, 2023
Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 159060/2022
Judge: Mary V. Rosado is an example of what courts fear in the legal malpractice field: metastasizing suits, each based upon the earlier suit. The rule of privity surely exists to stop the otherwise inevitable suit against your opponent’s attorney right after the end of the underlying case. Here, a personal injury case is followed by a permissible case against the attorneys who litigated it, and then a case against the new attorneys who came in to settle the legal malpractice case.

” To state a cause of action for legal malpractice, in addition to an attorney-client
relationship, the complaint must set forth “the negligence of the attorney; that the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss sustained; and actual damages” (Leder v Spiegel, 31 AD3d 266 [1st Dept 2006]). Further, the Appellate Division, First Department has held that “[a] claim for legal malpractice requires that a plaintiff allege facts that, if proven at trial, would demonstrate that the attorney ‘failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages”‘ (Kaplan v Conway & Conway, 173 AD3d 452 [1st Dept 2019] quoting Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438,442 [2017]). Further, in order to survive a motion to dismiss under CPLR 321 l(a)(7), “the complaint must show that but for counsel’s alleged malpractice, the plaintiff
would not have sustained some actual ascertainable damages” (Pellegrino v File, 291 AD2d 60 [1st Dept 2002]). “Conclusory damages … or injuries predicated on speculation cannot suffice” for a legal malpractice claim (Pellegrino at 64). “[A] failure to establish proximate cause required dismissal. .. regardless [ofJ whether negligence is established (Id. at 63).

Accordingly, in order to plead successfully a cause of action for legal malpractice, Plaintiff must plead, in non-conclusory fashion, that but for Defendants’ alleged negligence Plaintiff would have succeeded in the prosecution of both the Underlying Malpractice Action and the Underlying Personal Injury Action. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to do so. Without providing any basis whatsoever for the $160,000.00 claimed in damages on each of his causes of action, Plaintiff’s Complaint inartfully alleges, in conclusory fashion, that Defendants’ negligence and malpractice was the proximate cause of the damages sustained by Plaintiff (NYSCEF Doc. 2 at if40). Such conclusory damages predicated on speculation are insufficient to satisfy the pleading standard for a legal malpractice claim (Pellegrino at 64). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim is granted.”

It is unusual, and definitely an exception to the requirement of privity of contract between a client and the attorney in order to make a good legal malpractice claim, but such claims can be made in the absence of privity where fraud, collusion, malice or other special circumstances are alleged. Hager v Inner Circle Logistics, Inc.,
2023 NY Slip Op 33395(U), September 28, 2023, Supreme Court, Kings County
Docket Number: Index No. 525941/2022, Judge: Reginald A. Boddie gives the background.

” The initial complaint alleged six causes of action, breach of contract against ICL, money had and received against ICL, unjust enrichment against ICL, fraudulent inducement against ICL, permanent injunction against Riverside and declaratory judgment against all defendants. Plaintiff now seeks to amend the complaint to include a claim against Philips Nizer, a law firm involved in the transaction, and its attorneys Landis and Rosenberg. Plaintiff also sought to add additional claims against the SDC Defendants. However, subsequent to the filing of the motion, those claims were resolved and consequently withdrawn. Therefore, the court need only address the remaining relief sought, wherein plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to add malpractice and tort claims against Philips Nizer, Landis and Rosenberg and make additional edits.”

“Here, defendants argue, “a threshold inquiry in a legal malpractice claim is whether an
attorney-client relationship exists. An attorney may be liable for malpractice to a third party only if there is “near privity” with the third-party. Absent fraud, collusion, malicious acts, or other special circumstances, an attorney is not liable to third parties not in privity or near-privity for harm caused by professional negligence. As defendants aptly acknowledges, citing Gifford v Harley, 62 AD2d 5 [3d Dept 1978], an attorney may be held liable to third parties if he or she has been “guilty of fraud or collusion or of a malicious or tortious act.”

Plaintiff also agrees and argues, “[ w ]hile privity of contract is generally necessary to state a cause of action for attorney malpractice, liability is extended to third parties, not in privity, for harm caused by professional negligence in the presence of fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances,” citing Ginsburg Dev. Cos. v Carbone, 85 AD3d 1110, 1111 [2d Dept 2011]. Further, plaintiff asserts the subject firm and attorneys were aware of the terms of the money deposit and loan and intentionally evaded their obligations, causing plaintiff to suffer damages. Therefore, the court finds neither the malpractice nor prima facie tort claims palpably improper or devoid of merit at this juncture. Moreover, the additional edits in the proposed amended complaint do not appear to be improper. Accordingly, the motion is granted in its entirety.”

In Sage v Neil H. Greenberg & Assoc., P.C. 2023 NY Slip Op 04787 Decided on September 27, 2023 Appellate Division, Second Department there is not a lot of explanation, but the Judiciary Law 487 claim was dismissed for lack of sufficient allegations of deceit.

“Neil H. Greenberg and Associates, P.C., a law firm, and its managing attorney, Neil H. Greenberg, represented Jose Sanchez and Antonio Mejia Palacio in an action commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against, among others, Ethan Sage and Oceanside First Class Roofing, Inc., inter alia, to recover damages for unpaid overtime wages and for failure to provide wage statement notices as required by Labor Law § 195(3). In August 2018, the District Court dismissed the claims for unpaid overtime wages, but found in favor of Sanchez and Palacio on the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 195(3). Sanchez and Palacio were awarded statutory damages, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with the Labor Law § 195(3) claims.

In October 2020, Sage and Oceanside First Class Roofing, Inc., commenced this action to recover damages for malicious prosecution and violation of Judiciary Law § 487. The complaint alleged, among other things, that Greenberg and Neil H. Greenberg and Associates, P.C. (hereinafter together the defendants), prosecuted the federal action based on false testimony from Sanchez and Palacio. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. “

“The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487. Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487(1), an attorney who “[i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party” is liable to the injured party for treble damages (see Cordell Marble Falls, LLC v Kelly, 191 AD3d 760, 762). “A violation of Judiciary Law § 487 requires an intent to deceive” (Moormann v Perini & Hoerger, 65 AD3d 1106, 1108; see Cordell Marble Falls, LLC v Kelly, 191 AD3d at 762). “[T]o establish liability under section 487, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive him or her or the court” (Palmieri v Perry, Van Etten, Rozanski & Primavera, LLP, 200 AD3d 785, 787). “Allegations regarding an act of deceit or intent to deceive must be stated with particularity” (Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P.C., 164 AD3d 635, 637, affd 35 NY3d 173; see Palmieri v Perry, Van Etten, Rozanski & Primavera, LLP, 200 AD3d at 785). Here, the factual allegations in the complaint, even as amplified by the plaintiffs’ evidentiary submissions in opposition to the defendants’ motion, were insufficient to establish that the defendants acted with intent to deceive the plaintiffs or the court (see Cordell Marble Falls, LLC v Kelly, 191 AD3d at 762; Michalic v Klat, 128 AD2d 505, 506; Shaffer v Gilberg, 125 AD3d 632, 636).”

Jarmuth v Wagner 2023 NY Slip Op 04820 Decided on September 28, 2023 Appellate Division, First Department is the story of a co-op shareholder bringing what was in essence a derivative action against the co-op’s attorneys concerning co-op litigation. The shareholder did not succeed in pleading legal malpractice.

“To properly plead a cause of action for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must allege negligence on the part of the attorney, that the attorney’s conduct was the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff, and that plaintiff suffered actual and ascertainable damages (see RTW Retailwinds, Inc. v Colucci & Umans, 213 AD3d 509, 510 [1st Dept 2023]).

Here, the complaint’s allegations are too vague and lacking in specificity with respect to the purportedly negligent legal advice given to the co-op concerning the settlement of an underlying action and the status of its contractual right to recover legal fees incurred in that action to permit any assessment of whether the advice was incorrect, let alone negligent. This failure by plaintiff to adequately allege negligence on the part of defendant attorneys requires dismissal of this legal malpractice action (see Lloyd’s Syndicate 2987 v Furman Kornfeld & Brennan, LLP, 182 AD3d 487, 488 [1st Dept 2020]). In any event, plaintiff cannot point to settled law that refutes and renders negligent the alleged legal opinion in connection with this particular fee provision, which has facial ambiguities as to its scope and applicability.

Moreover, even if the advice and conduct detailed by plaintiff in her appellate brief had adequately been alleged and sufficient to satisfy the pleading element of attorney negligence, dismissal of the malpractice claim would still be required because plaintiff did not, and cannot, adequately plead that this advice and conduct was the proximate cause of damage suffered by the co-op. The complaint contains no nonconclusory allegations suggesting that the purported negligence by defendants was the “but for” cause of the co-op sustaining actual damages (see Drasche v Edelman & Edelman, 201 AD3d 434, 435 [1st Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 906 [2022]; Silverstein v Pillersdorf, 199 AD3d 539, 540 [1st Dept 2021]). Had the complaint included the allegations raised by plaintiff on appeal, they still would nothave pleaded proximate cause sufficient to support the legal malpractice claim (see e.g. Ozimek v DiJoseph, 204 AD3d 448 [1st Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 911 [2022]; Menkes v Solomon & Cramer LLP, 203 AD3d 514 [1st Dept 2022]).”

In an unique Judiciary Law 487 setting, Justice Billings has appointed a Referee to hear and determine Judiciary Law 487 claims in Papageorgiou v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. 2023 NY Slip Op 33217(U) September 15, 2023 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 115106/2004.

“To the extent the motion by Flomenhaft Law Firm, PLLC, requires an examination of a long account, the court refers the motion to a referee to hear and determine. C.P.L.R. § 4317(b). The referee will hear and determine the allocation of attorneys’
fees among the successive attorneys for Luis Casas and his appointed guardian in this action, based on any agreements between the attorneys and otherwise on a quantum meruit basis. N.Y. Jud. Law§ 475. · In particulal, the referee will enforce the
agreement between Michael Flomenhaft Esq. and Perecman Law Firm, P.L.L.C., that David Perecman Esq. would determine the fair and reasonable compensation to Flomenhaft for his work on this action when Perecman Law Firm represented plaintiff.

The allocation of attorneys’ fee& will consider whether any attorney delayed the act~on without accomplishing results and whether the any such attorney consequently is entitled to reduced or no fees. The referee will ·determine these issues and also
will hear and recommend to the court whether plaintiff and Flomenhaft Law Firm are entitled to sanctions. C.P.L.R. 5543 & 4317(-) 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 130-1.1 (c). Sanctions may be in the form of (1) interest on the settlement distributed to Luis Casas and on the attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded to Flomenhaft Law Firm, to compensate for
the delay in recovery, C.P.L.R. §§ 5001, 5004, or (2) a specified amount of additional fees incurred to combat another attorney’s delay. Both forms of relief are to be charged to the attorney who caused the delay.

Finally, the referee will hear and recommend whether the conduct of any attorney who delayed or obstructed resolution of this action was so egregious, so intentionally deceitful or protracted, as to violate New York Judiciary Law§ 487. C.P.L.R. 543_. While
the compensatory damages plaintiff and Flomenhaft Law Firm seek under Judiciary Law § 487 are the same as under 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 130-1.1, interest on the settlement amount and attorneys’ fees recovered or additional attorneys’· fees, liability under the
statute would trigger treble damages.”

Eshaghian v Dorsey & Whitney LLP 2023 NY Slip Op 33102(U) September 6, 2023
Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 154087/2020
Judge: Shlomo S. Hagler is the inverse of a common legal malpractice trope, siblings who act badly to each other for financial reasons which then devolves into legal malpractice claims over how the intra-sibling issues resolve. Here, the brothers worked well together for decades, only for it to unravel on the death of one of them.

“Plaintiff David and his brother Eshagh Eshaghian (Ike), now deceased, maintained a
decades long partnership relationship, engaging in the business of selling, buying, and
developing real property. The complaint alleges that ”the relationship was based upon love, family ties and mutual respect” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 [Complaint], , 14)

In 2001, Ike was diagnosed with cancer and began a regime of surgery, chemotherapy,
and radiation. At the time of the diagnosis, the brothers were in the midst of developing one of their buildings into a condominium (the York Avenue Project). They agreed to sell part of said project to a third party (the Buyer). David continued to work on the York Avenue Project, including negotiating with the Buyer, while undertaking significant responsibility for his brother’s care.

Early in 2003, at a family gathering in California, Ike proposed that David prepare an
agreement memorializing certain management and financial relationships in connection with the sale of the York A venue Project. David alleges that this was the first time in more than thirty years of working together that Ike wanted to memorialize an agreement in writing.”

“On May 5, 2003, Ike passed away, three weeks before the scheduled sale of the York
Avenue Project. Immediately after Ike’s death, the executors of his will, Mahrokh and Tanaz, changed the locks on the office which David and Ike had shared since 1980, and denied David access to his office. Mahrokh and Tanaz allegedly caused huge amounts of papers and documents which were in that common office to be shredded and discarded. They claimed that the Side Agreement was invalid and refused to comply with its terms. Since then, litigation has “rage[d]” in the Surrogate’s Court of Queens County regarding every aspect of the properties previously owned by David and Ike (Id., -,i 32). The original Side Agreement has never been found.”

“The first cause of action for legal malpractice is based on the trial. It alleges that
defendants failed to adequately research the law concerning the evidentiary issues pertinent to the proceeding, namely the Dead Man’s Statute and the best evidence rule, that defendants were unprepared for trial, and that they did not adequately explain to David the risks which the evidentiary rules posed to his chances of prevailing. David contends that defendants should have called a handwriting expert as a witness who could have testified that Ike’s signature on David’s photocopy was a copy of Ike’s real signature.

The trial transcript (NYSCEF Doc. No. 54) shows that counsel for Ike’s estate objected to
any question posed by Singer to David remotely touching on the Side Agreement or David’s business relations with Ike and that the Surrogate sustained each objection. The complaint alleges that other evidence could have been introduced that might have shown the validity of the Side Agreement.

The complaint alleges further that at the trial, Singer failed to call any disinterested
witnesses (witnesses whose testimony did not run afoul of the Dead Man’s Statute) to testify about the circumstances attendant upon the making of the Side Agreement, failed to properly examine David, the one witness called by his side, and failed to offer any documents into evidence. The complaint also alleges that defendant made no attempt to offer the Side Agreement into evidence, “even though that document was the very gravamen of the proceeding” (NYSCEF Doc. No. l [Complaint], ,i 102)”

“Accepting the complaint as true and according plaintiff the benefit of every possible
favorable inference, the subject complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice (see Endless Ocean, LLC v Twomey, Latham, Shea, Kelley, Dubin & Quartararo,l 13 AD3d 587, 589 [2d Dept 2014]). The complaint alleges that Singer and his firm breached their duty towards their client David by failing to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by attorneys, causing plaintiff to lose his case and/or to incur damages (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301-302 [2002]). The September 15, 2004 Letter
Singer submits a September 15, 2004 letter with an attached memorandum that he claims he wrote and sent to David (NYSCEF Doc. No. 26). The 23-page memorandum is a discussion of the law regarding David’s position that the Side Agreement is valid. The memorandum presents the obstacles presented by the Dead Man’s Statute and the best evidence rule, and the chances of overcoming those obstacles. The memorandum evaluates whether the copy of the Side Agreement will be admitted into evidence.
There is no evidence that David received such letter and memorandum. In his opposition affidavit, David states that he has no recollection of receiving it, and Singer’s claim that the letter was mailed does not give rise to the presumption of receipt, as he does not present evidence of defendant firm’s office practices pertinent to mailing (see Lindsay v Pasternack Tilker Ziegler Walsh Stanton & Romano LLP, 129 AD3d 790, 793 [2d Dept 2015]; Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein, LLP v Brophy, 19 AD3d 161, 162 [1 st Dept 2005]).

Even if the presumption of receipt were to be established, the letter and memorandum
would not show that the causes of action for legal malpractice should be dismissed. Singer contends that he adequately informed David of the evidentiary obstacles in his case. However, under CPLR § 3211 (a) (1) “dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations” (Amsterdam Hospitality Group, LLC v MarshallAlan Assoc., Inc., 120 AD3d 431, 433 [1 st Sept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). The letter does not conclusively establish a defense to this action. While the letter may show that plaintiff was put on notice of the difficulties of his case, plaintiff’s allegations regarding the trial, raise factual issues regarding defendants’ alleged failure to present a sufficient case at the subject trial. “At this pre-discovery stage of the present litigation, th[is] submissio[n] do[es] not meet the CPLR 3211 (a) (1) requirement of conclusively establishing [the] defense as a matter of law” (IMO Indus. v Anderson Kill & Glick, 267 AD2d 10, 11 [1 st
Dept 1999]).”

While proximate cause is always an element of torts, we believe that the additional element of “but for” causation is unique to legal malpractice claims.  “An attorney’s conduct or inaction is the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s damages if “but for” the attorney’s negligence “the plaintiff would have succeeded on the merits of the underlying action” (AmBase Corp. v Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428, 434, 866 NE2d 1033, 834 NYS2d 705 [2007]), or would not have sustained “actual and ascertainable” damages (Dombrowski, 19 NY3d at 350; Brooks v Lewin, 21 AD3d 731, 734, 800 NYS2d 695 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 713, 849 NE2d 972, 816 NYS2d 749 [2006]).

1934 Bedford, LLC v Gutman Weiss, P.C. 2023 NY Slip Op 04558 Decided on September 13, 2023 Appellate Division, Second Department illustrates how this can derail plaintiff’s case.

“Although leave to amend a pleading should be freely given in the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party (see id.), a motion for leave to amend should be denied where the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see Buccigrossi v Glatman, 214 AD3d 696; Silverman v Potruch & Daab, LLC, 142 AD3d 660, 661; Pedote v Kelly, 124 AD3d 855, 856; Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 229). “A determination whether to grant such leave is within the Supreme Court’s broad discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be lightly disturbed” (Gitlin v Chirinkin, 60 AD3d 901, 902; see U.S. Bank N.A. v Cuesta, 208 AD3d 821, 822; Johnson v Ortiz Transp., LLC, 205 AD3d 696, 697).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendment was palpably insufficient or patently without merit. The proposed amendment failed to sufficiently allege that “but for” the defendants’ alleged negligence, the plaintiffs “would not have incurred any damages” (Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442; see Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 26 NY3d 40, 49-50; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301-302).”

Genesis Merchant Partners, LP v Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC 2023 NY Slip Op 33130(U) September 6, 2023 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 653145/2014 Judge: Nancy M. Bannon illustrates the general rule against multiple motions for summary judgment, even after an appellate reversal.

“In this action to recover damages, inter alia, for legal malpractice, plaintiffs, two related venture capital firms, move pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment (1) on the issue of liability on so much of the first cause of action as alleges that defendants, plaintiffs’ former counsel, committed legal malpractice in failing to perfect security interests in certain life insurance policies that were pledged as collateral for a series of loans made by plaintiffs to nonparty Progressive Capital Solutions, LLC (“Progressive”); and (2) dismissing defendants’ counterclaims seeking unpaid legal fees upon theories of quantum meruit and account stated (MOT SEQ 016). Defendants oppose the motion. By order dated October 31, 2022, defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against defendant Kenneth M. Gammill, Jr. was granted (MOT SEQ 017), and the instant motion was deemed amended to remove defendant Kenneth M. Gammill, Jr. The motion as amended is denied as barred by the principle of law of the case and the prohibition against successive summary judgment motions.

This is plaintiffs’ second motion for summary judgment. On December 31, 2015, plaintiffs filed their first summary judgment motion seeking the same relief – a determination of defendants’ liability on the first cause of action for legal malpractice, and dismissal of defendants’ counterclaims – based on substantially the same arguments as their present motion that defendants committed legal malpractice which proximately caused plaintiffs’ damages. By an order dated February 27, 2017, this court granted plaintiffs’ prior motion, holding that defendants negligently discharged their duty to perfect plaintiffs’ security interests, and that defendants’ counterclaims were subject to dismissal because they sought payment for the very work that constituted the alleged malpractice.
Upon the defendants’ appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, by order dated
January 11, 2018, reversed, denied summary judgment to plaintiffs, and reinstated defendants’ counterclaims. Genesis Merchant Partners, L.P. v Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane, LLC, 157 AD3d 479 (1st Dept. 2018). The Court held that the parties’ competing affidavits, the Collateral Assignment of Contracts (one of the loan documents drafted by defendants), and emails between the parties raised triable issues of fact as to the scope of defendants’ representation of plaintiffs. Specifically, the Court found issues of fact as to whether defendants’ role was limited, at plaintiffs’ express instruction, to exclude a duty to perfect plaintiffs’ security interests in the subject insurance policies, and if so limited, whether defendants ensured that plaintiffs, their
clients, understood that defendants were not responsible for perfecting the subject security interests. The Court further noted that discovery was not completed at the time of the first motion, that defendants had outstanding discovery requests “relating to issues of proximate cause”, and that by granting summary judgment while discovery was ongoing, this court had “foreclos[ed defendants’] attempt to obtain material and necessary discovery to [their] defenses.” As to defendants’ counterclaims, the Court held that their dismissal was improper given the reversal and denial of summary judgment on the issue of liability for legal malpractice. “

“Even were the present motion not barred by the principle of law of the case, it is barred by the prohibition against successive summary judgment motions. It is well-settled that “[s]uccessive motions for summary judgment should not be entertained without a showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient justification.” Jones v 636 Holding Corp., 73 AD3d 409, 409 (1st Dept. 2010); see Landis v 383 Realty Corp., 175 AD3d 1207, 1207 (1st Dept. 2019). To justify a successive summary judgment motion, purportedly “new” evidence must have been “unavailable to [the movant] before the prior motion[.]” Lorne v 50 Madison Ave LLC, 198 AD3d 483, 483 (1st Dept. 2021); see Landis v 383 Realty Corp., supra; Maggio v 24 West 57 APF, LLC, 134 AD3d 621, 625-26 (1st Dept. 2015). An intervening appellate decision in the same case may also constitute “sufficient justification” for a successive summary judgment motion if the decision clarifies or changes the controlling law. See Amill v Lawrence Ruben Co., 117 AD3d 433, 433–34 (1st Dept. 2014). It has also been held that a court may entertain a successive summary judgment motion that is ‘“substantively valid”’ and ‘“will further the ends of
justice and eliminate an unnecessary burden on the resources of the courts.”’ Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., v Osias, 205 AD3d 979, 982 (2nd Dept. 2022), quoting Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Yogev, 194 AD3d 996, 997 (2nd Dept. 2021). That is, entertaining the motion would ‘“enhance[] judicial efficiency.”’ MTGLQ Investors, LP v Collado, 183 AD3d 414, 414 (1st Dept. 2020), quoting Landmark Capital Invs., Inc. v Li-Shan Wang, 94 AD3d 418, 419 (1st Dept. 2012). However, this is a “narrow exception to the successive summary judgment rule.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, v Osias, supra at 981 (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘“Successive motions for the same relief burden the courts and contribute to the delay and cost of litigation. A party seeking summary judgment should anticipate having to lay bare its proof and should not expect that it will readily be granted a second or third chance.”’ Id. at 982, quoting Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Elshiekh, 179 AD3d 1017, 1020 (2nd Dept. 2020).”